Opinion
No. 04-CR-222S.
March 2, 2005
DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Hugh Stevens is charged in an 8-count Indictment with conspiracy to possess and to distribute quantities of ephedrine in violation of Title 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(c)(2) and 846; with conspiracy to manufacture 500 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing methamphetamine in violation of Title 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846; with possession and distribution of ephedrine having reasonable cause to believe that the chemical would be used to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of Title 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) and Title 18 U.S.C. § 2; and with engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of Title 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(c)(2), 846, and 848(a). Defendant is presently detained pending trial pursuant to an order issued by United States Magistrate Judge H. Kenneth Schroeder, Jr. on September 27, 2004. Currently before this Court is Defendant Stevens' motion to revoke the detention order. For the following reasons, Defendant Stevens' motion must be denied.
Defendant Stevens submitted a memorandum/affirmation with exhibits, including numerous letters (Docket No. 29), and a supplemental memorandum (Docket No. 38) in support of his motion to revoke Judge Schroeder's detention order. The Government filed a responding affidavit (Docket No. 34) in opposition to the motion.
II. BACKGROUND
On September 14, 2004, a federal Grand Jury in the Western District of New York returned a sealed Indictment charging Defendant and others with violations of Title 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 841(c)(2), 846, and 848(a), and Title 18 U.S.C. § 2. Specifically, the Indictment charges that Defendant knowingly conspired with others to possess and distribute quantities of ephedrine, conspired to manufacture methamphetamine, and possessed and distributed ephedrine having reasonable cause to believe that the chemical would be used to unlawfully manufacture methamphetamine. Further, Defendant Stevens is charged with managing a continuing criminal enterprise, which carries a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years and up to life in prison. See Indictment.After the Indictment was unsealed, Defendant and several of his co-defendants were arrested on September 15, 2004. At his initial appearance immediately following his arrest, the Government moved for Defendant's pretrial detention. Defendant opposed the Government's motion, prompting Judge Schroeder to conduct a detention hearing by proffer on September 21, 2004.
On September 27, 2004, Judge Schroeder issued a Decision and Order granting the Government's motion to detain Defendant pending trial. (Docket No. 21). Judge Schroeder's Decision and Order set forth the factual basis upon which he made his determination to detain Defendant Stevens pending trial. Neither the Government nor Defendant Stevens has submitted any new information or evidence to supplement that which was presented during the detention hearing. Thus, the record developed before Judge Schroeder constitutes the complete record of Defendant Stevens' detention proceedings. Familiarity with Judge Schroeder's Decision and Order is presumed.
Approximately two months after Judge Schroeder issued the detention order, Defendant Stevens filed a motion to revoke the detention order with this Court. Oral argument was held on January 10, 2005, and this Court reserved judgment at that time.
III. DISCUSSION and ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Eighteen U.S.C. § 3145(b) provides the mechanism by which a defendant may seek review of a magistrate judge's pretrial detention order by a district judge having original jurisdiction over the matter. Defendant properly invoked this review procedure by timely filing the instant motion for revocation as provided for in Section 3145(b).
Having received Defendant's motion, this Court must conduct a de novo review of Judge Schroeder's detention order. See United States v. Leon, 766 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Goba, 240 F. Supp. 2d 242, 245 (W.D.N.Y. 2003). Under this review standard, this Court will judge the issues anew, but in doing so, utilize the factual and evidentiary record developed during the detention hearing before Judge Schroeder. However, as is required under de novo review, this Court will reach its own independent findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Leon, 766 F.2d at 80 (finding that on de novo review, a district court "should not simply defer to the judgment of the magistrate, but reach its own independent conclusion").
B. Defendant's Arguments
In support of his motion to revoke Judge Schroeder's detention order, Defendant Stevens sets forth three general arguments. First, Defendant argues that the Government failed to meet its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that no conditions would overcome Defendant's risk of flight. Secondly, Defendant argues that the Government failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant, if released, would present a danger to the community or to another person. Lastly, Defendant argues that the probability of a lengthy pretrial delay weighs in favor of a release. These three arguments will be discussed below.
C. Entitlement to A Detention Hearing
Under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141, et seq., a court is empowered to order a defendant detained pending trial upon a judicial finding that "no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). In deciding whether to detain a defendant, a court must focus on two highly relevant issues: (1) whether that defendant, if released, is likely to flee the jurisdiction; and (2) whether that defendant, if released conditionally or otherwise, presents a risk of danger to the community or another person. United States v. Fernandez, 144 F. Supp. 2d 115, 118 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing United States v. Dillard, 214 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2000)).
