Opinion
F042088.
10-2-2003
JEROME F. VALENTA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JOSEPH S. KING, Defendant and Respondent.
Jerome F. Valenta, in pro. per, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Joseph S. King, in pro. per., for Defendant and Respondent.
The complaint filed by appellant Jerome F. Valenta contained four causes of action brought against respondent Joseph S. King — breach of fiduciary duty (first), intentional infliction of emotional distress (second); negligent infliction of emotional distress (third); and legal malpractice (fourth). The trial court sustained, without leave to amend, respondents demurrers to the complaint.
Respondent is an attorney who was appointed by the trial court to represent appellant in a criminal prosecution brought against appellant by the district attorney. The information in that criminal action charged appellant with eight separate felonies, all based upon appellants alleged violations of Penal Code section 632, subdivision (a). The jury acquitted appellant of counts 3 through 8 and convicted him of counts 1 and 2. On February 28, 1997, judgment and sentence was pronounced. Appellant was sentenced to 7 years 4 months in state prison.
Also on February 28, 1997, appellant filed with this court a notice of appeal from the judgment in the criminal action; he was represented on the appeal by an attorney — not respondent — appointed by this court. During the course of that pending appeal, appellant filed with this court a number of petitions for writs of habeas corpus and a petition for writ of coram vobis. One of the habeas petitions related to a decision by the trial court to deny appellant bail pending appeal. Others related to the conditions of appellants state prison confinement. The last included claims about the merits of the convictions, the validity of a search and seizure, and asserted prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct. All appellants petitions were denied except the last, which was ordered consolidated with his appeal.
Our opinion in the consolidated criminal proceedings was filed on October 6, 1999. In part, we found, in the habeas proceeding, that sufficient evidence supported appellants conviction of count 1, that insufficient evidence supported appellants conviction of count 2, and that the prosecutor had committed prejudicial misconduct with respect to certain evidence. Based on this last finding, we issued the writ, which commanded the trial court to vacate the judgment against appellant and conduct further appropriate proceedings. On remand in the trial court, all charges against appellant were dismissed in the interests of justice. Appellant was released from prison on February 1, 2000.
Discussion
I.
A.
The trial court did not err by sustaining, without leave to amend, respondents demurrers to appellants complaint based upon the statute of limitations.
Though appellants complaint contained four separate causes of action, all were governed by the limitations period of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 because all asserted a right to recover based upon alleged wrongful acts and omissions which occurred during and in connection with respondents legal representation of appellant in the criminal action. (Levin v. Graham & James (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 798, 805 [the one-year period of section 340.6 applies in all cases other than actual fraud, whether the theory of liability is based on the breach of an oral or written contract, a tort, or a breach of a fiduciary duty]; Stoll v. Superior Court (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1363-1364 [breach of fiduciary duty cause of action; section 340.6 applies].)
All references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
The absolute four-year limitations period contained in section 340.6 is not at issue.
When a professional malpractice action is brought against a lawyer who represented the plaintiff in a criminal prosecution, the one-year period of section 340.6 commences to run no later than the date the plaintiff, as the defendant in the criminal action, is sentenced to state prison. (Fantazia v. County of Stanislaus (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452.) At that moment, the plaintiff knows or should know of the facts constituting the alleged malpractice, because he or she has been convicted of the charged crime, and has suffered actual injury, because he or she is deprived of liberty by the incarceration. (Ibid.)
Assuming that the tolling provisions of section 340.6, subdivision (a)(4) and section 352.1, subdivision (a) extended the applicable section 340.6 one-year period, such an extension was limited to no more than two years by virtue of the express language of section 352.1, subdivision (a). Therefore, appellant was required to bring his action against respondent no later than three years after sentencing; i.e., no later than February 28, 2000. Because appellants action was not filed until January 11, 2001, it was barred by limitations unless some other valid legal reason to extend the statute applied.
In the context of this case, involving a demurrer to a complaint, the issue is whether the relevant facts demonstrate as a matter of law that respondents representation of appellant ended more than three years before January 11, 2001. (Saliter v. Pierce Bros. Mortuaries (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 292, 297 [on review from a judgment of dismissal after a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, the judgment will be affirmed if it positively appears from the relevant facts that the action is barred by limitations]; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 [the relevant facts for purposes of appellate review of a ruling on a demurrer consists of those facts disclosed by the complaint and those facts subject to judicial notice]; see CCP § 430.30, subd. (a); Stoney Creek Orchards v. State of California (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 903, 906 [for purposes of ruling on a demurrer, allegations in a complaint are accepted as true except where such an allegation is contrary to a fact of which the court must or may take judicial notice].)
