Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC348387, Gregory W. Alarcon, Judge.
Rodolfo Lewels for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Citron & Citron, Thomas H. Citron and Katherine A. Tatikian for Defendants and Respondents.
ALDRICH, J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellants Juan Valle and Rosa Martinez were behind on their mortgage payments and lost their mobilehome to foreclosure. They blame the foreclosure on the mobilehome park where they leased a space. They were also behind on the rent payments, and their landlord Cherryfield Village mobilehome park served the tenants and the lender with a three-day notice for nonpayment of rent pursuant to Civil Code section 798.56, subdivision (e)(1) of the Mobile Home Residency Law (MRL). The three-day notice overstated the amount of delinquent rent based upon the park’s mistake in applying the rent Valle paid to another space he leased in the same park. Cherryfield did not evict the tenants, but the lender took action to protect its legal rights.
Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references are to the Civil Code.
Appellants sued Cherryfield Village, LLC, and the park owners Bart Thomsen and Thomsen Properties (Cherryfield) for MRL violations and for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment and constructive eviction. Based upon the terms of the lease agreement, a referee decided the case. Following a trial, the referee filed a written statement of decision, concluding that Cherryfield’s misallocation of the rent and communications with the lender did not violate the law and was not willful for purposes of assessing statutory penalties.
Valle and Martinez appeal, claiming the referee committed legal errors by misinterpreting the penalty provision of the MRL, and ignoring judicial admissions to reach the conclusion that Cherryfield did not engage in willful conduct. Appellants also attack the referee’s decision, which they argue is not supported by substantial evidence. We find no errors and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Following the usual rules on appeal after a trial on the merits, we construe the facts, including all conflicting facts, in the light most favorable to the verdict. (Monroy v. City of Los Angeles (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 248, 252, fn. 1.)
Valle and Martinez purchased a mobilehome secured by a mortgage held by 21st Mortgage, Corp. (lender). In December 1998, Valle and Martinez entered into a lease agreement with Cherryfield for space 1411. Six months later, Valle and his wife purchased a mobilehome located in the same park and leased space 1616.
On July 5, 2005, Valle submitted a personal check to Cherryfield in the amount of $551.21 for rent. The personal check listed Valle’s address as space 1616, but the handwritten notation in the memo section indicated “Unit # 1411.” The rent for space 1411 was past due, and $551.21 did not cover the overdue rent. As of July 5, 2005, the rent for space 1616 was $662.46, and Cherryfield applied Valle’s check to space 1616. The July statement that Cherryfield sent to Valle at space 1616 stated his July 5, 2005 rent check had been credited to space 1616.
In July 2005, Valle and Martinez were in the process of selling the mobilehome occupying space 1411, and they thought they had a buyer. Cherryfield approved the buyer. As a condition of completing the sale, Martinez vacated the mobilehome on August 10, 2005. Martinez told the real estate agent they were behind on the mortgage and rent payments, but the agent told her that she did not need to make any further payments because any past due payments would be paid out of the sale. The sale fell through, but their agent found another buyer who signed a purchase agreement on August 19, 2005. Cherryfield approved the second buyer. Escrow opened immediately and would have closed on September 17, 2005. The agents did not notify the lender or secure an agreement regarding the delinquent mortgage. Valle and Martinez did not make any mortgage payments from July 19, 2005 (bringing the loan current through June 2005) until September 19, 2005.
On August 18, 2005, Cherryfield served the “three day notice to pay rent or quit” for space 1411, which included past due rent for June, July, and August, and thus did not reflect the July 5, 2005 payment. The notice was served on space 1411 and on the lender. Five days later, when the management office was closed, Martinez deposited a money order in the amount of $500 for rent on space 1411. The rent was returned because it did not cover the overdue amount and was untimely. Cherryfield did not evict the tenants or interfere with their tenancy.