A court may only order pretrial detention following a hearing.See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(e) and (f). "The government's right to a detention hearing, however, has been carefully circumscribed by Congress, and exists [only] in certain specifically enumerated circumstances." Fernandez, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 118. Under the Act, a detention hearing is warranted when: (1) the case involves a crime of violence; (2) the case involves an offense punishable by life imprisonment or death; (3) the case involves an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, et seq., and various other statutes; (4) the defendant is charged with a felony after having been convicted of two or more qualifying offenses; (5) the case involves a serious risk of flight; or (6) the case involves a serious risk of obstruction or attempted obstruction of justice or intimidation of a prospective witness or juror. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f); See Leon, 766 F.2d at 80-81. It is the government's burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant's case presents one or more of the circumstances mandating a detention hearing. See United States v. Friedman, 837 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
The threshold issue presented is whether the government has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that a detention hearing was warranted in this case. See United States v. Coleman, No. 5:01-CR-077, 2001 WL 1249682, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 24, 2001). This Court finds that it has. As an initial matter, it is undisputed that Defendant is charged with offenses for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act. As previously noted herein, Section 3142(f) mandates that a detention hearing be held for defendants charged with such crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(C).
In addition, this Court finds that the government was entitled to a detention hearing on the basis that this case involves a serious risk that Defendant Stevens, if released, will attempt to obstruct justice by threatening, injuring, or intimidating Louis Russo, a prospective witness, or by causing others to do the same. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B). Further, this Court finds that the Government has established this risk by a preponderance of the evidence having introduced the transcript of a wiretapped conversation between Defendant Stevens and his Co-Defendant Rodger Bruneau. During this conversation, Defendants Stevens and Bruneau, the alleged ringleaders of this charged drug conspiracy, discuss what will happen to Co-Defendant Louis Russo, if he cooperates with federal authorities. See Indictment, p. 7; Detention Order, p. 5.
According to Defendant Stevens' supplemental memorandum, Mr. Bruneau died in his sleep due to complications relating to his heart condition on February 14, 2005. This development, while tragic, does not alter this Court's analysis with respect to Defendant Stevens' detention.
By way of background, Defendant Russo was arrested on July 10, 2004 at the United States-Canadian Border after 431 pounds of ephedrine were seized from his truck and horse trailer. See Russo Crim. Compl.; Nowryta Aff., When questioned by Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents, Russo stated that he did not know where the ephedrine came from or who gave it to him.See Russo Crim. Compl.; Nowryta Aff., ¶ 6. Some weeks later, Government agents recorded the following conversation between Defendants Stevens and Bruneau regarding Russo:
BRUNEAU: What is it, though, uh, if they they're getting, you know, they're putting all the money up for this lawyer and, uh, and bail and all this, and after they do all this.
STEVENS: Pardon?
BRUNEAU: After they do all this, they pay all this, if he rats, if he rats out on them, then.
STEVENS: If he rats out on me, then we stop paying him.
BRUNEAU: Oh no. We don't stop paying for him. He'll die. (Expletive)
STEVENS: Well, you . . . you can do whatever you want to him, but once, you know, once once he turns me in, he's done.
BRUNEAU: No. Once once he turns you in, it's over.
STEVENS: Right. That's what I mean.
BRUNEAU: There will be no witness.
STEVENS: Right. That's what I mean.
See Detention Order, p. 5 (emphasis added).
In the view of this Court, this conversation establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that a serious risk exists that Defendant, if released, will attempt to obstruct justice by threatening, injuring, or intimidating Louis Russo, a prospective witness, or by causing others to do it. This conclusion constitutes a separate and alternative predicate for a detention hearing. See Leon, 766 F.2d at 81.
D. Release or Detention
Having determined that a detention hearing was warranted, the court must resolve the ultimate statutory issue, specifically, whether any condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure Defendant's appearance and the safety of other persons and the community. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(c) and (g);see also Friedman, 837 F.2d at 49. Under some circumstances, there is a rebuttable statutory presumption that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required and the safety of any other person and the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). For example, this presumption attaches if the judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act ( 21 U.S.C. § 801, et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act ( 21 U.S.C. § 951, et seq.), or various other specified provisions of federal law. See id.
"[T]he flight presumption of section 3142(e) places on the defendant only the burden of coming forward with evidence to rebut it." United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1144 (2d Cir. 1986). While "a defendant must introduce some evidence contrary to the presumed fact in order to rebut the presumption,"United States v. Rodriquez, 950 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1991), the Government retains the burden of proof and persuasion on the ultimate issue of whether there are release conditions that can reasonably assure the defendant's appearance and protect the community. United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
"Once a defendant introduces rebuttal evidence, the presumption, rather than disappearing altogether, continues to be weighed along with other factors to be considered when deciding whether to release defendant." Rodriquez, 950 F.2d at 88; see also United States v. Jackson, 823 F.2d 4, 6-7 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that "[t]he presumption of risk of flight continues to furnish `some weight' in favor of detention even when the defendant has come forward with evidence to rebut it."). Generally, the other factors that the court must consider include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence or involves a narcotic drug; (2) the weight of the evidence; (3) the defendant's personal circumstances, including family and community ties, criminal history, any indication of drug and alcohol abuse, and whether at the time of the offense or arrest the defendant was on probation, parole, or conditional release; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the defendant's release.See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (g); Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436 (noting that factors in Section 3142(g) should be considered by the district court to determine whether the statutory presumption is rebutted).