B.
Appellant contends the "continuous representation" rule constitutes a valid legal reason to extend the statute so that it accrued no earlier than January 21, 2000, the date the charges were dismissed and appellant was ordered released from prison (which occurred on February 1, 2000).
The "continuous representation" rule is expressed in subdivision (a)(2) of section 340.6, which provides in relevant part that the period of limitations is tolled during the time that the "attorney continues to represent the plaintiff regarding the specific subject matter in which the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred." The purpose of the continuous representation rule is to "`avoid the disruption of an attorney-client relationship by a lawsuit while enabling the attorney to correct or minimize an apparent error, and to prevent an attorney from defeating a malpractice cause of action by continuing to represent the client until the statutory period has expired." (Laird v. Blacker (1992) 2 Cal.4th 606, 618.)
Whether an attorneys representation is continuous is judged by an objective standard, not by the clients subjective beliefs, and depends upon the presence of facts that show an ongoing mutual relationship and activities in furtherance of that relationship. (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 887.) The representation ends for purposes of the accrual of the limitations period when the agreed representational tasks or events have occurred, or the client has consented to termination, or a court has authorized the attorney to withdraw. (Id. at p. 887-888.)
The relevant facts here demonstrate as a matter of law that respondents representation of appellant ended more than three years before January 11, 2001. Appellant alleged in his complaint that respondent was appointed by the Kern County Superior Court to represent appellant "in the prosecution against him entitled, People v. Valenta, Case No. SC065793." As noted earlier, appellant was sentenced and judgment was imposed in that "prosecution" on February 28, 1997; records of that proceeding show that appellant was remanded into the custody of the Sheriff at the conclusion of the hearing. Also on February 28, 1997, appellant filed a notice of appeal with this court. On May 1, 1997, a lawyer other than respondent was appointed by this court to represent appellant on the appeal; this other lawyer in fact represented appellant throughout the appeal.
These facts establish that the representational tasks undertaken by respondent, and the events relating to that representation, ended on February 28, 1997. (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 887-888.) When judgment was pronounced, respondents duties with respect to the "prosecution against [appellant] entitled, People v. Valenta, Case No. SC065793," necessarily concluded. With the imposition of judgment, the prosecution was final in the superior court, and, with the filing of a notice of appeal with this court, the superior court lost jurisdiction to "do anything in connection with the cause that [might] affect the judgment," jurisdiction having vested in the Court of Appeal until the appeal was decided and a remittitur to the trial court was issued. (6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Appeal, § 24, pp. 263-264.) The only powers retained by the trial court encompassed merely incidental matters that did not interfere with the appellate courts exclusive jurisdiction; none of those incidental powers could have affected the judgment unless the judgment was void on its face, which it was not. (Id. at § 25, pp. 264-265.) As of February 28, 1997, then, respondent no longer represented appellant "regarding the specific subject matter in which the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred" — that is, the criminal prosecution of appellant in the trial court. (§ 340.6, subd. (a)(2).)
In addition, respondent, not having been appointed as appellate counsel for appellant, had no power or authority to appear for appellant for any purpose relating to the appeal from the judgment. (Epley v. Califro (1958) 49 Cal.2d 849, 854 ["The attorney of record has the exclusive right to appear in court for his client and neither the party himself nor another attorney should be recognized by the court in the conduct or disposition of the case"]; see Pen. Code, § 1240 [provisions relating to the appellate courts power of appointment of counsel for an appellant]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 76.5; People v. Bailey (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1254-1255 [selection of trial counsel as counsel on appeal is discouraged, because it may put trial counsel in the untenable position of urging his or her own incompetence].) No doubt respondent could have prepared and filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus on behalf of appellant in the trial court or in this court during the pendency of the appeal. However, though several writ petitions were filed by appellant with the court of appeal during the pendency of the criminal appeal, all were prepared and submitted by appellant acting by himself. Nothing in either appellate record reflects any application by or for appellant for appointment of counsel, whether respondent or any other attorney, for the purpose of representing appellant on any application for habeas corpus in the trial court or in this court. Thus, there was no possibility of any disruption of an ongoing attorney-client relationship between appellant and respondent by a malpractice lawsuit, and respondent was never in position to correct or minimize an apparent error he might have made during his representation of appellant prior to judgment and imposition of sentence. (Laird v. Blacker, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 618.) In other words, there was no "ongoing mutual relationship and of activities in furtherance of [a] relationship" between appellant and respondent. (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 887.)
