Summary
recommending dismissal of claim against correctional facility medical department on Eleventh Amendment grounds
Summary of this case from Saxon v. Attica Medical DeptOpinion
9:00-CV-1369 (LEK)(GLS)
August 15, 2002
James H. Valentine, Dannemora, New York, Plaintiff, Pro Se.
Hon. Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General State of New York, David Fruchter, Esq., Asst. Attorney General, Albany, New York, for Defendants.
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction
This matter was referred to the undersigned for Report-Recommendation by the Honorable Lawrence E. Kahn, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 72.3(c). Currently before the court is the defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The defendants submitted a memorandum of law and an affidavit in support of their motion. Plaintiff, pro se, James H. Valentine ("Valentine") filed a response to the motion. Unfortunately, a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is an inappropriate procedural mechanism for the use of affidavits. However, the motion can be resolved without consideration of the aforementioned affidavit. After reviewing the plaintiff's claims and for the reasons set forth below, the defendants' motion to dismiss should be granted.
The defendants provided an affidavit by Thomas G. Eagen, Director of the Inmate Grievance Program for the New York State Department of Correctional Services which states that, "inmate James H. Valentine has not submitted an appeal of any determination concerning his grievance regarding smoking in the 'day rooms' at Watertown Correctional Facility" (Dkt. No. 20, ¶ 7).
II. BACKGROUND
Valentine brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the defendants violated his civil rights under the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, Valentine asserts that: (1) defendant James Newton ("Newton") violated his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment; (2) the Watertown Correctional Facility Medical Department violated his Eighth Amendment right through their deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs; and, (3) defendants Donna Backus ("Backus") and Vincent Carey ("Carey") had first-hand knowledge of the dangers of smoking and continued to sell cigarettes to the prison population at affordable prices.
The defendants move to dismiss this complaint on the following grounds: (1) failure to exhaust available administrative remedies; (2) sovereign immunity; and (3) qualified immunity. After reviewing Valentine's claims and for the reasons set forth below, the defendants' motion to dismiss should be granted.
III. Facts
Valentine alleges that for over twenty-eight (28) months he was exposed to second-hand smoke while incarcerated at Watertown (Am. Compl. ¶ 5). Valentine claims that he filed administrative grievances stating that the second hand-smoke which exists throughout the correctional facility had caused "him physical problems and mental stress" (Am. Compl. P. 6). Valentine, a non-smoker, claims that Superintendent Newton showed deliberate indifference to his health by exposing him to Environmental Tobacco Smoke ("ETS") levels that pose an unreasonable risk to present and future health." Id. at P. 3. Nevertheless, Valentine states that he "has had various tests performed and has been told that there is nothing wrong." Id. at P. 6. Valentine claims that in response to his grievance, he was told that he would have to tolerate smoking until January of 2001 (Am. Compl. ¶ 6).
Valentine also alleges that the medical staff at Watertown violated his Eighth Amendment by denying him proper medical treatment. He claims that he complained to the medical staff on numerous occasions concerning "continuous loss of breath, nausea, chest pains, headache and anxiety attacks," and that the medical staff simply responded that "there is nothing wrong with you, just wait until the smoke-free policy comes into effect" (Am. Compl. ¶ 4). Lastly, Valentine states that Backus and Carey sold tobacco products at the facility despite their knowledge that smoking poses dangerous health risks. Id.
IV. DISCUSSION A. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a cause of action shall be dismissed if a complaint fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In other words, the court should dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the complaint which would entitle him to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 247 (2d Cir. 1999); S.E.C. v. U.S. Environmental, Inc., 155 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1998). "The task of the court in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 'is merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.'" Cooper v. Parsky, 140 F.3d 433, 440 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Ryder Energy Distribution Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir. 1984)). Therefore, in analyzing a motion to dismiss, the facts alleged by a plaintiff are assumed to be true and must be liberally construed in the light most favorable to him. See e.g., Easton v. Sundram, 947 F.2d 1011, 1014-15 (2d Cir. 1991).
The Court must "confine its consideration 'to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken.'" Leonard F. v. Israel Discount Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Allen v. WestPoint-Pepperell, Inc., 945 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1991)); Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 54 (2d Cir. 1999). "Moreover, 'when a plaintiff chooses not to attach to the complaint or incorporate by reference a [document] upon which it solely relies and which is integral to the complaint,' the court may nevertheless take the document into consideration in deciding the defendants' motion to dismiss, without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment." Int'l. Audiotext Network, Inc. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d (1995) (citation omitted). With this standard in mind, the court now turns to the sufficiency of Valentine's claims.
