Summary
finding employer's termination of employee pursuant to a reduction in force to alleviate financial constraints constituted a non-discriminatory basis for plaintiff's termination
Summary of this case from O'Donnell v. Pinnacle Corporation Town Country HomesOpinion
No. 01 C 557
December 24, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. Background
This dispute arises out of the elimination of the Public Relations position in Defendant Proviso Township ("Township") held by Plaintiff Tina Valentino. In her Complaint, Valentino claims that the Township, Robert Grace, Jeffrey Alien, Arnie Bryant, Marianne Laski, and Donald Sloan ("Individual Defendants") discharged her in retaliation for an earlier filed sexual harassment complaint. The Township and the Individual Defendants claim that Valentino was discharged because of the Township's financial distress. As evidence of this distress, the Township and the Individual Defendants state that the Township took out approximately $400,000 in short term loans and discharged six other employees. Four of the six employees discharged were involved in the Handy Man and Handy Helper programs, one was a social worker, and the other was a part-time secretary.
Valentine alleges that the Township and Individual Defendants' actions and the existing financial condition of the Township were inconsistent with the existence of financial distress. For example, Valentino claims that the Township decreased its overall expenses in 2000 by only $18,910 (a change of-.6%), had significant cash reserves at the end of each year between 1997-2001, and made significant cash transfers to the Mental Health Commission.
The Township and the Individual Defendants now move, separately and together, for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986). In determining whether any genuine issue of material fact exists, I must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable and justifiable inferences in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A genuine issue of fact exists only when, based on the record as a whole, a reasonable jury could find for the non-movant. Pipitone v. United States, 180 F.3d 859, 861 (7th Cir. 1999). Motions for summary judgment in employment discrimination cases should be approached with added rigor because credibility and intent are often central issues. Collier v. Budd Co., 66 F.3d 886, 892 (7th Cir. 1995).
II. The Township's Motion for Summary Judgment
The Individual Defendants join in this motion.
Under Title VII, the plaintiffs may demonstrate retaliation through the direct or indirect method of proof. Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Util. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2002). According to the direct method, direct or circumstantial evidence may be presented to show that the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity, and as a result, suffered an adverse employment action. Id.; Rogers v. City of Chicago, 320 F.3d 748, 753-754 (7th Cir. 2003). Direct evidence "requires an admission by the decisionmaker that his actions were based upon the prohibited animus." Rogers at 753. Circumstantial evidence must be the kind of evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker. Id. The Township argues, and Valentino does not dispute, that she has failed to present evidence either direct or circumstantial that would satisfy the requirements of the direct method.
Valentino's arguments appear to rest, instead, on the second method for proving retaliation. Under the indirect method, the plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant then has the burden of establishing a non-discriminatory basis for the termination. If the defendant does so, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff is able to show that the proffered reason is a pretext. Stone at 644; Texas Dep't Of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)
A. Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Retaliation
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show that she (1) engaged in a statutorily protected activity, (2) performed her job according to her employer's expectations, (3) suffered a materially adverse employment action, and (4) was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who did not engage in a protected activity. Stone at 644. The first three prongs of this test are easily satisfied here; Valentino filed a Title VII suit for sexual harassment, did not receive any negative evaluations of her work, and was discharged by the Township.
Because Valentine's position with the Township was unique, the fourth prong presents a much greater challenge. The Township claims that six other comparable employees were similarly discharged. Four of those employees were involved in the Handy Man and Handy Helper Program, one was a social worker, and one was a part-time secretary. By contrast, Valentino was a part-time manager in charge of Public Relations. Since these other employees worked in different departments and had vastly different responsibilities, they cannot be considered as similarly situated. Valentino argues that because there exists no other similarly situated employees to whom she may be compared, it would be unreasonable for me to apply the fourth prong of Strong's test. Valentino asks instead that I allow her to establish a prima facie case without having to show other similarly situated employees were treated more favorably.
This type of allowance has been made in other Title VII discrimination cases. In Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485 (7th Cir. 2000), the plaintiffs position was eliminated in what the defendant called a reduction in force ("RIF"). Id at 489. RIF is a term of art in employment law meaning the positions were eliminated and employees were not replaced. Id. After she was terminated, the plaintiff filed a Title VII complaint alleging gender discrimination. Id. at 492. The plaintiff could not establish a prima facie because there were no other similarly situated employees to whom she could compare herself. Id. In Bellaver, the Seventh Circuit found that a "plaintiff in a single-discharge case does not need to make a showing that similarly situated employees were treated better because the inference of discrimination arises from the fact that they were constructively replaced by workers outside of the protected class." Id. at 495. See Also Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Ill. Inc., 209 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2000). In essence, the Seventh Circuit found the requirement unfair where no such similarly situated persons existed.
Defendant argues that Bellaver should not apply to this case (a retaliation case) because it involved cases of gender discrimination. While it is true that Bellaver was not a retaliation case, I still find it extremely relevant. In this case and in Bellaver, the prima facie cases were derived from the McDonnell Douglas elements, both plaintiffs held unique positions, which were eliminated, and because of this both plaintiffs could not find any other similarly situated employees. As in Bellaver, it would seem unfair to dismiss Valentine's case simply because she was the sole employee working in a specialized area. I find that the single-discharge exception laid out in Bellaver applies here and that Valentino need only show that some of her duties were taken over by other Township employees. Michas at 693. Since it is undisputed that after Valentino's departure public relations work was done, on a reduced scale, by other Township employees, I find that Valentino has established a prima facie case for retaliation.