From July 19, through August 23, 2005, the lender unsuccessfully attempted to contact Valle and Martinez. The lender contacted Cherryfield on August 23, 2005, and Cherryfield management told the lender the mobilehome in space 1411 appeared to be vacant, the space rent was three months in arrears, and the park had issued a three-day notice. The next day, the lender posted a “Notice of Abandonment” on the mobilehome.
On August 29, 2005, the lender again contacted Cherryfield. Cherryfield advised the lender the mobilehome was vacant, and it was “unsure” on the amount of overdue rent. A subsequent inspection confirmed the mobilehome was abandoned and there were “no signs on the property indicating the mobilehome was for sale.”
On September 13, 2005, when the time expired to respond to the notice of abandonment, the lender authorized repairs on the mobilehome in order to resell it at the highest possible value. Four days later, Valle and Martinez paid the overdue mortgage payments.
On September 29, 2005, the lender sent a conditional lien release to the escrow company that had opened the escrow for the mobilehome sale to the second buyer. The following day, the lender revoked the conditional lien release because it did not include payment for the modifications and improvements. The lender instructed the escrow company not to close escrow until Valle and Martinez paid the repair costs. On October 15, 2005, Valle canceled the escrow.
After negotiations failed between the lender and Valle and Martinez to repay the repair costs, the lender issued a notice of default. Thereafter, the lender repossessed the mobilehome.
B. Procedural Background
1. The Operative Complaint
The complaint is based upon Cherryfield’s allegedly wrongful conduct in misapplying the July 5, 2005 rent to space 1616, issuing the defective three-day notice (because it included July as a delinquent month), failing to serve the three-day notice on space 1616, and communicating to the lender that the mobilehome appeared to be abandoned. The first amended complaint alleged a cause of action against Cherryfield Village, LLC seeking damages and punitive damages for serving a defective three-day notice under the MRL, and engaging in willful conduct for purposes of imposing statutory penalties.
Valle and Martinez filed a third amended complaint, which is the operative complaint, additionally naming the individual defendants. The third amended complaint (complaint) alleges two causes of action against Cherryfield for (1) violations of sections 798.55, subdivision (b)(1), and 798.56, subdivision (e)(1) of the MRL in connection with the three-day notice; and (2) wrongful eviction and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment (§ 1927). In addition to damages, the complaint sought statutory penalties pursuant to section 798.86 for a willful violation of the MRL.
2. The Verified Answer
Cherryfield Village, LLC filed a verified answer to the first amended complaint and acknowledged that it had misallocated the rent. The answer states: “a rental payment in the amount of $551.21 was received by Plaintiff, Juan Valle, but with ratification and agreement of the Plaintiffs, as reflected by issuance of subsequent monthly statements, without objection of any kind, said monies were applied to other defaults for the second of two mobilehome spaces rented by Plaintiff, Juan Valle, from the Defendant, and that additionally and alternately, Plaintiffs had no power or right to require application of a partial, nonconforming payment to any particular default amid multiple defaults and accounts then delinquent, when by subsequent ratification, Plaintiffs agree and acquiesce in the application of the payments that were made.”
Cherryfield Village, LLC also acknowledged that it rejected the $500 rental payment, but did so because it was untimely and a partial payment of the overdue rent.
3. The Admissions
Prior to trial, the parties engaged in discovery. In response to requests for admissions, Cherryfield made several admissions concerning the July 5, 2005 rent payment that had been misapplied, and the $500 rent payment that had been rejected. Appellants rely on the following admissions:
Request for Admission 10: “Plaintiffs did not authorize [you] to apply check #1031 dated July 5, 2005 to the rent due for [space] 1616.” Response: “Deny. Plaintiffs accepted payment by never objecting to the bill for either of the spaces at the times in question. Plaintiffs never sought to pay the amount for 1616 as if the payment had not been credited; they accepted the credit and paid accordingly thereafter. Plaintiffs accepted the application of the payments.”
