Opinion
CASE NO. 19-80673-CV-MIDDLEBROOKS/Matthewman
2021-06-22
Nedel Diaz VALDES, Plaintiff, v. ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE RESOURCES, INC., Defendant.
Paul Aaron Herman, Consumer Advocates Law Group, PLLC, Delray Beach, FL, Scott David Owens, Hollywood, FL, for Plaintiff. Charles James McHale, Jr., Golden Scaz Gagain, PLLC, Tampa, FL, for Defendant.
Paul Aaron Herman, Consumer Advocates Law Group, PLLC, Delray Beach, FL, Scott David Owens, Hollywood, FL, for Plaintiff.
Charles James McHale, Jr., Golden Scaz Gagain, PLLC, Tampa, FL, for Defendant.
ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DONALD M. MIDDLEBROOKS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon the Parties’ Renewed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, filed on May 25, 2021. (DE 63; DE 64). The Motions are fully briefed. (DE 68; DE 70; DE 76; DE 77). For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment is denied, and Defendant's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Nedel Diaz Valdes ("Valdes") sustained a workplace injury and received medical treatment from Emergency Physician Solutions of South Florida, LLC at JFK Medical Center ("the Medical Center"). (DE 62, Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts ("Pl.’s SOMF") ¶¶ 2, 7; DE 69, Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts ("Def.’s Response SOMF") ¶¶ 2, 7). Between the date of his injury and the date he received treatment at the Medical Center, Valdes filed a petition for worker's compensation benefits with the Office of Judges of Compensation Claims. (Pl.’s SOMF ¶¶ 2–3, 7; Def.’s Response SOMF ¶¶ 2–3, 7). More than three months after his injury, Valdes received a letter from Defendant Accounts Receivable Resources, Inc. ("ARR"), seeking to collect payment for the services rendered by the Medical Center. (Pl.’s SOMF ¶ 9; Def.’s Response SOMF ¶ 9).
ARR disputes the materiality of paragraphs 3 and 7 of Valdes’ Statement of Material Facts, arguing that the primary question presented by this case is not "whether [Valdes] had filed a Petition for Benefits" or whether [Valdes] had sought medical treatment for a work-related injury" but rather "whether ... the medical facility informed ARR [Valdes’] medical debt was or was not covered by workers’ compensation." (DE 69 ¶¶ 3, 7). A disputed fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Talavera v. Shah , 638 F.3d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). While I agree with ARR that the crux of this case is not whether Valdes applied for workers’ compensation insurance or received medical care for a workplace injury, the existence of the workers’ compensation coverage triggered this alleged FDCPA violation in the first place, and the Medical Center indeed treated Valdes and referred the medical bill for such services to ARR for collection. Therefore, these facts provide relevant background information necessary to understanding this case, and I rely on them for that purpose.
The Medical Center and ARR have a contractual relationship whereby the Medical Center may refer only "validly due and owing" debts to ARR for collection. (DE 65, Defendant's Statement of Material Facts ("Def.’s SOMF") ¶¶ 13–14; DE 71, Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Material Facts ("Pl.’s Response SOMF") ¶¶ 13–14). Pursuant to their agreement, on May 30, 2018, the Medical Center referred Valdes’ account to ARR for collection of the outstanding balance. (Def.’s SOMF ¶ 1; Pl.’s Response SOMF ¶ 1). As part of the referral, the Medical Center provided ARR with certain limited information, including Valdes’ name, address, account number, and the total amount due. (Def.’s SOMF ¶ 2; Pl.’s Response SOMF ¶ 2). The Medical Center did not inform ARR that Valdes’ debt was incurred due to a work-related injury or that the account was covered by worker's compensation. (Def.’s SOMF ¶ 3; Pl.’s Response SOMF ¶ 3). Therefore, ARR "did not perform[ ] a pre-collection investigation into the validity of [Valdes’] debt[,] as ARR relied on [the Medical Center] regarding the validity and legality of the debt it sought to collect from Valdes." (Def.’s SOMF ¶ 11; Pl.’s Response SOMF ¶ 11).
In his Response to ARR's Statement of Material Facts, Valdes disputes the majority of ARR's statements; however, Valdes does not once cite to the factual record to indicate the basis for his dispute. (DE 71 ¶¶ 1–3, 10–12, 14–23). "All material facts ... will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the opposing party's statement, provided that the Court finds that the movant's statement is supported by evidence in the record." See S.D. Fla. L. R. 56.1(b). Because (1) materiality is a question of law, (2) ARR supports its facts with citations to the record evidence, and (3) Valdes disputes those facts without referring to any citation to the record or identifying any specific basis for its dispute of ARR's evidence (e.g. , credibility), the Court deems those facts admitted.