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Before addressing the substance of Valentine's claims, the court must first consider whether he properly exhausted his administrative remedies. The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") requires that prisoners suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must first exhaust their available administrative remedies. The Supreme Court has held that the PLRA requires administrative exhaustion even where the grievance process does not permit award of money damages, and a prisoner seeks only money damages, so long as the grievance tribunal has authority to take some responsive action. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001).
"No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under Section 1983 of this title, or any other federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
In this case, Valentine filed an inmate grievance complaint on or about July 14, 1999. On July 29, 1999, the Inmate Grievance Resolution Committee ("IGRC") denied his grievance. Valentine was then given four days to respond to the IGRC's decision, in which he chose the box which read "I disagree with IGRC response," rather than the box which read "I wish to appeal to the Superintendent."
While Valentine concedes that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, he argues that he believed that the appeal was optional. More specifically, he claims that nothing in the Inmate Grievance Manual 7 N.Y.C.R.R. § 701.7(c)(1) states that he must file an appeal irrespective of relief sought. Additionally, he claims that Superintendent Newton in responding to his claim stated the following: "his requested action had been addressed. Smoking in the day rooms will be permitted until the planned implementation date" (Am. Compl. Unnumbered P. 17). He further notes that he was unaware that the PLRA required that prisoners exhaust administrative remedies. Id. Furthermore, Valentine asserts that his continued grievance would have been moot because Superintendent Newton was not going to change his position since he felt it was resolved.
Although, Valentine claims that he was essentially told to wait for the January 2001 implementation of the no smoking policy to occur, he was given the option to continue to appeal. Moreover, it was Valentine's responsibility to exhaust his administrative remedies regardless of how he thought Superintendent Newton would resolve the issue. Accordingly, this court recommends the dismissal of this case for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.
C. Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit for any relief against a State or an agency of the State in federal court absent its consent or congressional abrogation. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 2939, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986); Kostok v. Thomas, 105 F.3d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1997). Similarly, the Eleventh Amendment provides immunity to state officials in their official capacity. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (suit against a state official in his official capacity is a suit against the official's office and is no different from a suit against the State itself).
In this case, it is unclear whether Valentine has asserted the above claims against the defendants in their official capacities. However, to the extent his claims are asserted against the defendants in the their official capacities, this court recommends dismissal because this claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Also, Valentine names the Medical Department as a defendant. He fails to name individual medical personnel within the Medical Department who allegedly violated his rights. Since it appears that Valentine is suing the Medical Department as a whole, itself is a state agency as part of the Department of Correctional Services, this court recommends that the complaint against the Medical Department should also be dismissed.
Lastly, Valentine accuses defendants Backus and Carey of selling tobacco products to the general population at Watertown. It appears that Valentine is not alleging any wrongdoing on the part of these defendants in their individual capacities, but rather he finds fault with their actions in their official capacities. Accordingly, as an alternative basis to grant dismissal, this court recommends that the claims against the Medical Department, Backus and Carey, should be dismissed because they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
D. Qualified Immunity
Defendants Backus and Carey contend that to the extent that Valentine's claims are asserted against them in their individual capacities, the claims should be dismissed under the doctrine of qualified immunity. "The doctrine of qualified immunity shields state officials from liability for damages if their actions did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known, or in circumstances where the rights were clearly established, if it was objectively reasonable for defendants to believe that their acts did not violate those rights." Calhoun v. New York State Division of Parole Officers, 999 F.2d 647, 654 (2d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Similarly, in determining whether a particular right was clearly established at the time the defendants acted, the Court considers three factors: (1) whether the right in question was defined with reasonable specificity; (2) whether the decisional law of the Supreme Court and the applicable circuit court support the existence of the right in question; and, (3) whether under pre-existing law a reasonable defendant official would have understood that his or her acts were unlawful. Richardson v. Selsky, 5 F.3d 616, 621 (2d Cir. 1993).
In this case, defendants Backus and Carey contend that to the extent that Valentine's claims are asserted against them in their individuals capacities, the complaint should be dismissed under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Valentine's only claim against Backus and Carey is that they worked in the commissary at Watertown where they sold legalized tobacco products to the general population. Accordingly, this court recommends that the complaint should be dismissed against these defendants.
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby RECOMMENDED, that the defendants' motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 19) be GRANTED due to Valentine's failure to exhaust, and it is further
RECOMMENDED, in the alternative, that the defendants' motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 19) against the Medical Department, Backus and Carey be GRANTED because it is barred by the Eleventh Amendment; and it is further
RECOMMENDED, in the alternative, that the defendants' motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 19) be GRANTED in favor of defendants Backus and Carey based on qualified immunity; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Report-Recommendation upon the parties by regular mail.
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may lodge written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court within TEN days. FAILURE TO SO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a), 6(e).