Request for Admission 11: “Plaintiff, Rosa Martinez, was not legally obligated by the terms of any lease agreement between [you] and herself to pay space rent or cure defaults for [space] 1616.” After imposing objections, Cherryfield responded: “deny for lack of information and belief. Family members were actually occupying space 1616 as well....”
Request for Admission 13: “The [3 day notice] served on [space] 1411 did not accurately state the amount of the past due rent.” Response: “Deny. With application of rent to the space actually occupied at the time to forestall a demand notice on the space occupied by the plaintiffs’ family, the amount was proper and as accepted by the Plaintiffs....”
Request for Admission 15: “On August 23, 2005, a rent payment for [space] 1411 in the form of a money order in the amount of $500 was left in the drop box of the office of Cherryfield Village Mobilehome Park.” Response: “Admit.” These admissions and responses were presented at trial.
4. The Trial Before The Reference
Based upon the terms in the lease agreement, the trial court granted the motion for an appointment of a general reference pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 638. The referee’s statement of decision is based upon oral and documentary evidence presented at trial.
The referee concluded Cherryfield acted in good faith and within its legal rights in notifying the lender of the rent arrearages and vacancy of space 1411. The referee found the misapplication of the July 5, 2005 rent was a “clerical mistake and not intentional.” In a footnote, the decision states: “While Plaintiffs’ note Cherryfield stated in its verified answer that the rent was intentionally misapplied, the Referee credits Ms. Morris’ testimony at trial that it was an error.” Further, while the amount was misstated, the referee concluded the three-day notice accurately stated rent was overdue, and the law required that Cherryfield serve the lender with the three-day notice.
The referee also concluded Cherryfield acted in good faith in its dealings and communications with the lender. Cherryfield was not aware that Martinez had vacated the mobilehome because of a pending escrow.
The referee addressed each purported violation of the MRL, finding the evidence did not establish a violation of the law.
Valle and Martinez raised numerous objections to the statement of decision after it had been filed with the court. Although Cherryfield questioned whether the objections were properly raised before the trial court under Code of Civil Procedure section 644, subdivision (a), the trial court overruled the objections and denied the motion to set aside the decision. The trial court granted Cherryfield’s motion to enter judgment in its favor on the general referee’s statement of decision. The judgment also states Cherryfield is entitled to costs pursuant to statute. Judgment was entered on June 30, 2009, and Valle and Martinez timely appealed.
A referee’s statement of decision made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 638 may be “excepted to and reviewed in like manner as if made by the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 645; SFPP v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 452, 463.) Cherryfield argued that immediate entry of judgment was required once the statement of decision is filed, and the right to object is limited to a motion for new trial, motion to vacate, or appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 644, subd. (a); SFPP v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co., supra, at pp. 462-466.)
5. Attorneys’ Fees Awarded To Cherryfield
While the appeal was pending, the trial court heard Cherryfield’s motion for attorneys’ fees under the prevailing party fee provision in the MRL. The trial court granted the motion. Cherryfield moved the trial court for an order fixing the amount of a bond or undertaking to stay enforcement of the attorneys’ fees award pending appeal. The trial court granted the motion.
Section 798.85 states: “In any action arising out of the provisions of this chapter the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. A party shall be deemed a prevailing party for the purposes of this section if the judgment is rendered in his or her favor or where the litigation is dismissed in his or her favor prior to or during the trial, unless the parties otherwise agree in the settlement or compromise.” (§ 798.85.)
DISCUSSION
We must determine whether the referee committed reversible legal error by weighing what appellants characterize as binding admissions against oral testimony to conclude Cherryfield did not willfully violate the MRL. We find no legal error, and further conclude the referee’s decision that Cherryfield did not violate the MRL is supported by substantial evidence.
