Opinion
Case No. 00-3518-CIV-GRAHAM
January 5, 2001
ORDER
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant Subklew's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (D.E. 3)
I. BACKGROUND
On December 16, 1999, Jeffrey G. Tardiff ("Tardiff") died in Miami, Florida. subsequently, on April 24, 1995, federal estate taxes were assessed against Tardiff's Estate by the Secretary of the Treasury. On July 16, 1999, a judgment was entered against Tardiff's Estate in the amount of $965,257.99, plus interest, for the unpaid estate tax liability. On September 20, 2000, the United States of America ("government") filed the instant action to obtain a judgment against Michael Subklew ("Subklew") for the unpaid federal estate tax liability of Tardiff's Estate.
In this action, the government also seeks to obtain a judgment against MaryBeth Tardiff Pearson ("Pearson") for the unpaid federal estate tax liability of Tardiff's Estate and to foreclose the federal estate tax lien levied against the property owned by Pearson and Bruce N. Smith.
Specifically, the government asserts in Count II of the Complaint that prior to Tardiff's death, Subklew and Tardiff jointly held a bank account in the Cayman Islands containing $116,742 on the date of Tardiff's death. The government asserts that Subklew received a portion of the bank account, $58,371, which was included in Tardiff's gross estate. Moreover, the government contends that Subklew was the beneficiary of two life insurance policies on Tardiff's life and received $785,256 as the beneficiary of these policies. The government seeks judgment against Subklew in the amount of $697,396.57 plus interest and statutory additions, which remains due on the July 16, 1999 judgment.
On December 15, 2000, Defendant Subklew filed the instant motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack at personal jurisdiction.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Personal Jurisdiction
As a general rule, courts should address issues relating to personal jurisdiction before reaching the merits of a plaintiff's case. See Republic of Pam. v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935 (11th Cir. 1997) The determination of whether personal jurisdiction exists over a non-resident defendant requires the Court to employ a two-part test.See Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 626 (11th Cir. 1996) First, the Court must consider the jurisdictional issue under Florida's Long-Arm Statute, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48.193. Second, the Court must determine whether there are sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so that "maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id., citing Robinson v. Giarmarco Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253, 256 (11th Cir. 1996) quoting International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). Only if both prongs of the analysis are satisfied may a federal or state court exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. See Madara, 916 F.2d at 1514.
The reach of the Florida Long-Arm Statute is a question of Florida law. Therefore, the Court must construe the statute in accord with the Florida Supreme Court's construction. See Oriental Imports Exports Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990). Under Florida law, a defendant wishing to contest the jurisdictional allegations of a complaint or to raise a contention of minimum contacts must file affidavits in support of his position. See Venetian Salami Co. v. Barthenais, 554 So.2d 499, 503 (Fla. 1989). If the defendant sufficiently challenges plaintiff's assertions, then the burden is placed upon the plaintiff to prove by affidavit, or other competent sworn proof, the basis upon which jurisdiction is obtained. See Id. Where the affidavits conflict, the court must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Id. 1. Florida Long-Arm Statute § 48.193(2): "General Jurisdiction"
The government asserts that personal jurisdiction exists over Subklew by reason of Subklew having engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within the State of Florida pursuant to the "general jurisdiction" subsection of Florida Statutes § 48.193(2), which provides in part:
A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48.193 (West 2000). General jurisdiction arises from a nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum that are unrelated to the cause of action being litigated. See Consolidated Development Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2000). In construing § 48.193(2), Florida courts "have harmonized this language with the constitutional due process requirements" set forth inHelicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984); see also Nichols v. Paulucci, 652 So.2d 389, 391 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Price v. Point Marine, Inc., 610 So.2d 1339 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). In Helicopteros, the Supreme Court held that the due process requirements for general personal jurisdiction are more stringent than for specific personal jurisdiction, and require a showing of "continuous and systematic general business contacts" between the nonresident defendant and the forum state before the Court can exercise general jurisdiction. 466 U.S. at 416, 104 S.Ct. at 1868; see also Consolidated Development Corp., 216 F.3d at 1291. Because § 48.193(2) requires this high threshold, if the defendant's activities meet the requirements of § 48.193(2), then the minimum contacts requirement of the due process clause is also satisfied. See Woods v. Nova Companies Belize LTD., 739 So.2d 617, 620 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
Subklew, in moving to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, asserts that during the past five years he has not conducted, advertised or solicited business in Florida, has no employees, agents or offices in Florida, has derived no income from Florida, nor owned real property or bank accounts in Florida. In support of these assertions, Subklew submitted a sworn affidavit attached to his motion.