ARR, however, did do the following, as it does with all accounts referred for collection: Upon receiving the referral, ARR reviewed Valdes’ account to determine whether Valdes had changed addresses, whether Valdes was deceased, whether Valdes had filed for bankruptcy, and whether the account was covered by workers’ compensation. (Def.’s SOMF ¶¶ 19, 23; Pl.’s Response SOMF ¶¶ 19, 23). ARR also forwarded Valdes’ information to an outside credit reporting agency to verify certain biographical information and to "score" the probability Valdes would pay the referred debt. (Def.’s SOMF ¶ 23.b.; Pl.’s Response SOMF ¶ 23.b.). Aside from these standard procedures, ARR did not follow any other internal procedure to verify the validity of the debt before beginning its collection efforts. (Def.’s SOMF ¶¶ 22–23; Pl.’s Response SOMF ¶¶ 22–23). Instead, in the absence of any indices that Plaintiff's account was covered by worker's compensation or related to a workplace injury—including that the account contained no information that it was covered by any widely known workers’ compensation insurer, such as Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc.—ARR concluded that Valdes’ account was likely valid and thus began collection efforts. (Def.’s SOMF ¶¶ 23.a., 24; Pl.’s Response SOMF ¶¶ 23.a., 24).
To that end, on May 30, 2018, ARR sent Valdes a letter seeking to collect the debt purportedly owed to the Medical Center in the amount of $1,487.00. (DE 62-1 at 13, "Collection Letter"). The Collection Letter included the following notice: "Unless you notify this office within 30 days from receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt, or any portion thereof, this office will assume this debt is valid." (Id. ). Valdes acknowledges that he received the Collection Letter, after which Valdes did not contact ARR or the Medical Center to dispute the debt. (Def.’s SOMF ¶¶ 6, 9; Pl.’s Response SOMF ¶¶ 6, 9).
If ARR comes to learn that a consumer disputes the validity of the debt, ARR ceases all collection activity, investigates the consumer's claims, and confirms the amount due with the creditor. (Def.’s SOMF ¶ 18; Pl.’s Response SOMF ¶ 18). And if either before or after collection attempts begin, ARR is notified that the debt relates to a workplace injury covered by workers’ compensation insurance, ARR will not accept the referral or immediately cease all collection activity, close the account, aid the patient in re-submitting the bill to the proper worker's compensation insurance company, and send the account back to the creditor. (Def.’s SOMF ¶¶ 17, 19; Pl.’s Response SOMF ¶¶ 17, 19). ARR trains its employees that workers’ compensation claims are not compensable by the consumer, never to collect on such account, and if collection on such an account is occurring, to cease all collection efforts and close the account. (Def.’s SOMF ¶ 20; Pl.’s Response SOMF ¶ 20).
By way of this lawsuit, ARR learned that Valdes’ medical debt was covered by workers’ compensation insurance. (DE 68 at 14). As such, Valdes claims that ARR violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. ("FDCPA") by sending a collection letter to Valdes for a debt he did not owe. Valdes also maintains that ARR is not entitled to a bona fide error defense because ARR does not have any policies or procedures in place to prevent the specific conduct giving rise to this action. ARR maintains it did not violate the FDCPA because (1) it is not a "debt collector" within the meaning of the statute; (2) it was entitled to rely on information provided by the creditor; and (3) the affirmative defense of bona fide error applies under these circumstances.
For the reasons set forth herein, I find that the bona fide error defense applies, thereby absolving ARR from liability for the purported violation.