B. Establishing Pretext
The Township claims that Valentino's position was terminated because of financial constraints. Because the Township has presented a non-discriminatory basis for Valentino's termination, Valentino has the opportunity to show this reason is a pretext for retaliation. Texas Dep't Of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Pretext may be established by showing that a discriminatory motive is more likely the actual motivation or that the reason given by the defendant is without credence. Michas at 694. Valentino can show that the Township's proffered reason lacks credibility by demonstrating that it has no basis in fact, did not actually motivate the trustees to discharge her, or was insufficient to motivate her discharge. Collier v. Budd Co., 66 F.3d 886, 892 (7th Cir. 1995).
Valentino claims that the financial reason given for her discharge had no basis in fact and was insufficient motivation. Valentino submits the report of Robert Horstman, a licensed certified public accountant, in which Horstman states that between 1997 and 2001 the Township had adequate financial resources to conduct its affairs. His report shows that during the year 2000, the end of the year cash balance was reasonably similar to the year end balances from 1997-2001 being neither the highest nor the lowest balance recorded, the Township cut expenses by only $18,910 or. 6%, and the Township transferred a total of $170,000 to the Proviso Mental Health Commission. Valentino claims that both Horstman's findings and the Individual Defendants' actions were inconsistent with financial distress. In addition, Valentino presents the deposition testimony of her immediate supervisor, Robert Grace, who stated that he did not believe Valentino was discharged for financial reasons.
The Township argues that this is not enough to establish pretext. It points out that there exists no direct evidence showing Valentino was discharged for anything other than financial reasons. The Township claims it had only enough cash on hand at the end of 2000 to pay its expenses for the next three and a half months, which fell short of the next tax collection date. Because of this shortfall, the Township was forced to take out $400,000 in short-term loans to cover its expenditures. This the Township argues demonstrates that it was truly in a state of financial distress. Even given the cash shortfall, I find that Valentino has cast sufficient doubt on the Township's claims of financial distress. Horstman's report tends to show that the Township had year end cash reserves similar to other years and that the Township did not significantly reduce its expenses. Therefore, I find that Valentino has presented sufficient evidence of pretext.
In cases like this, where the employee offers specific evidence from which the finder of the fact may reasonably infer pretext, the case will then lie on the credibility of the witness. Collier at 893. Ultimately, this will come down to the credibility of the Township's trustees and employees versus the credibility of Valentino, Grace, and Horstman. Such a credibility judgment is best left to the finder of fact. Id. (citing Courtney v. Biosound Inc., 42 F.3d 414 (7th Cir. 1994).
III. The Individual Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
Qualified immunity, which does not work here, applies to governmental officials performing discretionary functions and shields them from liability for civil damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). But, if the Individual Defendants' motivation was retaliation, it was a clear violation of Title VII — a statutory violation of which the Individual Defendants should have been aware. Murray v. Lichter, 1995 WL 631794, at 8 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Johnson v. Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees, 1997 WL 548555, at 5 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
Absent immunity, an individual is subjected to personal liability if he sets into motion a series of events that he knew or reasonably should have known would deprive the plaintiff of a federal right. Luck v. Rovenstine, 168 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 1999); Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, Individual Defendants Alien, Bryant, Laski, and Sloan voted as trustees to discharge Valentino. If they acted in retaliation, they clearly violated Valentine's statutory rights and could be subject to individual liability.
Unlike the other Individual Defendants, Grace neither knew about the trustees plans to discharge Valentino nor participated in the vote that resulted in her discharge. Since Grace did not participate in the discharge, he could not be subject to individual liability.
Individual Defendants are protected by legislative immunity and for that reason cannot be held personally liable for discharging Valentino.
So, the Individual Defendants come to legislative immunity to cover their decision to terminate Valentino's Public Relations position. American law has long recognized that legislators should be immune from liability for their legislative activities. Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 48-49 (1998). Thus, the Individual Defendants are entitled to absolute legislative immunity for any actions that fall within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. Id. at 54 (quoting Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951)). "Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it." Id. In Bogan, the plaintiff claimed, and a jury agreed, that her position was eliminated for racial and retaliatory reasons. Id. Even with this motivation, the Court found that the city counsel's vote to eliminate the plaintiffs position was legislative. Id.
Valentino argues that the situation here is distinguishable from Bogan, however, I find that it is not. Like the city counsel in Bogan, the Individual Defendants voted to eliminate a department or position for which Valentino was the sole employee. Here, the Individual Defendants acting in their capacity as trustees were promulgating the Township's policies of terminating the formal Public Relations department and decreasing expenses. Effectuating these policies was a legislative act, which makes the Individual Defendants' motives irrelevant. Iglesia de la Biblia Abierta v. Banks, 129 F.3d 899, 905 (7th Cir. 1997). Since the Individual Defendants were involved in a legislative action, I find they are entitled to absolute legislative immunity.
IV. Conclusion
As to the Township, Valentino has established a prima facie case for retaliation under Title VII and has presented sufficient evidence of pretext to make summary judgment inappropriate. Valentino cannot, however, survive the Individual Defendants' motion for summary judgment. When the Individual Defendants voted to terminate her position, they were acting in a legislative capacity and are protected by legislative immunity regardless of their motives.
For the reasons stated above, the Township's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED and the Individual Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.