The subject of any such petition in the trial court would have had to have been limited to issues arising from information outside the record on appeal and, as a consequence to issues that were not reviewable on the appeal. (6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law, supra, Criminal Appeal, § 26, pp. 265-266.)
In fact, other than the habeas petition which this court in part granted by virtue of its written opinion — a habeas petition based upon matters appearing in the record on appeal and therefore not proper for consideration by the trial court in any event — appellants writ petitions all dealt with matters unrelated to the validity of the judgment against appellant, such as bail pending appeal and the conditions of appellants prison confinement pending appeal.
We recognize the existence of a superior court docket entry, which shows that on January 31, 2000, respondent appeared as appellants attorney when the criminal prosecution was dismissed and appellant was ordered released from custody. While it is true that the proceeding on remand was a continuation of the original case against appellant in the trial court, this courts remittitur having been issued and jurisdiction having revested in the trial court, this does not mean the limitations period did not commence until the conclusion of that remand proceeding. First, counsels appearance was unnecessary given the dismissal on remand. Second, the pro-forma appearance by respondent was not in furtherance of the defense of the criminal allegations against appellant, the "`main task or particular undertaking in which the [alleged malpractice] occurred," and thus was not an activity which fell within the "objectives" of that particular undertaking. (Crouse v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1530.) Third, under the continuous representation rule, the limitations period is not tolled when an attorneys subsequent role is only tangentially related to the legal representation which gave rise to the malpractice claim; the continuous representation rule assumes a relationship between client and attorney that is not sporadic but is one which develops from, and continues as a part of, those professional services during which the alleged malpractice occurred. (Foxborough v. Van Atta (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 217, 228-229.) Fourth, a rule that representation is continuous through the appellate process, despite the fact that the appellant has separate counsel on appeal, and until the exhaustion of all an appellants postconviction remedies by the efforts of appellant or separate counsel rather than by the efforts of target counsel, would effectively negate both the principle that the limitations period commences when the defendant is sentenced and the statutory provision that limits the tolling of the limitations period to no more than two years when the defendant is incarcerated. Fifth, such a rule would establish a virtually unlimited period of tolling that would undermine the fundamental purpose of limitations statutes — to insure the timely initiation of lawsuits in order to prevent injustice by the loss of evidence, witnesses and the like. (See 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1996) Actions, § 408, p. 513.)
The continual representation rule is not made applicable by appellants allegations that respondent had a duty to act but did not do so and thus did not take affirmative steps to insure that the judgment against appellant was promptly overturned. First, as we have already said, respondent, not being counsel of record on appeal for appellant, was not empowered to do anything by way of representing appellant with respect to any issue raised by the appellate record. Second, appellant made no request that respondent be appointed to bring any habeas petition on appellants behalf, whether in this court or the trial court. Third, none of appellants habeas petitions raised issues related to the validity of the judgment except the petition consolidated with the appeal, and this courts opinion demonstrates that the reversible errors involved issues comprehended by the record on appeal and thus improper subjects of a habeas petition in the trial court. Last, a rule that defined continuous representation as including a lawyers failure to act to remedy his or her own past malpractice would mean that representation once commenced would as a practical matter never end, in the absence of an express discharge or a court-sanctioned withdrawal, so long as some possible remedy remained open and even though such a remedy was actively pursued by other counsel or by the defendant during the period of the target counsels alleged inaction. This cannot be, and indeed is not, the law. (Foxborough v. Van Atta, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at pp. 228-229 [continuous representation rule does not assume a sporadic or quiescent professional relationship; it instead assumes a developing and continuing one that is related to the representation which gave rise to the alleged malpractice].)
For many reasons, appellant is plainly wrong that section 324A of the Restatement 2d, Torts, demonstrates the trial court erred. This section applies only to the liability to a third party of a first party who performs services for a second party. Appellant, with respect to the services performed by respondent, was the second party, not the third party addressed by the section. In addition, the section deals with substantive liability under common law tort doctrine; it says nothing about a period of limitations under a specific California statute.
Appellants argument on this point assumes that different periods of limitation apply to the various causes of action of appellants complaint. As we noted, this is not the case; section 340.6 applies to all counts in the complaint. (Levin v. Graham & James, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 805.)
