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Vair v. City of Ravenna

Supreme Court of Ohio
Mar 1, 1972
29 Ohio St. 2d 135 (Ohio 1972)

Opinion

No. 71-110

Decided March 1, 1972.

Municipal corporations — Public safety — R.C. 737.11 — Duties of police and fire departments — "Such other duties" for firemen not incident to duties as firemen — Ordinance in conflict with general law, when.

1. R.C. 737.11 specifically delineates the duties of firemen and policemen in a noncharter city and the provision therein that policemen and firemen shall perform "such other duties as are prescribed by ordinance" refers only to duties which are incident to the performance of a fireman's duty as a fireman or a policeman's duty as a policeman.

2. A city ordinance providing compensation for firemen "for duties as firemen and operators of the safety department radio" prescribes duties for firemen not incident to the performance of their duties as firemen, thereby conflicting with R.C. 737.11.

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Portage County.

The stipulated facts in this case reveal that "for a number of years" the plaintiffs-appellees, full-time firemen employed by the city of Ravenna, have operated the safety department radio for the police department and for the fire department. Duties of operating the police radio include answering a police telephone, keeping a log of certain police telephone calls, checking ownership registration on motor vehicles and dispatching police cars.

During pay raise negotiations in 1968, the firemen requested to be relieved of the duty of operating the police radio. As a result of those negotiations, the city of Ravenna agreed to hire a daytime police radio operator and the firemen agreed to maintain their operation of the police radio between the hours of 3:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. The saving in salaries of police radio operators between the hours of 3:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. was to be used instead for wage and salary increases for the firemen. Pursuant to this agreement, Ordinance No. 1968-32 was passed by Ravenna city council and it provides in Section 1 thereof:

"That the Fire Department of the city of Ravenna shall consist of the following officers and other members who shall receive the salaries and other compensation hereinafter provided for duties as firemen and operators of the Safety Department radio." (Emphasis added.)

On July 17, 1969, a petition for declaratory judgment was filed by the firemen in the Common Pleas Court of Portage County, asking the court to set forth "the duties of firemen in light of Ohio Revised Code Section 737.11 and in particular whether the answering of the police telephone and answering and dispatching of the police radio with other duties related thereto are required duties of firemen."

R.C. 737.11 provides:

"* * * The fire department shall protect the lives and property of the people in case of fire. Both the police and fire departments shall perform such other duties as are provided by ordinance. * * *" (Emphasis added.)

Finding that Ordinance No. 1968-32 was a proper exercise of legislative authority by the Ravenna city council and not in conflict with general laws, the Common Pleas Court rendered judgment in favor of the city of Ravenna. Upon appeal, the Eleventh District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and declared the Ravenna ordinance unconstitutional because it was at variance with R.C. 737.11.

The cause comes to this court upon the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Mr. Joseph Giulitto, for appellees.

Mr. Paul M. Wilson, for appellants.


The question presented for judicial determination is whether the words "such other duties," as used in R.C. 737.11, contemplate any other duties or only other duties incident to the performance of one's position. More broadly stated, we are to ascertain whether the Ravenna ordinance is in conflict with R.C. 737.11.

Ravenna concedes that since it is a noncharter city it cannot pass an ordinance in conflict with the provisions of R.C. 737.11, regardless of "whether the ordinance deals with local self-government or police regulation."

In this connection, see State, ex rel. Petit, v. Wagner (1960), 170 Ohio St. 297; Leavers v. Canton (1964), 1 Ohio St.2d 33; Opinions of Atty. Gen. (1962), 496, No. 3103; and Opinions of Atty. Gen. (1959), 513, No. 819.

In attempting to determine the legislative intent expressed in R.C. 737.11, we look to other Revised Code provisions and find, as did the Court of Appeals, "that separate civil service examinations be given for police and firemen, that separate eligibility lists be maintained for each, that no person may transfer from one list to the other nor shall personnel transfer from one department to the other (R.C. 143.33); that the chief of the fire department shall have exclusive control of the stationing and transferring of all firemen * * * (R.C. 737.09); that no person shall be appointed as a permanent full time paid member of the fire department * * * unless such person has received a certificate * * * evidencing a satisfactory completion of a fire fighter training program (R.C. 737.08); and that no person shall * * * receive an * * * appointment on a permanent basis as a peace officer * * * unless such person has previously been awarded a certificate * * * attesting to his satisfactory completion of an approved state, county or municipal police basic training program (R.C. 109.77)."

Because of the specificity with which the General Assembly has delineated individuality of treatment and requirements for members of each of the public safety departments, we conclude that the legislative intent in using the words "such other duties" in R.C. 737.11 was to refer to "other duties" incident to a fireman's performance of duties as a fireman and "other duties" incident to a policeman's performance of duties as a policeman.

The question now emerges as to whether or not the Ravenna ordinance, which requires firemen to operate the police radio, is in conflict with R.C. 737.11, wherein we deem the words "such other duties" to mean duties incident to the performance of one's position.

We hold that the words "such other duties" which appear in R.C. 737.11, as we have defined them, refer to such duties as are incident to the operation of the respective police or fire departments.

The Ravenna ordinance, No. 1968-32, prescribes duties for firemen outside the purview of R.C. 737.11, and such a prescription of duties is in conflict with the general law.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

O'NEILL, C.J., SCHNEIDER, HERBERT, SILBERT, STERN and LEACH, JJ., concur.

SILBERT, J., of the Eighth Appellate District, sitting for DUNCAN, J. JUDGE SILBERT of the Court of Appeals was, pursuant to Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution of Ohio, duly directed by the Chief Justice "to sit with the justices of the Supreme Court in the place and stead of" JUSTICE DUNCAN and JUDGE SILBERT did so and heard and considered this cause prior to the resignation of JUSTICE DUNCAN on November 28, 1971.


Summaries of

Vair v. City of Ravenna

Supreme Court of Ohio
Mar 1, 1972
29 Ohio St. 2d 135 (Ohio 1972)
Case details for

Vair v. City of Ravenna

Case Details

Full title:VAIR ET AL., APPELLEES, v. CITY OF RAVENNA ET AL., APPELLANTS

Court:Supreme Court of Ohio

Date published: Mar 1, 1972

Citations

29 Ohio St. 2d 135 (Ohio 1972)
279 N.E.2d 884

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