Valsin v. Noble Drilling

Full title: JOHN VALSIN v. NOBLE DRILLING (U.S.) INC., ET AL

Court: United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

Date published: Jan 30, 2008

CIVIL ACTION NO. 05-2748, SECTION "T" (1) (E.D. La. Jan. 30, 2008)

Opinion

CIVIL ACTION NO. 05-2748, SECTION "T" (1).

January 30, 2008

G. PORTEOUS JR., District Judge

Before this Court is a Motion to Supplement and Amend the Original Complaint Striking the Request for Jury (Doc. 86) filed by Plaintiff, John Valsin ("Valsin"), which came before the Court for hearing on January 30, 2008. Oral argument was waived by the parties and the matter was taken under submission on the briefs only. The Court, having considered the record, the evidence submitted, the law and applicable jurisprudence, is fully advised in the premises and ready to rule.

ORDER AND REASONS

I. BACKGROUND

On July 6, 2005, plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to the Jones Act and General Maritime Law. He requested a trial by jury and a requested that this matter be heard in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h). On October 12, 2005, defendant, Noble Drilling (U.S.) ("Noble") answered the Complaint and preliminary pretrial conference was held on December 1, 2005. Following the conference, Judge Beer issued an order stating that, "Amendments to pleadings, third party actions, cross-claims and counterclaims shall be filed no later than January 2, 2006." (Rec. Doc. 8.) A status conference was held on June 1, 2006. The order issued by the Judge following that conference stated, "Trial will commence on November 6, 2006 at 10:00 a.m. before the District Judge WITH a jury." The order further mandated, "Amendments will NOT be made in this case." (Rec. Doc. 18).

A second status conference was held on September 8, 2006 and a third conference was held on June 21, 2007. Following each of these conferences, the District Court issued orders mandating that the trial was to be held WITH a jury and amendments would not be made in this case.

On January 10, 2008, the parties met with this Court at a pretrial conference. The plaintiff's intent to file a supplemental and amending complaint to designate this as a claim in admiralty, which would be tried to a Judge pursuant to FRCP 9(h), thereby striking the jury demand, was discussed.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the deadlines to be set by the District Court in issuing its scheduling order. The Rule provides that a District Judge shall enter a scheduling order that limits the time to join other parties to amend pleadings. In the instant matter, the Court's scheduling order mandates that all amendments to pleadings shall be filed no later than January 2, 2006. The instant motion was filed by the plaintiff over two years past this Court's deadline. Plaintiff now seeks to amend his pleadings to strike the jury thirty days prior to trial.

Rule 16(b) governs amendment of pleadings after the scheduling order deadline has expired. Only upon the movant's demonstration of "good cause" to modify the scheduling order will Rule 15(b) apply to the district court's decision to grant or deny leave. S W Enters, LLC v. South Trust Bank of Ala., N.A., 315 F.3d 533, 536 (5^th Cir. 2003). In determining good cause, the court should consider four factors: (1) the explanation for the failure to timely move for leave to amend; (2) the importance of the amendment; (3) the potential prejudice in allowing the amendment; (4) the availability of a continuance to remedy such prejudice.Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. City of El Paso, 346 F.3d 541, 546 (5^th Cir. 2003), citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b).

Weighing the factors enumerated in S W Enterprises, plaintiff cannot establish the requisite "good cause" to modify the scheduling order and amend his complaint to strike the jury at this late hour. He has provided no explanation for his untimely motion nor has he explained the importance of his amendment.

In Rachal v. Ingram Corp., 795 F.2d 1210 (5^th Cir. 1986), the plaintiff, a Jones Act seaman, filed suit and initially prayed for a trial by jury. He later moved to strike his jury demand, over the objection of the defendant, by designating his case 9(h). The Fifth Circuit upheld the decision of the district court to allow the amendment of a Jones Act case originally designated as a jury trial to be designated under FRCP 9(h). The Court based its decision on the fact that at the time of plaintiff's motion, defendant had no constitutional right to a jury trial. The district could held trial three months after it struck the jury demand and six months after it granted leave to proceed in admiralty.

However, the Fifth Circuit stated:

We hasten to add, however, that we can imagine circumstances in which the district court would not be abusing its discretion under Rule 15 if it refused to allow an amendment electing admiralty For instance, the plaintiff may not be permitted to "ambush" the defendant by amending shortly before trial.

Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1217 (emphasis added).

Noble objects to plaintiff's attempt to designate his case in admiralty thirty days prior to trial. Noble argues, and this Court agrees, that allowing plaintiff to amend its complaint two years after the deadline imposed by the Court's scheduling order, and thirty days prior to trial, would lead to the type of situation the U.S. Fifth Circuit warned against in Rachal.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion, be and the same is hereby DENIED.