Appellant continuously makes reference to Deteresa v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (9th Cir. 1977) 121 F.3d 460 and asserts his convictions were "wrongful" because the crimes of which he was convicted "didnt exist." They "didnt exist," says appellant citing Deteresa, because one cannot be liable under Penal Code section 632 for "`eavesdropping on his own conversations." Deteresa did not hold that a person cannot violate Penal Code section 632 with respect to his or her own conversations; it held that the evidence before the trial court supported a conclusion that Deteresa did not have an objectively reasonable expectation that her recorded conversation with a media reporter was confidential. (Deteresa, supra, at p. 465.) We emphasize that the recorded conversation in issue was between Deteresa and the reporter, but there is nothing in the courts opinion that suggests in the slightest that the statute did not apply, and would not have applied, because the conversation was Deteresas "own," to use appellants word. In fact, the Deteresa opinion clearly implies the contrary (id., at pp. 464-465), which is consistent with the statute and the interpretive case law. (Pen. Code, § 632; see Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 200, 234-235 [statute prevents the recording of a confidential communication without the consent of all parties to the communication]; Coulter v. Bank of America (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 923, 929 [the statute prevents one party to a conversation from taping it without the consent of the other party].)
Appellant seems to have misread our opinion in his appeal in the criminal action. We held specifically that there was adequate evidence to support one of the two Penal Code section 632 counts for which appellant was found guilty by the jury — that is, we held that the evidence warranted a finding that appellant had violated the statute by recording one of his "own conversations" without the consent of the other party. We ordered issuance of the writ, however, on grounds — prosecutorial misconduct — not related to the sufficiency of the evidence itself to support the conviction.
Next, and even though the subject is irrelevant to the issues — the dates of accrual and expiration of the section 340.6 limitations period — before us on this appeal, we address briefly appellants complaint that the Supreme Court and this court were in some manner responsible for appellants extended incarceration because these courts "ignored addressing Appellants wrongful conviction, and the provisions of Penal Code section 632." What appellant really seems to be saying is that the courts should have agreed with him in every instance and immediately granted each of his writ petitions because these courts should have recognized that a violation of Penal Code section 632 could not be based upon appellants "own conversations." First, as we noted above, a defendant may be convicted of a violation of the statute based upon the defendants recordation of one of his "own conversations," as appellant was convicted in the criminal action against him. (Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 234-235; Coulter v. Bank of America, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th 923, 929; Deteresa v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., supra, 121 F.3d at pp. 464-465.) Second, we did address appellants claims in his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was consolidated with his appeal; we agreed with his allegations in this petition that the prosecutor had engaged in prejudicial misconduct and ordered issuance of the writ on that ground. Third, this court and the Supreme Court did in fact "address" all of appellants other writ petitions because these courts denied all of those petitions. There are many reasons why a habeas petition may be denied. (See, e.g., In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 826, 830 [habeas is not available to review search and seizure claims or procedural errors]; In re Lindley (1947) 29 Cal.2d 709, 723 [habeas is not available to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction]; In re Dexter (1979) 25 Cal.3d 921, 925 [prisoners challenging conditions of confinement must show exhaustion of available administrative remedies or show that remedy is inadequate]; In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 762 [issues discernable from the record on appeal cannot be raised on habeas, including alleged prosecutorial misconduct]; People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 [the court will deny a habeas petition that is conclusory or that does not allege or incorporate specific facts — as opposed to contentions and arguments — sufficient to establish a right to relief].)
The same is true about a petition for writ of coram vobis. (See, e.g., People v. Shipman (1965) 62 Cal.2d 226, 230 [coram vobis may not be used to question the merits of the issues tried].)
We do not pretend to, and will not, review each of appellants several petitions and attempt to explain why each was or may have been denied. The petitions are not part of the record on this appeal. Appellant is not entitled to have such explanations and we will not expend the time and resources to give them, because, as we said, the matters are irrelevant to the issues properly raised on this appeal.
All appellants complaints about respondent and the appellate courts are based upon the proposition that appellant was convicted of non-existent crimes because one cannot "eavesdrop" on ones own conversations. While it is obviously true that one cannot "listen in" on ones own conversation with another, the record before us discloses that the information in the criminal prosecution charged appellant with illegally eavesdropping on or recording confidential communications, and that the verdicts rendered by the jury found appellant guilty of violating Penal Code section 632, which includes recording ones own conversation with another. Consistently, the one count about which this court on appeal found sufficient evidence to support a conviction was not based upon appellants eavesdropping on his own conversation with another but rather upon appellants recording of his own conversation with another, an act which falls within Penal Code section 632. (See Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 234-235.)
Neither the information nor the verdicts in the criminal prosecution are a part of the record on this appeal. The only information contained in this record about these matters is found in our opinion in the criminal action and the trial courts minute entries in its records of the criminal action.
II.
