Opinion
Case No. C2-04-145.
March 3, 2005
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Before the Court is a motion by the United States to reconsider the memorandum opinion and order granting Defendant's motion to suppress (doc. # 22). Defendant has filed a brief in opposition. For the reasons explained below, the United States' motion is DENIED.
On January 31, 2005, the Court issued its memorandum opinion and order granting Defendant's motion to suppress statements obtained in violation of Miranda. The Court found Defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda when he was handcuffed and directed to sit in a chair. The United States has requested that the Court consider two additional cases not previously presented to the Court — United States v. Brave Heart, No. 03-2888 (8th Cir. Feb. 4, 2005) and Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
The legal determination to be made in this case is whether the defendant was "in custody" for purposes of Miranda. The ultimate question in determining whether a person is "in custody" under Miranda is "whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983). Thus, the Court begins with the notion of what constitutes an arrest. The term "arrest" is often defined in terms of restricting liberty of movement. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103 (1959); see also Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (defining arrest as: 1. a seizure or forcible restraint; 2. the taking or keeping of a person in custody by legal authority). Because an arrest is a Fourth Amendment seizure, efforts to define the term "arrest" also require inquiry into what amounts to a seizure in the Fourth Amendment sense. Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 5.1(a) (4th ed. 2004). The United States Supreme has concluded a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (joint opinion of Stevens and Rehnquist, JJ.). Consequently, the category of seizures includes not only formal arrests but other more limited and less intrusive investigative stops. LaFave, at § 5.1(a) n. 54. As a result, not every restraint on an individual's freedom of movement constitutes an arrest, and the amount of restraint that is required to constitute an arrest is not always easily determined.Cook v. Sigler, 299 F.Supp. 1338, 1343 (D. Neb. 1969).
In this case, however, the amount of restraint is clear. Defendant was placed in handcuffs and told where to sit in his house. The parties did not cite, and the Court has not located, any controlling authority addressing the question of custody for purposes of Miranda when a defendant, although he is told he is not under arrest and he does not have to speak with law enforcement officers, is physically restrained in a manner consistent with an arrest. In two recent cases, the Eighth Circuit has focused on statements made by law enforcement officers to a detained individual, averting a finding of custody for purposes of Miranda. United States v. Brave Heart, No. 03-2888 (8th Cir. Feb. 4, 2005) (concluding defendant was not in custody when he was advised his participation in the interrogation was voluntary); United States v. Czichray, 378 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 2004) (determining defendant was not in custody when he was advised his participation in the interview was voluntary and he was free to ask agents to leave his home).
However, neither in Brave Heart nor in Czichray was the individual physically restrained in any way. The Supreme Court has determined that a person is "in custody" when he is formally arrested or when his freedom of movement is restrained to a degree equivalent with formal arrest. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125. As explained in the Court's previous memorandum opinion and order, handcuffs are generally recognized as a hallmark of a formal arrest. United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 677 (2d Cir. 2004). Likewise, handcuffs present a restraint on freedom of movement, and telling an individual that he is not under arrest does not carry the same weight in determining custody when the suspect is in handcuffs as it does when he is unrestrained. Id.
In this case, Defendant was not only restrained with handcuffs during the search and interview, but he was told where to sit by law enforcement officers. A reasonable person in this predicament would understand the situation to be comparable to arrest. See United States v. Mora-Cabrera, 59 F.Supp.2d 366, 382 (D.P.R. 1999) (stating a reasonable person in handcuffs would have understood the situation to be comparable to arrest); see also United States v. Miller, 722 F.Supp. 1, 5 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating it is apparent that from the moment the defendant was handcuffed and placed in the agents' vehicle, defendant could reasonably have believed he was not free to leave and was effectively in custody for the purposes of invoking the procedural safeguards of Miranda).
Furthermore, a relevant inquiry in determining custody is whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have felt at liberty to end the interrogation and leave.Czichray, 378 F.3d at 826. The Court finds a reasonable person restrained with handcuffs by law enforcement officers, told where to sit in his own house by the officers, and not advised that he was free to leave or that he could ask the agents to leave would not have felt free to terminate the interview and leave. Custody is not defeated in this case simply because law enforcement officers uttered to Defendant that he is not under arrest and his participation in the interview is voluntary. To hold Defendant was not in custody under the circumstances of this case would render meaningless the United States Supreme Court's pronouncement that custody for purposes of Miranda occurs when an individual's freedom of movement is restrained to a degree equivalent with formal arrest.
Moreover, prior to interrogating Defendant, law enforcement officers informed Defendant he was not under arrest and at least two different officers told Defendant he did not have to speak with the officers. Requiring law enforcement officers to further advise a suspect that anything he might say can be used in evidence, that he has the right to have counsel present, and the right to have counsel appointed if he cannot afford a lawyer is not an onerous burden.
Additionally, the United States has requested that the Court review the Supreme Court's decision in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), in which the Court held that a warrant to search for contraband, founded on probable cause, implicitly carried with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises during the search. In Summers, a warrant was issued to search for narcotics inside a residence. Upon arriving at the residence, the defendant was on the porch and asked to return inside the residence where he was then detained. Summers, 452 U.S. at 693. The Supreme Court noted that the seizure of the defendant during the search of his residence was not likely to have coercive aspects likely to induce self-incrimination. Id. at 702 n. 15.
In this case, a search warrant was authorized to search Defendant's residence for a federal fugitive. Upon execution of the search warrant, the fugitive was located and taken into custody. While inside Defendant's residence, law enforcement officers observed paraphernalia for ingesting controlled substances. Although officer safety is a legitimate consideration during any search, the issue before the Court is not the lawfulness of Defendant's detention, but whether Defendant was restrained in a manner consistent with a formal arrest, necessitating Miranda warnings prior to any interrogation. Thus, the Supreme Court's opinion in Summers does not persuade this Court that it should vacate its order granting suppression.
After reconsideration, the Court is not convinced a different result is warranted. This Court can reach no other rational conclusion but to find Defendant's freedom of movement was restrained to a degree associated with formal arrest when law enforcement officers handcuffed him, directed him to sit in a chair, and never told him he was free to leave or that he could ask the officers to leave at any time. A reasonable person in this situation would not have felt free to leave. Thus, the Court finds law enforcement officers effectively placed Defendant in custody for purposes of invoking the procedural safeguards ofMiranda and failed to provide Miranda warnings prior to interrogating him. Accordingly, the United States' motion for reconsideration and request to vacate the previous order is DENIED.