Before we address the merits of this appeal, we summarily resolve a jurisdictional issue, that is, the right to appeal. In the case of a consensual general reference pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 638, the decision of the referee stands as the decision of the court, and judgment is entered thereon in the same manner as if the action had been tried to the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 644, subd. (a).) After judgment is entered, a referee’s decision may be challenged by appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1).) We read the lease agreement as agreeing to resolve any dispute before a neutral referee and “giving up all rights you have to have the disputes litigated in a court or by a jury trial.” This is not a clear and express waiver of the right to appeal. (See Guseinov v. Burns (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 944, 952.)
1. Standard Of Review
Appellants ask that we independently review the record, and Cherryfield counters that our review begins and ends if substantial evidence supports the judgment. Both sides are correct. We independently review the legal issues presented in this appeal, including: (1) the interpretation of “willful” under the MRL; and (2) the binding effect of admissions on the referee’s determination that Cherryfield’s conduct was not willful. (In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145, 159; Patarak v. Williams (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 826, 829; Valerio v. Andrew Youngquist Construction (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1271.) We apply the substantial evidence standard to the referee’s findings of fact. (SFPP v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 462.) Since appellants did not present a reporter’s transcript of the proceedings, if no error is apparent on the face of the existing appellate record, the judgment must be conclusively presumed correct as to all evidentiary matters. (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992.)
2. The Referee Did Not Misinterpret The Penalty Provision Of The MRL Or Err By Failing To Give Conclusive Effect To Cherryfield’s Admissions
Appellants contend the referee legally erred by concluding the misallocation of the July 5, 2005 rent check was not willful conduct because that “fact” had been conclusively established by Cherryfield’s admissions. We disagree and find no legal error.
The MRL regulates relations between the owners and the residents of mobilehome parks. (See generally Cacho v. Boudreau (2007) 40 Cal.4th 341, 345.) We are initially concerned with the penalty provision in the MRL which states: “If a homeowner or former homeowner of a park is the prevailing party in a civil action, including a small claims court action, against the management to enforce his or her rights under this chapter, the homeowner, in addition to damages afforded by law, may, in the discretion of the court, be awarded an amount not to exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000) for each willful violation of this chapter by the management.” (§ 798.86, subd. (a).)
“Willful” as used in the penalty provision of section 798.86, subdivision (a), has been interpreted in Patarak v. Williams, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th 826, to mean “intentional conduct undertaken with knowledge or consciousness of its probable results. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 829; see also De Anza Santa Cruz Mobile Estates Homeowners Assn. v. De Anza Santa Cruz Mobile Estates (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 890, 910-911 [adopting deliberate and intentional conduct standard].) Additionally, the Patarak court agreed with the use of a criminal law pattern jury instruction to convey the meaning of willfulness as not requiring “ ‘any intent to violate the law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage.’ ” (Patarak v. Williams, supra, at p. 830.) Willful conduct is not negligent or accidental conduct. (Id. at p. 829.)
We agree with the analyses of the term “willful” as involving an intentional or deliberate act with knowledge or consciousness of its probable result. The referee’s statement of decision reflects a proper understanding of “willful” as that term is used in the MRL. The referee noted the misallocation of the July 5, 2005 rent, was a “clerical mistake, ” Cherryfield acted in “good faith, ” and its accounting error on the three-day notice was unrelated to appellants’ delinquent loan payments that ultimately led to foreclosure. Thus, while the referee may not have used the same words as the Patarak court, the decision reflects the same understanding that willful conduct must be a deliberate act with knowledge of its probable result. We cannot stretch the meaning of willful as used in the MRL to include intentional acts with unforeseeable consequences, as appellants urge. While it is foreseeable that an intentional and deliberately defective three-day notice might result in an unlawful termination of the tenancy, it is not foreseeable that the same conduct would lead to a loan foreclosure. The lender’s rights under the mortgage are too attenuated to the defective three-day notice.
To dispute the referee’s determination that the misallocation of rent was not willful for purposes of assessing statutory penalties, appellants contend the referee committed legal error by not accepting Cherryfield’s admissions as established facts. Appellants have cited the previously quoted admissions that appear in the verified answer and Cherryfield’s responses to request for admissions. (See p. 6, ante.) The referee did not disregard these admissions.