In opposition, the government asserts that personal jurisdiction is proper over Subklew because: 1) Subklew resided and engaged in activity in Florida as early as 1987 or 1988, prior to establishing residence in Connecticut sometime before 1995; 2) Subklew defended an action brought in Florida in 1995 that contested his designation as beneficiary for Tardiff's life insurance policy and trust; and 3) Subklew continued to employ agents in Florida as late as 1997 to represent him in the aforementioned beneficiary contest actions. As evidence of Subklew's contacts with Florida, the government submitted a portion of Subklew's trial testimony from the 1995 action as well as several letters pertaining to that action.
a. Subklew's representation by agents in Florida
The government asserts that Subklew' s representation by agents in Florida, as recently as 1997, should be considered in assessing whether Subklew's contacts with the forum are "continuous and systematic." The Court finds this theory to be without merit. Indeed, "while Florida Statutes 48.193(1) creates specific jurisdiction as a result of the acts of an agent of a defendant, Florida Statutes 48.193(2) limits general jurisdiction to acts of the defendant itself." Polymers, Inc. v. Ultra Flo Filtration Systems, Inc., 33 F. Supp.2d 1008, 1011 (M.D.Fla. 1998)citing Pesaplastic C.A., v. Cincinnati Milacron Co., 750 F.2d 1516, 1521 (11th Cir. 1985). Thus, the government's assertion that the acts of Subklew's agents are capable of subjecting Subklew to personal jurisdiction under 48.193(2) directly contradicts both the plain language of the long-arm statute and the case law interpreting that language. Accordingly, personal jurisdiction over Subklew cannot be asserted on this basis.
b. Subklew's Defense of an Action Brought in Florida
The government further argues that Subklew's defense of an action brought against him in Florida in 1995 and his decision to file a counterclaim in that action subjects Subklew to personal jurisdiction in the case at bar. The Court is unconvinced by this argument. Florida courts have held that a party's prior initiation or defense of a legal action in Florida does not provide personal jurisdiction over that party in a separate suit. Gibbons v. Brown, 716 So.2d 868, 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). This is even true where, as here, the later suit arises from subject matter that is similar to the earlier suit. See Id. Therefore, Subklew's defense of an action brought against him in this forum and his assertion of a counterclaim in that action cannot be deemed a contact sufficient to subject Subklew to personal jurisdiction pursuant to § 48.193(2).
c. Subklew's Activity Prior to 1995
As a final argument, the government urges this Court to consider Subklew's contacts with this forum over a thirteen year period, from 1987 to 2000, to determine whether Subklew is subject to general jurisdiction in Florida. As a rule, district courts considering general jurisdiction cases should examine a defendant's contacts with the forum state over a period that is reasonable under the circumstances — up to and including the date the suit was filed — to assess whether they satisfy the "continuous and systematic" standard. See Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp, 84 F.3d 560, 569 (2nd Cir. 1996) (cited approvingly in Woods, 739 So.2d at 621, n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) The determination of what period is reasonable in the context of each case should be left to the court's discretion. See Id.; see also Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 650-51 (5th Cir.) (examining defendant's contacts with forum state over five-year period in assessing minimum contacts for general jurisdiction purposes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 930, 115 S.Ct. 322, 130 L.Ed.2d 282 (1994); Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 1987) (analyzing defendant's contacts with forum state over five-year period in general jurisdiction case); Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1329, 1330-31 (9th Cir. 1984) (examining defendant's contacts over three-year period in connection with general jurisdiction inquiry).
In the instant case, the Court finds that it is unreasonable to consider Subklew's contacts with Florida over a thirteen year period. The government's allegations that Subklew was a resident of Florida between 1987 and 1994 and conducted general carpentry work out of his home during an unspecified portion of that period, are insufficient to cause the Court to look past the fact that Subklew has had no contacts with Florida since 1995. The only evidence asserted by the government as to business contacts between Subklew and this forum relate to Subklew's performance of carpentry work in 1988. The Court finds these business contacts, which occurred more than five years prior to the filing of this action, to be insufficient to give this Court cause to review the eight year period prior to 1995. Therefore, the Court finds that Subklew is not subject to personal jurisdiction in this forum.
The Court cannot discern from the trial transcript when Subklew actually ceased performing carpentry work in this forum. Nonetheless, it can be inferred from the trial transcript that Subklew stopped performing carpentry work sometime in 1990.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is hereby,
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant Subklew's Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 3) is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Michael Subklew is DISMISSED from this action.