LEGAL STANDARD
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A disputed fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Talavera v. Shah , 638 F.3d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). A dispute over a material fact is "genuine" if it could lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. See Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge at summary judgment. Thus, [the court] do[es] not determine the truth of the matter, but instead decide[s] only whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Barnett v. PA Consulting Group, Inc. , 715 F.3d 354, 358 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Pardo-Kronemann v. Donovan , 601 F.3d 599, 604 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ). Under the summary judgment standard, the moving party bears the "initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for [its] motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits which [it] believe[s] demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In response, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, ‘designate’ specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (internal citations omitted). If a party against whom a motion is filed fails to "establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial," summary judgment for the movant is warranted. Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If a party against whom a motion is filed does not bear the burden of proof at trial, the nonmovant is entitled to summary judgment if the evidence cannot support one or more elements of the burdened party's claim. The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing that there is insufficient evidence to support the non-moving party's case/defense. Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
DISCUSSION
The FDCPA "regulates interactions between consumer debtors and ‘debt collector[s],’ [and] [a]mong other things ... prohibits debt collectors from making false representations as to a debt's character, amount, or legal status ...." Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA , 559 U.S. 573, 577, 130 S.Ct. 1605, 176 L.Ed.2d 519 (2010). "The FDCPA also provides that any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of th[e] [Act] with respect to any person is liable to such person." Id. at 578, 130 S.Ct. 1605 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) ). The FDCPA has been described as a "strict liability statute" and generally "subjects debt collectors to liability even when violations are not knowing or intentional." Owen v. I.C. Sys., Inc. , 629 F.3d 1263, 1270–71 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners , 601 F.3d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) ). However, there are two narrow carve-outs to strict liability under the FDCPA—the good faith conformity defense and the bona fide error defense. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692k(c), (e) ; see also Owen , 629 F.3d at 1271.
The good faith conformity defense, which shields debt collectors from liability for "any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any advisory opinion of the [Federal Trade] Commission," 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(e), is not implicated here.
To establish an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must prove that: "(1) [he or she] was the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt, (2) the defendant is a debt[ ] collector as defined by the FDCPA, and (3) the defendant has engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA." Pescatrice v. Orovitz , 539 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1378 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fuller v. Becker & Poliakoff, P.A. , 192 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1366 (M.D. Fla. 2002) ). The Parties do not dispute that the debt referred by the Medical Center to ARR was a consumer debt and that sending the collection letter to Valdes violated the FDCPA, as Valdes did not owe the referred debt, rendering the communication false and thus in violation of the Act. However, they do dispute that ARR is a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA. I need not resolve the issue of whether ARR is a debt collector because even if it is, and assuming, arguendo, that it committed the FDCPA violation alleged by Valdes, I conclude that ARR has demonstrated, by the preponderance of evidence, a bona fide error.
See Fla. Stat. § 440.13(13)(a) ("A health care provider may not collect or receive a fee from an injured employee within this state, except as otherwise provided by this chapter. Such providers have recourse against the employer or carrier for payment for services rendered in accordance with this chapter."). "A false representation in connection with the collection of a debt is sufficient to violate the FDCPA facially, even where no misleading or deception is claimed." Bourff v. Rubin Lublin, LLC , 674 F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir. 2012). Whether a representation is false is judged under the "least sophisticated consumer" standard. Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc. , 760 F.2d 1168, 1177 n.11 (11th Cir. 1985). This standard does not depend on the plaintiff's individual perception or the perception of a reasonable consumer; rather, it depends on whether the least sophisticated consumer would know that the particular statement was false. Landeros v. Pinnacle Recovery, Inc. , 692 F. App'x 608, 613 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Jeter , 760 F.2d at 1172–73 ).
For this same reason, I also need not reach ARR's argument that a "reliance on the creditor" defense applies.
The bona fide error defense is a limited exception to the general rule of strict liability under the FDCPA. Owen , 629 F.3d at 1271. Section 1692k(c) of the FDCPA provides that:
A debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought under this subchapter if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.
15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (emphasis added). The defense excepts a debt collector from liability if the debt collector demonstrates the following by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the violation was not intentional; (2) the violation was a bona fide error; and (3) the violation "occurred despite the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error." Owen , 629 F.3d at 1271 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Edwards v. Niagara Credit Solutions, Inc. , 584 F.3d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 2009) ).
Because ARR did not know Valdes’ medical debt was due to a work-related injury or covered under workers’ compensation, nor could it determine such from the information provided by the Medical Center, I find that ARR acted unintentionally and committed a reasonable bona fide error by sending Valdes the Collection Letter. Indeed, Valdes does not dispute that ARR's FDCPA violation was unintentional and a bona fide error. Rather, Valdes contends that ARR did not satisfy the third element of the bona fide error defense: the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the type of errors at issue. Therefore, the Court need only consider the third prong of the bona fide error defense.
