Opinion
Case No. 6:13-cv-00634-MGL-JDA
07-27-2017
David Valencia, Plaintiff, v. John Doe Officers, Greenville County Police Department; Greenville County City Police Department; Jeremy E. Jones, Officer, E38 Greenville Police Department, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment filed by the Greenville County Sheriff's Office ("GCSO") and Officer Jeremy Jones ("Jones") (collectively "Defendants"). [Doc. 98.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
The Greenville County Sheriff's Office is improperly identified as Greenville County/City Police Department in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. [Doc. 16 at 1.]
Pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the undersigned recommends that the John Doe Officers be dismissed without prejudice. The undersigned further notes that Plaintiff has indicated to the Court that he no longer desires to pursue this action against the John Doe Officers. [See Doc. 71.]
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action on March 4, 2013, alleging excessive force, false imprisonment, cruel and unusual punishment, and violations of due process. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff amended his Complaint on April 30, 2013. [Doc. 16.] In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges an excessive use of force claim against Jones and a failure to train or properly supervise against GCSO. [Doc. 16 at 1.] Plaintiff names Defendants in their official and individual capacities. [Id.]
A prisoner's pleading is considered filed at the moment it is delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988). In this case, construing the filing date in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, his Complaint was filed on March 4, 2013. [Doc. 1-1 at 5 (Complaint signed by Plaintiff on March 4, 2013).]
Although Plaintiff submitted a motion to amend the complaint, it was filed as an Amended Complaint because it was submitted within the time period for Plaintiff to amend as a matter of course under Rule 15. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.
In order to preserve the issues raised in this case and give liberal construction to the pleadings, Plaintiff's Original Complaint is attached to his Amended Complaint [see Docs. 16; 16-2], and the Court construes these documents as one Amended Complaint. [see Doc. 19 at 1]. However, in Plaintiff's response to summary judgment, Plaintiff seems to address only the excessive force and failure to train or supervise claims. [See Doc. 101.] Thus, Plaintiff may have abandoned the original claims. Out of an abundance of caution, and liberally construing the pleadings, the undersigned has addressed the claims Plaintiff raises in his Original and Amended Complaints.
On July 23, 2014, this action was stayed pending a decision by the state court on Plaintiff's pending criminal charges. [Doc. 58]; see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (holding that a federal court must abstain from enjoining a state criminal proceeding). Defendants' motion for summary judgment, filed on September 3, 2013 [Doc. 39], was denied with leave to refile once the stay was lifted [Doc. 58]. On April 3, 2017, after dispositions were entered in Plaintiff's underlying criminal action [see Doc. 90], the Court entered a renewed limited scheduling order [Doc. 95]. On May 3, 2017, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 98.] The following day, the Court issued an Order in accordance with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the summary judgment/dismissal procedure and of the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. [Doc. 99.] On June 5, 2017, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition [Doc. 101], to which Defendants filed a reply [Doc. 103]. Accordingly, the motion is ripe for review.
BACKGROUND
The facts included in this background section are taken directly from the Original Complaint attached to the Amended Complaint. [Doc. 16-2.]
At the time Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint, he was a detainee at the Greenville County Detention Center. [Doc. 16-2 at 2.] On December 10, 2012, Plaintiff alleges that he ran from some "associates" who wished to kill him. [Id. at 3.] The police became involved and found Plaintiff at the Garden Spot Convenience Store in Greenville, South Carolina, where Plaintiff was "armed with a knife at all times for his protection only." [Id. at 4.] Plaintiff remained inside the store with the store clerk while police were outside. [Id.]
After speaking with the police on the phone, Plaintiff came from the back of the store, with another person, with his hands in the air. [Id.] The police opened fire, striking Plaintiff four times in his chest and arms. [Id.] Further, Plaintiff remembers "the police hindering EMS workers from working on him by their [police] questioning." [Id.]
Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $5,000,000.00 for each civil rights violation; $5,000,000.00 in punitive damages to prevent vigilante police from shooting at unarmed persons; and any other relief this Court deems just and proper. [Id. at 5.] Plaintiff further seeks appointment of counsel, discovery, and a jury trial. [Id.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Even under this less stringent standard, however, the pro se complaint is still subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction means only that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him. See Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court "conjure up questions never squarely presented." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Requirements for a Cause of Action Under § 1983
This action is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. Section 1983 "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1983 allows "a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . ."42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant "deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States" and (2) that the defendant "deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage." Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The under-color-of-state-law element, which is equivalent to the "state action" requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment,
reflects judicial recognition of the fact that most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments. This fundamental limitation on the scope of constitutional guarantees preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed."Id. (quoting Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, "the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual" may at times be treated "as if a State has caused it to be performed." Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Specifically, "state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a 'close nexus between the State and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior 'may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.'" Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). State action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation "caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible" and that "the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). A determination of whether a private party's allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State requires the court to "begin[ ] by identifying 'the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.'" Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Ross v. Commc'ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, he must produce existence of a factual dispute on every element essential to his action that he bears the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to establish he is entitled to relief on his Fourth Amendment excessive force claim; Plaintiff has failed to set forth allegations giving rise to a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment; Plaintiff's Complaint fails to identify any policy or custom which would impose liability on GCSO under § 1983; Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; and Plaintiff has no cognizable claims against Defendants based on state law. [Doc. 91-1 at 6-22.]
Excessive Force Claim Against Jones
Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to establish entitlement to relief on his excessive force claims. [Doc. 98-1 at 6-14.] The undersigned agrees.
"[A]ll claims that law enforcement officials have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard . . . . " Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); see also Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1161 (4th Cir. 1997) (the Fourth Amendment "governs claims of excessive force during the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a person."). The Fourth Amendment test is "an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation." Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. The test of reasonableness is "not capable of precise definition or mechanical application." Id. at 396. In determining the reasonableness of the use of force, the court must balance "the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests" against the importance of the governmental interest alleged to justify the intrusion. Id. (citations omitted). Courts have "long recognized that the right to make an arrest . . . necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it." Id. (citations omitted). This right is obviously greater when the suspect is resisting arrest and refusing to comply with the officer's orders. Id.
The Graham Court set forth several factors to consider when determining whether officers' actions are reasonable, including "the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Id. (citations omitted). The Supreme Court explained this reasonableness inquiry by noting that there must be an "allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Id. at 396-97.
Here, Jones' sworn testimony states,
On 12-11-12 at approximately 1744 hrs dispatch advised all areas units that an armed robbery was in progress at the Garden Spot store located at Altamate Rd. and Statepark Rd. I responded along with Deputy D. Kilgore with blue lights and siren and arrived on scene at approximately 1749 hrs. While driving to the scene dispatch advised that the subject was blocking the front door and was armed with a knife. As I pulled in to the parking lot I observed numerous people around the gas pumps looking into the store. Myself and Deputy D. Kilgore exited my patrol car and began our approach to the front door at which time I observed two white male subjects on the far side of the counter closest to the back of the store. One subject was standing closely behind the other and had his arm around him while holding what appeared to be a knife to his throat. Having the distance in mind as well as the facts that dispatch advised the subject was armed and that the subject was using the man as a shield I retrieved my Rock River LAR-15 from the trunk of my patrol car. Professionally, I felt that this situation required a weapon with precise shooting capabilities.