In its verified answer, Cherryfield Village, LLC admitted it credited the July 5, 2005 rent to space 1616 instead of space 1411. The admission of fact in a pleading is a judicial admission. (Valerio v. Andrew Youngquist Construction, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1271.) Citing Witkin, the Valerio court stated the effect of a judicial admission is “ ‘a waiver of proof of a fact by conceding its truth, and it has the effect of removing the matter from the issues.’ ” (Ibid.) Since an admission in the pleading forbids the consideration of contrary evidence, a finding contrary to the judicial admission is error. (Ibid.) Thus, as to the verified answer, an admitted fact is that Valle’s rent payment was applied to space 1616, the other space he leased at the park. The answer also admits why it was misapplied: (1) Valle leased space 1616 and previously lived there, and (2) the July 5, 2005 rent did not cure the default for space 1411. Rather than conclusively establishing willful conduct, as defined in the MRL, this admission establishes a mistaken belief that the rent was intended for space 1616. Given this admission of a mistake, the referee did not err in considering additional oral testimony that the misallocation was an honest mistake. We read the referee’s reference to Cherryfield’s intentional conduct in the statement of decision as characterizing appellants’ position, not that Cherryfield admitted to intentional and deliberate conduct.
The referee also did not erroneously ignore Cherryfield’s admissions made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.010. “Any matter admitted in response to a request for admission is conclusively established against the party making the admission... unless the court has permitted withdrawal or amendment of that admission....” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.410, subd. (a); Monroy v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at pp. 259-260.) While a trial court has discretion to consider parol evidence to explain an ambiguous admission, if the response to a request for admission is unambiguous, the matter is conclusively established. (Id. at p. 260.)
Cherryfield’s responses to requests for admission do not admit conduct to deliberately misallocate the rent with the intent to prompt the lender to initiate foreclosure proceedings. Foreclosure occurred long after the three-day notice had any legal effect. Indeed, several of the admissions appellants’ rely on are denials, which are not conclusively binding, and do not admit conduct to establish a willful MRL violation for purposes of the penalty provision.
Cherryfield admitted it did not accept the $500 late rent payment for space 1616, which was accepted as true. That admission does not conclusively establish willful conduct. The admission did not address why the rent was rejected. The referee could properly consider additional admissions on that subject, including other admissions that the rent was rejected because it was insufficient and untimely.
In their reply brief, appellants represent that they “objected” to the referee’s consideration of this evidence. Appellants raised these objections before the trial court after the referee rendered the decision, not during trial.
Appellants rely on cases demonstrating the application of the legal principle of conclusive admissions, which all address evidence that contradicted an admission, something appellants have failed to show here. In Valerio v. Andrew Youngquist Construction, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at page 1271, for example, the trial court erred in finding no written contract because it ignored the express admission that the contract existed in Valerio’s answer to the cross-complaint. In St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, the trial court correctly concluded the parties to a lease containing an indemnity agreement could not dispute the terms of the agreement for purposes of summary judgment because the party seeking to dispute the existence of the indemnity agreement had quoted it in its entirety to support its cross-complaint. (Id. at p. 1248.) In Monroy v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at page 261, the trial court erred in giving an instruction that had the effect of permitting the officer to contradict an earlier admission.
Here, there is no contradiction between the admissions and the trial testimony cited in the statement of decision and relied on by the referee. The admissions that the July 5, 2005 rent was credited to space 1616 and not 1411, and the late rent payment for space 1411 was rejected were both accepted by the referee as established facts. We find no legal error.
3. Cherryfield Did Not Violate The MRL
Stemming from the misallocation of rent, the purportedly defective three-day notice, and communications with the lender, appellants contend Cherryfield committed numerous MRL violations, and the referee’s statement of decision is not supported by substantial evidence. We review the referee’s statement of decision in the same manner as if the superior court had rendered the decision. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 638, subd. (a); 644, subd. (a); SFPP v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 462.) As previously stated, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor. (Ibid.)