Alternatively, even if there were merit in appellants argument concerning the statute of limitations, we still would not reverse the judgment because the trial courts ruling may be supported by other grounds not expressly relied upon by the trial court but raised by respondent in his demurrer and about which appellant has said nothing in his briefs on this appeal.
In order to secure the reversal of an adverse judgment, it is not enough for the appellant to establish that the trial court committed some error during the course of the proceedings under review. The appellant must also affirmatively demonstrate that the error complained of caused the appellant legal injury and was therefore "prejudicial." (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; § 475; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 835-836; Tupman v. Haberkern (1929) 208 Cal. 256, 263; Waller v. TJD, Inc. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 830, 833; Robbins v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 313, 318.) In other words, prejudice is not presumed from error, and the reviewing court is obliged to declare "whether the error found to exist has resulted in a miscarriage of justice, and not to reverse the judgment unless such error be prejudicial." (Tupman v. Haberkern, supra, at p. 263.) Legal prejudice is established when the reviewing court "is of the `opinion that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error." (People v. Watson, supra, at p. 836; Waller v. TJD, Inc., supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 833.) This principle has been a part of the law of California since 1914. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 408, pp. 459-460.)
Respondents demurrer did not rely solely upon the defense of the statute of limitations; it also asserted that appellants complaint failed to state any cause of action on a variety of other grounds, including the failure to allege factual innocence (see Wiley v. County of San Diego (1998) 19 Cal.4th 532, 539), the bar of collateral estoppel, the bar of judicial estoppel, and the failure to allege all the elements required to state any cognizable cause of action. Each of these grounds raised by respondent constituted a potential independent basis for a ruling in favor of respondent; a determination that any one or more of them was legitimate would be sufficient to validate the trial courts ultimate order that the demurrers should be sustained without leave to amend. (See Bagatti v. Department of Rehabilitation (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 344, 352 [judgment based upon an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend must be affirmed on appeal if any one of the several grounds for the demurrer is well taken]; Air Products, Inc. v. State of California (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 340, 348 [if a complaint is insufficient upon any ground raised by the defendants demurrer, the order of the trial court sustaining the demurrer must be affirmed on appeal even if it was not the ground relied upon by the trial court]; Southall v. Security Title Insurance and Guarantee Company (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 321, 323 [reasons stated by the trial court for sustaining a demurrer are irrelevant on appeal].) However, there is nothing in appellants briefs which raises any appellate issue with respect to any of these other, alternate grounds for respondents demurrers; appellant makes no contention or argument, nor presents any authority, that any such alternate ground was legally unsound or otherwise would not have supported, standing alone, the trial courts ruling sustaining respondents demurrers.
We will not speculate about the merits of the grounds raised by respondent in his demurrer but not mentioned by the trial court in its decision. It is the appellants responsibility on appeal from a summary adjudication to affirmatively demonstrate, by reference to the record, that the judgment must be reversed. (Bagatti v. Department of Rehabilitation, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 369 [appellant has the burden to affirmatively establish error by the trial court; appellate court presumed the defendants demurrer was properly sustained with respect to allegations not addressed in appellants briefs on appeal]; see Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 451, 466, fn. 6.) Included in this obligation is the duty to prove the purported error operated to the appellants prejudice; that is, that the outcome of the proceeding would likely have been different had the error not occurred. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 577; Pool v. City of Oakland (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1051, 1069; Tupman v. Haberkern, supra, 208 Cal. at p. 263; see generally 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Appeal, §§ 408, 409, pp. 459-461.) We are not partisan advocates for either of the parties, and therefore will not scour the record for the benefit of either of them in order to find and then articulate arguments not expressly presented by them.
Appellants failure to incorporate into his briefs any argument or authorities that establish the lack of merit of the other grounds raised by respondent in his demurrer but not addressed by the trial court means appellant has not demonstrated he was legally prejudiced by the trial courts ruling. Put differently, even if the trial court was wrong in deciding that appellants complaint was barred by the statute of limitations, appellant has not affirmatively shown that none of the other grounds for the demurrer would require the same result as a matter of law. (See Davey v. Southern Pacific. Co. (1897) 116 Cal. 325, 329; Tupman v. Haberkern, supra, 208 Cal. at p. 263; see also Brokopp v. Ford Motor Co. (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 841, 853-854; In re Marriage of McLaughlin (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 327, 337 [the appellate courts duty to assess the prejudicial impact of an error only arises when the appellant has first fulfilled his or her duty to tender a proper prejudice argument; that is, the appellant bears the duty of spelling out in his or her brief exactly how the error caused a miscarriage of justice].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover costs on appeal.
Vartabedian, J., Cornell, J., Concurs.