As I again approached the front of the store I observed that the front door was barricaded by display racks. I also observed the subject take the hostage into a room beside the sales counter. This room was later identified as a stock room. I remained at the front of the store and directed my partner, Deputy David Kilgore, to the side door to ensure the subject had no avenue of escape. While awaiting back up I observed the stock room door open and a younger male run out. I had not seen this person until this time. I then observed the male hostage that was being held with the knife. He began to exit the stock room but then stopped. I then noticed that he was still being held by the subject with a knife, at this point I was four to five feet from the suspect and hostage. The suspect had an aggressive hold on the hostages shirt and was trying to pull him back into the stock room. The hostage looked at me and I motioned for him to move forward. I did not have a safe shot at that time. The hostage lunged forward and due to the subject having a strong hold on him it resulted in the subject being pulled out of the room and into full view. I then engaged the subject with four rounds into the center mass of his body. The subject released the hostage and went back into the store room. I covered the door in case he came back out while Deputy D. Kilgore got the hostages out of the store. Once the hostages were out of harm's way myself and Deputy D. Kilgore entered the store and covered the stock room door as we awaited back up. I could hear the subject in the stock room moaning and ordered for him to come out several times however he refused. Once additional units were on scene Sgt. K. Robinson, Sgt. D. W Wiener, Master Deputy D. Hoover, and Master Deputy M. Mcgaha and myself made an approach on the stock room. M/D Hoover opened the door from the right side while using the wall for concealment and I covered the door from straight ahead using an ice cream freezer for cover. Once the door was open I could see the subjects hands. I ordered him to come out and to keep his hands visible. The subject remained on his back and moved back into view. I covered the subject as other units moved in to take the subject into custody. Sgt. D. Wiener handcuffed the subject at which time I exited the store and went to Sgt. K. Robinsons vehicle. No further action was taken on my part.[Doc. 98-2 at 4-6 (errors in original).]
After a careful review of the facts, the Court finds that the Graham factors weigh in favor of finding that no genuine dispute of facts exists with respect to whether Jones' actions were reasonable. Specifically, the Court considered (1) the severity of the crime at issue—Jones responded to an armed robbery in progress to find Plaintiff had barricaded himself in the Garden Spot, armed with a knife; (2) that Plaintiff posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers and others in that Plaintiff had taken hostages and was seen to be aggressively holding a knife to the neck of one hostage; and (3) that Plaintiff was actively resisting arrest in that he barricaded the door and forced hostages into the stock room. [See id.] Further, although Plaintiff alleges a different set of facts in his Original Complaint, Plaintiff has failed to submit any evidence to support his contentions or counter Jones' sworn testimony. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends summary judgment be granted on this ground.
False Imprisonment Claim
As an initial matter, because Plaintiff's false imprisonment claims concern his arrest and detention for a crime for which he entered a guilty plea, and Plaintiff has not shown that his conviction has been overturned or otherwise expunged, to the extent Plaintiff alleges that there was insufficient probable cause to seize him, his claims are barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); see Edwards v. Balisock, 520 U.S. 641 (1997) (the preclusive rule of Heck extends to § 1983 claims challenging procedural deficiencies which necessarily imply the invalidity of the judgement). Further, even if Plaintiff's claims for false arrest are not barred by Heck, Plaintiff has failed to show that he was falsely arrested or falsely imprisoned.
Section 1983 actions premised on alleged unlawful seizure, malicious prosecution, false arrest and/or false imprisonment are analyzed as actions claiming unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e. g., Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a plaintiff alleging a § 1983 false arrest claim needs to show that the officer decided to arrest him without probable cause to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating claims of false arrest and false imprisonment "are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment"). "The Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on probable cause." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
Under § 1983, "a public official cannot be charged with false arrest when he arrests a defendant pursuant to a facially valid warrant." Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 568 (4th Cir. 1998) ("[A] claim for false arrest may be considered only when no arrest warrant has been obtained."); see also Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 181-82 (4th Cir. 1996) (determining that when the arresting official makes the arrest with a facially valid warrant, it is not false arrest). Moreover, "an indictment, 'fair upon its face,' returned by a 'properly constituted grand jury,' conclusively determines the existence of probable cause." Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19 (1975)); see also Provet v. S.C., C.A. No. 6:07-1094-GRA-WMC, 2007 WL 1847849, at *5 (D.S.C. June 25, 2007) (§ 1983 claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution were precluded because of indictment).
