Opinion
No. DBD CV04-4000784 S
File Date: December 29, 2006.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this declaratory judgment action by filing a complaint seeking a judicial determination as to whether an umbrella insurance policy issued by the plaintiff to the defendant Robert L. Williams provides coverage to his son Michael L. Williams for claims made in an underlying personal injury action. In the present action it is alleged that Michael L. Williams caused the plaintiff therein, Marianne Noyes-Ryder (a defendant herein), injuries and losses as a result of a motor vehicle accident. In the present action, the plaintiff USAA Property and Casualty Insurance Company ("USAA") alleges that the defendant Michael L. Williams was not a resident of his father`s household at the time of the motor vehicle accident and therefore was not an insured under the terms of the umbrella policy issued by it. Accordingly, USAA argues it has no obligation to make payment for any claims against Michael L. Williams arising out of the underlying personal injury action. Hence, the sole issue before the court is to determine whether, under the terms of the umbrella insurance policy, the defendant Michael L. Williams was a resident of Robert L. Williams` household at the time of the May 29, 2003 motor vehicle accident which forms the basis of the underlying action. The relevant language of the umbrella insurance policy at issue defines "insured" as including "relatives [of the named insured] who are residents of your household." (Plaintiff`s Trial Exhibit 1.) The policy does not define "resident" or "household."
Policy #00062365170U effective October 15, 2002 to October 15, 2003 (Plaintiff`s Trial Exhibit 1).
Marianne Noyes-Ryder v. Michael Williams et al., Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket #CV04-0352130S. The motor vehicle accident forming the basis of the claim in that matter took place on May 29, 2003. Marianne Noyes-Ryder is a named defendant in the instant action.
The matter has already been tried to the court (Axelrod, J.) commencing on September 20, 2005 and concluding on September 23, 2005. Trial briefs were filed by the parties with the last reply brief filed on July 14, 2006. On July 27, 2006, the court declared a mistrial. Thereafter, on September 13, 2006 the parties filed a joint motion which contained a stipulation agreeing that the matter could be referred to another judge for purposes of issuing a decision. The court (Mintz, J.) granted the motion and referred the matter to the undersigned. In considering the matter, this court has completely reviewed the trial transcripts, the trial briefs, and all of the exhibits admitted into evidence. The court also held a hearing in September 2006 wherein the parties again presented their closing arguments relative to the case. At that hearing the parties waived the 120-day requirement for the issuance of a decision by the court. The court expresses its gratefulness and appreciation to the parties for their professional courtesy in this regard.
STATEMENT OF LAW
The law in Connecticut on residency is well-settled but a determination of residency rests on a conglomeration of factors. In Remington v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 240 Conn. 309, 314, 692 A.2d 399 (1997), the Supreme Court of Connecticut recognized "that a trier of fact must determine where an individual resides by analyzing the facts unique to each case." The court mentioned that in order to determine residency, the requirements set forth in Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. v. Walsh, 218 Conn. 681, 590 A.2d 957 (1991) must be met. Remington v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., supra, 240 Conn. 314-15. In Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. v. Walsh, supra, 218 Conn. 681, the court focused upon ten objective factors that would establish whether a person was a resident of a household. These factors were: (1) intent of the individual; (2) the frequency of contact between the individual and other household inhabitants; (3) the frequency with which the individual spends time at the household; (4) the maintenance of a separate residence for the individual; (5) whether the individual is emotionally and financially capable of establishing and maintaining a residence independent of the household; (6) the location of personal belongings; (7) the location of and address used for personal records; (8) the location of and address used for business records; (9) the address at which mail is received; and (10) the address used for formal purposes such as voting, licenses, and income tax filings.
Although Middlesex set forth the ten factors to be considered in determining residency, there have been other holdings that have been instructive on the issue. In Griffith v. Security Ins. Co., 167 Conn. 450, 458, 356 A.2d 94(1975) the insurance policy at issue defined a relative as "a relative of the named insured who is a resident of the same household." (Internal quotations marks omitted.) Id., 453. The court went on to define household as "those who dwell under the same roof and compose a family; a domestic establishment . . . a social unit comprised of those living together in the same dwelling place." (Internal quotations marks omitted.) Id., 454. Further, in Lawrence v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 29 Conn.App. 484, 616 A.2d 806 (1992) the court focused on the importance of a person actually living at a subject premises in order to be considered a resident there.
Legal treatises have also noted that whether a person is a resident or member of the household depends on several factors. (L. Russ T. Segalla, 8 G. Couch, Insurance (3rd Ed. 1997), § 114:13, pp. 114-21. They "generally include whether the named insured and the person at issue: (1) live under the same roof; (2) in a close, intimate, and informal relationship; (3) the intended duration of which is likely to be substantial and consistent with the informality of the relationship; and (4) from which it is reasonable to conclude that the parties would consider the relationship in contracting about such matters as insurance or in their conduct in reliance thereon." Id.
However, our Supreme Court has held that a person need not "share the same roof" in order to be deemed a resident of the same household. Remington v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., supra, 240 Conn. 315. Further, that "in each case, the decision has depended upon the particular factual circumstances involved. These factual circumstances are so varied that the decisions themselves are of little precedential value." Griffith v. Security Ins. Co., supra, 167 Conn. 459.