"As used in the [FDCPA,] ‘bona fide’ means that the error resulting in a violation was ‘made in good faith; a genuine mistake, as opposed to a contrived mistake.’ " Edwards , 584 F.3d at 1353 (quoting Kort v. Diversified Collection Servs., Inc. , 394 F.3d 530, 538 (7th Cir. 2005) ). "To be considered a bona fide error, the debt collector's mistake must be objectively reasonable." Id. at 1354. Moreover, "a bona fide error" as used in § 1692k(c) refers only to clerical or factual mistakes, not legal errors. Owen , 629 F.3d at 1272 (citing Jerman , 559 U.S. at 586, 130 S.Ct. 1605 ).
To determine whether a debt collector satisfied the procedures component, the Court must consider: (1) whether the debt collector maintained—that is, actually employed or implemented—procedures to avoid errors; and if so, (2) whether the procedures were "reasonably adapted to avoid the specific error at issue." Owen , 629 F.3d at 1273–74 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Supreme Court has described the term "procedures" as employed in § 1692k(c) as connoting "a routinized process of error-checking" and "internal controls" consisting of "a series of steps followed in a regular orderly definite way." Id. at 1272.
"[T]o qualify for the bona fide error defense, the debt collector has an affirmative statutory obligation to maintain procedures reasonably adapted to avoid readily discoverable errors ...." Id. at 1276–77 (emphasis added). Notwithstanding the maintenance of such procedures, "the FDCPA does not require debt collectors to independently investigate and verify the validity of a debt to qualify for the bona fide error defense." Id. at 1276. Courts must determine whether a defendant has established the third element of the bona fide error defense on a "case-by-case basis and depend[ing] upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case," while bearing in mind that "the third element of the bona fide error defense is a uniquely fact-bound inquiry susceptible of few broad, generally applicable rules of law." Id. at 1274, 1277.
Here, ARR identifies four procedures that it maintained to avoid errors: (1) ARR reviewed the account information provided by the Medical Center for indices that the account was not collectable (e.g. , whether Valdes had filed for bankruptcy); (2) ARR verified Valdes’ biographical information with Experian; (3) ARR performed a "deceased debtor scrub" to determine whether Valdes was still alive; and (4) ARR verified Valdes’ address using the National Change of Address Database. (DE 64 at 12; DE 65 ¶ 23). These four procedures satisfy the "low threshold" for the first prong of the procedural inquiry. See Owen , 629 F.3d at 1274 (finding the debt collector satisfied the first prong of the procedural component by implementing similar procedures). The question remains whether ARR has proven the second prong. I conclude that it has.
ARR identifies several procedures it maintained that it claims are reasonably adapted to avoid the specific error at issue in this case—seeking to collect a medical debt covered by workers’ compensation. I recognize three of those proffered procedures as relevant to this inquiry: (1) during its initial screening of the account information provided by the creditor, ARR looks for indices that the debt may be covered by workers’ compensation, such as the presence of an insurer generally known to cover workers’ compensation claims (e.g. , Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc.) (2) ARR enters into contracts with its clients, including the Medical Center, whereby the creditor agrees to refer only validly due and owing debts and to provide accurate information about the referred account; and (3) ARR instructs its employees that workers’ compensation claims are not payable by the consumer and to never collect on such accounts. (DE 64 at 14–15). In my view, the other procedures posited by ARR do not support this analysis, given that they are practices in place: simply to comply with the law (i.e. , if, at the inception of the referral, ARR is made aware that an account is or may be compensable by workers’ compensation insurance, ARR will not accept the account and return it to the client); for when an account already in collection is discovered to be covered by workers’ compensation (i.e. , immediately suspending collection efforts); or are otherwise not specifically tailored to protect against the error at issue here (i.e. , verifying whether Valdes filed for bankruptcy prior to sending the Collection Letter). (See id. ). As to the specific procedures employed to protect against this type of error, I recognize that the Eleventh Circuit in Owen stated: "Employing a one-time form contract with [the Medical Center] and blindly relying on creditors to send only valid debts is a procedure, but it is not one reasonably adapted to avoid the type of [errors] at issue here." Owen , 629 F.3d at 1275. That pronouncement makes sense in the context of Owen , wherein the error identified as violating the FDCPA was one involving a calculation of principal and interest based on documentation provided to the debt collector by the creditor. Indeed, the distinguishing factual feature between Owen and the instant case is that the debt collector in Owen had the information before it necessary to ascertain the error without need of conducting further investigation. (See id. ("Importantly too, the errors here were not errors requiring [the debt collector] to further investigate the validity of [the creditor's] listed charges. Rather, the errors were discernible on the face of [the creditor's] documents forwarded to [the debt collector] and therefore readily discoverable by [the debt collector].")). In that sense, relying on the contractual relationship with the creditor as a "procedure" to minimize such errors naturally would not provide any enhanced protection from this type of error, as the debt collector could just as easily identity the error itself. Here, however, it is undisputed that the information and documentation provided to ARR contained no indication that Valdes’ account was or may be covered by workers’ compensation insurance. Rather, to discover this information, ARR would have had to engage in further investigation. In his Response to ARR's Motion for Summary Judgment, Valdes argues that ARR has failed to identify specifically tailored procedures it employs to protect against collecting on claims not payable by the consumer under Florida's workers’ compensation scheme because, for instance, there is no evidence in this case that ARR runs searches of Florida's Department of Administrative Hearings’ website or the Judge of Compensation Claims’ website, public domains containing open workers’ compensation proceedings, to determine whether the account at issue potentially is covered by workers’ compensation insurance. (DE 70 at 11). But these additional procedures are not statutorily mandated; rather, they would involve a debt collector in what appears to be an independent pre-collection investigation and verification that a debt collector is under no obligation to perform. Owen , 629 F.3d at 1276. Still, the Eleventh Circuit has indicated that "[a] debt collector does not fulfill [its] affirmative obligation [to maintain procedures reasonably adapted to avoid readily discoverable errors] by delegating it entirely to creditors ... whose actions are not even regulated by the FDCPA." Id. at 1277.