Here, Plaintiff was arrested pursuant to valid arrest warrants [Doc. 98-2 at 7-11] and by indictment [Doc. 98-3 at 2-8]; thus, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights under § 1983. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment on this ground.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to raise a cause of action under South Carolina law for false imprisonment, for the reasons stated, his claim is without merit. The tort of false imprisonment is simply "a deprivation of a person's liberty without justification." Caldwell v. K-Mart Corp., 410 S.E.2d 21, 23 (S.C. Ct. App.1991). To establish a cause of action for false imprisonment, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: "(1) the defendant restrained the plaintiff, (2) the restraint was intentional, and (3) the restraint was unlawful." Id. (citing Andrews v. Piedmont Air Lines, 377 S.E.2d 127 (S.C. Ct. App.1989)). Generally, a police officer who arrests an individual will not be liable for false imprisonment if the arrest was supported by probable cause. See Jones v. City of Columbia, 389 S.E.2d 662, 663 (S.C. 1990). Because Plaintiff cannot show that he was arrested without probable cause, this claim fails.
Failure to Train Claim Against GCSO
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims against them should be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to allege any improper custom or policy of GCSO which resulted in a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Municipal liability is based on execution of a governmental policy or custom. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). A municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs the tortfeasor; rather, a plaintiff must identify a municipal "policy" or "custom" that caused the plaintiff's injury. Board of Cty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997). Because Plaintiff fails to identify a policy or custom of the GCSO that caused his federal rights to be violated, the undersigned recommends summary judgment be granted on this ground.
Due Process Claim
To the extent Plaintiff alleges a due process violation, this ground is without merit. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff states that he remembers "[p]olice hindering EMS workers from working on him by their [police] questioning." [Doc. 16-2 at 4.] While the "liberal pleading requirements" of Rule 8(a) require only a "short and plain" statement of the claim, the plaintiff must "offer more detail . . . than the bald statement that he has a valid claim of some type against the defendant." Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). Even with respect to a pro se complaint, a plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements to support his claim. Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967 (10th Cir. 1995); see White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723 (4th Cir. 1989) (dismissing a complaint where it "failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support the [plaintiff's] bare assertion")). It is well settled that federal courts performing their duties of construing pro se pleadings are not required to be "mind readers" or "advocates" for pro se litigants. See Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1278; Leeke, 574 F.2d at 1151. Plaintiff's Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to support a due process claim, and thus, this claim should be dismissed. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment on this ground.
Qualified Immunity
Defendants also argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. [Doc. 98 at 2.] The Court agrees.
Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damage suits as long as the conduct in question does not "violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Thus, qualified immunity does not protect an official who violates a constitutional or statutory right of a plaintiff that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation such that an objectively reasonable official in the official's position would have known of the right. Id. Further, qualified immunity is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
To determine whether qualified immunity applies, a court must determine "'whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all[ ] and ... whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.'" Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (quoting Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999)). "[W]hether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the action[,] assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time it was taken." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987) (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819). For purposes of this analysis, a right is "clearly established" if "[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Id. at 640.
District court and court of appeals judges are "permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). If a court decides in the negative the first prong it considers—i.e., the court decides the plaintiff has not alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right or the right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation—the court need not consider the other prong of the qualified immunity analysis. See id. at 243-45; Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding the court "need not formally resolve" the constitutional question of "whether the [plaintiffs] were arrested without probable cause" to address the plaintiffs' § 1983 claim; the court stated that it "need only determine whether [the defendant]—a deputy sheriff performing within the normal course of his employment—acted with the objective reasonableness necessary to entitle him to qualified immunity").
As discussed above, Plaintiff's allegations fail to demonstrate Defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that the John Doe Officers be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Defendants GCSO and Jones' motion for summary judgment [Doc. 98] be GRANTED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge July 27, 2017
Greenville, South Carolina