DISCUSSION
Again, the dispositive issue in this matter is whether Michael L. Williams was a resident of his father`s household as of May 29, 2003. The defendant in the present action, Marianne Noyes-Ryder (plaintiff in the underlying action) argues that under the factual circumstances of this case, Michael L. Williams was a resident of his father`s household at the time of the May 29, 2003 accident or, in the alternative, held a dual residency and therefore was an insured under the umbrella insurance policy issued by USAA. In Remington v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., supra, 240 Conn. 314, our Supreme Court recognized that a trier of fact must determine where an individual resides by analyzing the facts unique to each case. As noted, in order to determine residency, the requirements set forth in Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. v. Walsh, supra, 218 Conn. 681 must be considered. Remington, supra, 240 Conn. at 314-15.
In analyzing the evidence presented to the court, the following is found to be in support of the plaintiff`s argument. At the time of the accident, Michael L. Williams rented a cottage at 9 Evans Hill Rd., Sherman, Connecticut. This property was a relatively short distance from 10 Blackberry Lane, Sherman, Connecticut where he grew up and where his parents continued to reside. He had rented the cottage for a little over two years before the date of the accident and had made payment of the rent and utilities through his own funds. During that time he had no overnight stays at his parents except for a period where he stayed with them for two weeks for medical reasons. He would go over to his parents irregularly, sometimes for meals, and sometimes to do laundry. At the time he moved out of his parents` household in 2001, he took with him all but a few of his personal belongings. He also kept his own truck at the cottage and paid the insurance on it. He made payment of his expenses through his own checkbook. The local phone book carried a separate listing and number for him. After the accident, both his parents and his roommate at the cottage advised the police that he lived at the cottage. Though he went to stay with his parents after the accident, he continued to keep his clothes and belongings at the cottage and also continued to contribute to the payment of the rent thereon. Finally, the umbrella policy itself listed only Robert L. Williams and his wife Loree Williams as operators of the vehicles listed on the policy.
A review of the record finds that there are other facts in support of the defendant`s position that Michael L. Williams was a resident of Robert L. Williams` household. Michael`s driver`s license and motor vehicle tax bill both reflected his parents` address of 10 Blackberry Lane, Sherman, Connecticut. At one point prior to the accident he had stayed with his parents for a period of two straight weeks so that they could care for him. He had full access to his parents` house as he had a key to the property. He provided information to the registrar of voters as late as November 2002 that reflected his parents` address. A credit card application filled out by Michael was co-signed by his father and they both listed their address as 10 Blackberry Lane. Under the terms of Michael`s own auto insurance policy, he listed the truck as being garaged at his parents` address. Although the checking account used by Michael was his own the checks still reflected his parents` address and phone number. He used his parents` post office box as a mailing address as neither he nor his parents had a mailbox in front of their residence. A tax return filled out with the assistance of his father used his parents` address. Finally, it was not uncommon for him to eat meals with his parents or have his laundry done there.
In applying the factors set forth in Middlesex to the above-referenced facts, the court finds the following: (1) it was the intent of Michael to live at 9 Evans Hill Rd., Sherman, Connecticut; (2) although there was a good deal of contact between Michael and his parents, the frequency of contact and the purpose for which it was done was not sufficient to find that he remained a resident of his parents` household; (3) the amount of time spent at his parents` household, although significant, was not so much as to make him a resident thereof; (4) Michael maintained the cottage at 9 Evans Hill Rd. as residence separate and apart from that of his parents; (5) he was emotionally and financially capable of establishing and maintaining a residence independent of his parents` household; (6) the vast majority of his personal belongings were maintained at 9 Evans Hill Rd.; (7) the location of most of his personal records was at 9 Evans Hill Rd. However, some personal records reflected his parents` address of 10 Blackberry Lane (e.g., the credit card application) and were so made shortly before the accident. (8) the location and address of business records was not relevant for consideration as he was not engaged in a business; (9) mail was received at a jointly used post office box address. However, this was done as neither Michael nor his parents had a physical mailbox in front of their residences. Therefore, the court does not view this as evidence of residency with his parents, nor of any intent to establish residency there. Rather, it was simply a matter of convenience for both of the parties; (10) his parents` physical address of 10 Blackberry Lane was used for formal purposes such as voting, licenses, and income tax filings. However, as to his driver`s license, the court notes that it was issued in 2000 and that he moved to 9 Evans Hill Rd. in 2001. Although Michael conceded at trial that there was a legal obligation to advise the motor vehicle department of any change in address, the court finds that the failure to make such a change was done not with the intent of maintaining a residential address of 10 Blackberry Lane, but rather stemmed from simple inertia (i.e., a lack of diligence) on his part. See Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Conzito, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV99-0270188 (July 25, 2000, Levine, J.). Although the income tax filing reflected his parents` address, this was done partly due to Michael`s incarceration subsequent to May 29, 2003. By providing such an address, Michael could ensure that any further correspondence on the matter would be attended to by his parents and they could bring it to his attention. As to the voting registration which reflected his parents` address, although it is a factor indicative of establishing that address as his residence (like the credit card application), it does not outweigh the other cumulative factors considered.
Based on the facts of this case, the court finds that there is more than sufficient evidence to establish 9 Evans Hill Rd., Sherman, Connecticut as the residence of Michael L. Williams as of May 29, 2003. The court further finds the facts do not warrant a finding of dual residency between 9 Evans Hill Rd. and 10 Blackberry Lane, Sherman, Connecticut. Accordingly, the court grants the plaintiff`s request seeking a judgment declaring that Michael L. Williams was not a resident of Robert L. Williams` household on May 29, 2003, and, that Robert L. Williams` umbrella insurance policy which was in effect on May 29, 2003 does not cover Michael L. Williams relative to the claims of Marianne Noyes-Ryder.