I find these concepts somewhat in tension with one another. On the one hand, debt collectors are not obligated to conduct a pre-collection investigation and verification to qualify for the bona fide error defense, but on the other, if the debt collector does not do so—such as in this case by running searches in public workers’ compensation databases to detect the non-facially apparent error—then it may not be able to satisfy the third element of the bona fide error defense. Mindful of this apparent conflict, on this record, I am to decide whether ARR's procedures are sufficiently designed to prevent collection activity on medical debts covered by workers’ compensation when such errors are not readily discoverable. In considering this question, I acknowledge that ARR cannot rely entirely on the Medical Center's contractual obligation to refer only validly due and owing debts. Owen , 629 F.3d at 1277. After all, the whole point is that the Medical Center didn't refer a valid debt in this case, tasking me with deciding whether ARR's procedures are sufficiently designed to actually detect that when it happens. Obviously then, the mere fact of entering into an "agreement" with the creditor that the creditor will only refer valid debts is not enough.
However, ARR does not exclusively rely on that procedure. In addition, ARR sets forth two other procedures that it employs to avoid this type of error: (1) ARR initially screens referrals for an indication that the debt may be covered by workers’ compensation by looking for the presence of an insurance carrier widely known to cover workers’ compensation claims; and (2) ARR trains its employees that debts covered by workers’ compensation are not compensable and to not collect on them. As such, while I am not finding that ARR could not have done more to detect this error, my point is that it did do marginally more than rely exclusively on the creditor's contractual obligation to refer only validly due and owning debts. Thus, while ARR's procedures for detecting debts covered by workers’ compensation may be less than robust, they are existent and reasonably calibrated to protect against the type of violation at issue in this case. This finding is animated by my understanding of Owen and its description of ARR's statutory obligation—"to maintain procedures reasonably adapted to avoid readily discoverable errors ...." Id. at 1276–77 (emphasis added). It is undisputed that the instant error was not readily discoverable based on the information provided to ARR by the Medical Center. Thus, assuming without deciding that an FDCPA violation occurred in this case, I find that ARR is entitled to a bona fide error defense and thereby summary judgment in its favor.
Finally, Valdes directs the Court's attention to an unpublished Eleventh Circuit opinion where the court affirmed the district court's finding that the debt collector was not entitled to the bona fide error defense because the debt collector relied on its clients to provide information whether the referred debts were subject to workers’ compensation coverage and "used no additional screening procedures to detect if a debt was subject to worker's compensation before mailing a dunning letter." Kottler v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, Inc. , 847 F. App'x 542, 544 (11th Cir. 2021). However, I find this reasoning somewhat inconsistent with the Eleventh Circuit's binding decision in Owen , asserting that no pre-collection investigation or verification procedures that go beyond careful review of the initial information provided by the creditor are necessary to identify readily discoverable errors and thus establish a bona fide error defense. Owen , 629 F.3d at 1276.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
(1) Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 63) is DENIED .
(2) Defendant's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 64) is GRANTED .
(3) Pursuant to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a final judgment in favor of Accounts Receivable Resources, Inc. and against Nedel Diaz Valdes will be entered by separate order.