The substantial evidence standard applies to both express and implied findings. (SFPP v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 462.) Appellants contend we should not invoke the doctrine of implied findings to support the referee’s decision because they filed numerous objections to the decision which brought the deficiencies in the statement to the attention of the trial court. We do not invoke the implied findings doctrine to resolve this appeal.
Since no reporter’s transcript has been provided, unless an error is apparent on the face of the existing appellate record, the judgment must be conclusively presumed correct as to all evidentiary matters. (Estate of Fain, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 987.) The effect of this rule is that an appellant who attacks a judgment but supplies no reporter’s transcript will be precluded from raising an argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence. (Ibid.) We reject appellants’ contention that this presumption is overcome because the referee did not weigh the evidence. (See Kemp Bros. Construction, Inc. v. Titan Electric Corp. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1477.) The statement of decision explicitly states the referee’s factfinding process.
The first paragraph in the “fact” section of the statement of decision states: “The following is a statement of those facts found by the Referee to be true and necessary to the Decision. To the extent that this recitation differs from any party’s position, that is the result of determinations as to credibility and relevance, burden of proof considerations, and the weighing of the evidence, both oral and written.”
Appellants sought damages arising from the violation of two provisions in the MRL addressing the manner of terminating a tenancy and permissible reasons for termination. Section 798.55, subdivision (b)(1) states mobilehome park management may not terminate or refuse to renew a tenancy, except for the reasons specified in the MRL and upon written notice to the homeowner in the manner prescribed in Code of Civil Procedure section 1162, which describes three types of effective service. Section 798.56 describes the possible reasons for termination, including nonpayment of rent. (§ 798.56, subd. (e)(1).) Appellants also sought damages for wrongful eviction and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. Substantial evidence supports the referee’s conclusion that in foreclosing on the mobilehome, the lender relied on appellants’ failure to make mortgage payments, not on Cherryfield’s three-day notice, which had no legal effect by the time the lender foreclosed.
Section 798.55, subdivision (b)(1) states in pertinent part: “The management may not terminate or refuse to renew a tenancy, except for a reason specified in this article and upon the giving of written notice to the homeowner, in the manner prescribed by Section 1162 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to sell or remove, at the homeowner’s election, the mobilehome from the park within a period of not less than 60 days, which period shall be specified in the notice. A copy of this notice shall be sent to the legal owner, as defined in Section 18005.8 of the Health and Safety Code, and the registered owner of the mobilehome, if other than the homeowner, by United States mail within 10 days after notice to the homeowner. The copy may be sent by regular mail or by certified or registered mail with return receipt requested, at the option of management.”
Code of Civil Procedure section 1162 states: “The notices required by Sections 1161 and 1161a may be served, either: [¶] 1. By delivering a copy to the tenant personally; or, [¶] 2. If he or she is absent from his or her place of residence, and from his or her usual place of business, by leaving a copy with some person of suitable age and discretion at either place, and sending a copy through the mail addressed to the tenant at his or her place of residence; or, [¶] 3. If such place of residence and business can not be ascertained, or a person of suitable age or discretion there can not be found, then by affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the property, and also delivering a copy to a person there residing, if such person can be found; and also sending a copy through the mail addressed to the tenant at the place where the property is situated. Service upon a subtenant may be made in the same manner.”
Section 798.56 states in pertinent part: “A tenancy shall be terminated by the management only for one or more of the following reasons: [¶]... [¶] (e)(1) Nonpayment of rent, utility charges, or reasonable incidental service charges; provided that the amount due has been unpaid for a period of at least five days from its due date, and provided that the homeowner shall be given a three-day written notice subsequent to that five-day period to pay the amount due or to vacate the tenancy.... The three-day written notice shall be given to the homeowner in the manner prescribed by Section 1162 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A copy of this notice shall be sent to the persons or entities specified in subdivision (b) of Section 798.55 within 10 days after notice is delivered to the homeowner....”
