Opinion
No. 06-4871-cr (L).
January 18, 2008.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut is AFFIRMED.
For Appellant: DOREEN KLEIN (Andrew P. Gaillard, on the brief), Day, Berry Howard LLP, Stamford, Connecticut.
For Appellee: ALINA REYNOLDS (Alex V. Hernandez, Assistant United States Attorney, Sandra S. Glover, on the brief), for Kevin J. O'Connor, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, New Haven, Connecticut.
Defendant-appellant John Foster ("Foster") appeals from the September 19, 2006 decision of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Nevas, J.), denying his constitutional challenge to a prior felony narcotics conviction that resulted in his being sentenced to a statutorily mandated 20-year term of imprisonment for violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 846. We assume the parties' familiarity with the facts and procedural history of this case.
Foster offers two reasons why his prior Connecticut Superior Court felony narcotics conviction may not be used to enhance his sentence. He asserts that the transcript of the subject guilty plea (1) fails to demonstrate a knowing, voluntary and intelligent plea, and (2) fails to establish a factual basis for that conviction. We reject both claims.
As to Foster's first claim, the record demonstrates that Foster understood the charges against him and voluntarily made the decision to plead guilty. The transcript of the plea allocution informs that Foster discussed the charges with his attorney, who advised him of the elements of each offense. See Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005) ("[T]he constitutional prerequisites of a valid plea may be satisfied where the record accurately reflects that the nature of the charge and the elements of the crime were explained to the defendant by his own, competent counsel."). The transcript further informs that the superior court judge explained to Foster that by pleading guilty, he was giving up a panoply of rights, listing them explicitly. Foster acknowledged these rights and affirmed that he was pleading guilty "freely and voluntarily." Viewing the record as a whole, we find no error in the district court's conclusion that Foster's plea was intelligent and voluntary. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) ("Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity."); Hanson v. Phillips, 442 F.3d 789, 798 (2d Cir. 2006) (setting forth totality of circumstances standard).
As to Foster's second claim, we have stated that "due process does not mandate a factual basis inquiry [into the charged conduct] by state courts." Willbright v. Smith, 745 F.2d 779, 780 (2d Cir. 1984). Instead, "[a] factual basis inquiry . . . is merely one way of satisfying the constitutional requirement that a plea be voluntary and intelligent." Id. Because we find the state court plea transcript adequate to establish that Foster's guilty plea was constitutionally valid, a factual basis inquiry into the charged conduct was not necessary to ensure that Foster received due process.
We have considered the defendant's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the reasons discussed, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.