Section 1927 states: “An agreement to let upon hire binds the letter to secure to the hirer the quiet possession of the thing hired during the term of the hiring, against all persons lawfully claiming the same.”
The statement of decision lists 12 alleged MRL violations, none of which resulted in termination of the tenancy. This conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.
a. Defective Three-Day Notice
Four of the alleged MRL violations are based upon the overstated delinquent rent in the three-day notice, and two of the alleged violations refer to communications with the lender regarding the delinquent rent. The failure to credit the July 5, 2005 rent to space 1411 was a mistake, but the three-day notice accurately reflected overdue rent for space 1411. Likewise, the communications with the lender in which a representative from Cherryfield overstated the delinquent rent was “unintentional and inadvertent.” This evidence (referenced in the statement of decision) supports the conclusion Cherryfield’s conduct did not violate the MRL.
b. Defective Service And Service On Lender
Four of the alleged MRL violations are based upon service of the three-day notice that did not comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 1162. The notice was posted on space 1411 (which was vacant), but not served on space 1616 where Valle previously lived. From June 2005 forward, neither Valle nor his wife actually lived in the mobilehome occupying space 1616. Valle did not provide Cherryfield with a forwarding address. But Cherryfield credited the July 5, 2005 rent to space 1616 and sent statements to that address. The evidence supports the referee’s conclusion Cherryfield should have served space 1616, but since Cherryfield did not terminate the tenancy, it did not violate the MRL.
Appellants also contend the three-day notice served on the lender was defective because it did not accurately state the overdue rent. Cherryfield complied with the law and while the amount was misstated, it accurately reflected overdue rent. We find both of these conclusions supported by substantial evidence.
c. Rejection Of The Untimely $500 Rent Payment
Two of the alleged MRL violations are based upon the rejection of the $500 rent payment for space 1411. Cherryfield had a policy of rejecting space rent payments after a lender initiates foreclosure proceedings. The lender had begun the process to repossess the mobilehome on the same day Martinez made the rent payment. Cherryfield also did not accept the rent because it was untimely and did not cover the entire overdue amount. Although appellants present contrary dates to attack this testimony but we cannot say on this record that the referee’s conclusion lacks evidentiary support.
d. Denial of Tenancy Rights
Appellants contend they were denied tenancy rights for 203 days in violation of the MRL. There is no evidence in the record that either Valle or Martinez attempted to move back into the mobilehome and were prevented from doing so.
e. Communications With Lender And Conduct During Foreclosure
The remaining MRL violations involve Cherryfield’s communications with the lender and Cherryfield’s conduct after the lender initiated foreclosure proceedings. Although Cherryfield approved both mobilehome buyers, it had not been advised that Martinez moved out because of the pending sale, and Cherryfield was not aware that an escrow had been opened. The lender also was not advised that an escrow had been opened and was unable to contact Valle regarding the overdue loan payments.
Appellants contend that had Cherryfield truthfully communicated to the lender that an escrow was pending, the lender would have served a default notice instead of a notice of abandonment, and the lender would not have incurred costs to repair the mobilehome. Appellants’ argument asks that we reweigh the evidence to conclude Cherryfield knew about the escrow, which we cannot do. There is substantial evidence in the record to support the referee’s conclusion.
As for Cherryfield’s conduct that occurred after the lender initiated foreclosure proceedings, including the failure to turn over Valle’s mail and failure to honor a power of attorney, this conduct was unrelated to the termination of tenancy (which did not occur) or any MRL violation.
The referee’s findings are supported by substantial evidence set forth and cited in the statement of decision. Thus, we cannot credit appellants’ attack on these factual findings. We must and do find that the statement of decision was supported by the evidence. The statement fully supports the judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Cherryfield is entitled to recover costs on appeal.
We concur: KLEIN, P. J., CROSKEY, J.