In considering these factors in the context of a detention hearing, the court is not bound by the rules of evidence, and may rely on hearsay evidence. United States v. Ferranti, 66 F.3d 540, 542 (2d Cir. 1995); Goba, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 247. Ultimately, the Government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant presents a risk of flight and that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure Defendant's appearance as required. See Jackson, 823 F.2d at 5. "When detention is based wholly or in part on a finding of dangerousness, that finding must be supported by clear and convincing evidence" that Defendant, if released, presents danger to the safety of any other person and the community. Coleman, 2001 WL 1249682, at *3 (citing Ferranti, 66 F.3d at 542); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(e) and (f). After reviewing the factual record, the pretrial services report, and the papers filed on the instant motion, this Court is compelled to deny defendant's motion to revoke Judge Schroeder's detention order. The following constitutes this Court's findings on the relevant factors.
First, Defendant is charged with conspiring to possess and distribute ephedrine, with conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine, with possessing and distributing ephedrine to manufacture methamphetamine, and with engaging a continuing criminal enterprise. These crimes are quite serious in nature. This Court notes that Defendant is claimed to be the organizer and leader of this conspiracy, which reaches beyond the borders of the United States into Canada and which involves numerous co-conspirators. See Indictment, p. 7. If convicted, Defendant faces a mandatory minimum of twenty years in prison.See Detention Order, p. 4; Coleman, 2001 WL 1249682, at * 6 (noting that while not determinative, "the severity of the punishment facing the defendant is still a relevant factor that bears upon the risk of flight"). This Court agrees with Judge Schroeder's observation that such a sentence would essentially equate to a life sentence for this 58-year-old Defendant. See Detention Order, p. 4. This Court finds that this factor weighs heavily against pretrial release.
Second, the Government suggests that the evidence against Defendant is substantial, and is comprised in large part of wiretapped conversations between Defendant and various alleged co-conspirators. Most significantly, the conversation between Defendants Stevens and Bruneau, cited above, evidences their shared belief that there is a substantial likelihood Russo, who was arrested in July of 2004 with over 400 pounds of ephedrine, has cooperated or will cooperate with federal authorities. Further, this conversation focuses on what will happen to Russo if he "rats" on Defendant Stevens, which suggests that Russo's testimony would be particularly damaging to Defendant Stevens. Based on this transcript, and the quantity of drugs seized from Russo's vehicle and trailer, this Court finds that the weight of the evidence is against Defendant. Cf. United States v. Davidson, No. 92-CR-35, 1992 WL 144641, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. June 18, 1992) ("[A] government proffer need not always spell out in precise detail how the government will prove its case at trial, nor specify exactly what sources it will use."). Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of detention.
Third, Defendant's history and personal characteristics suggest that Defendant is a flight risk. This Court begins with the statutory presumption of flight imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e), based on the crimes for which Defendant Stevens has been indicted. It is undisputed that the Grand Jury for the Western District of New York returned an Indictment against Defendant Stevens charging him with offenses for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by the Controlled Substances Act. Based on the Indictment, this Court finds that there is probable cause to believe that Defendant committed these offenses. As such, there is a presumption, subject to rebuttal by Defendant, that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure his appearance and the safety of the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). While Defendant has met his limited burden to produce some evidence to rebut this presumption, Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436, this Court continues, as it must, to give this presumption some weight. Martir, 782 F.2d at 1144. Were this Court to disregard the presumption altogether upon any showing that Defendant were likely to appear, it would give too little deference to Congress' finding, based on extensive testimony, that "flight to avoid prosecution is particularly high among those charged with major drug offenses." Martir, 782 F.2d at 1144 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Specifically, Defendant offers evidence that two of his children live in Batavia, New York, that he owns a home in Buffalo, with his wife of three years, and that despite his limited education, he has developed a solid business and respectable reputation in the community as a horse trainer. See Def.'s Mot. for Revocation, p. 9. Numerous letters from Defendant's friends were also submitted in support of Defendant's release.
Moreover, while acknowledging that Defendant is currently undergoing the application process for naturalization, this Court notes that, at present, Defendant is a permanent resident alien, who does not have citizenship status in the United States, and who would be subject to removal as an aggravated felon if convicted. Detention Order, p. 4. Defendant's other personal circumstances suggest that he is a flight risk. Specifically, Defendant's wife and son-in-law, who both live in Western New York, are charged coconspirators in this case. In the view of this Court, Defendant's incentive to remain in the Western District of New York has undoubtedly been undermined by the return of the Indictment in the case, and the probability of substantial incarceration for Defendant, his wife, and his son-in-law. As noted previously herein, if convicted, Defendant could be incarcerated for the remainder of his life. Detention Order, p. 4.
Further, this Court finds that Defendant's connections in Canada support a finding that he would flee the United States if released. Specifically, Defendant Stevens has at least one sibling and an adult child who reside in Canada, with whom he maintains regular contact. While Defendant does not possess a passport, he reports that, prior to his detention, he traveled to Canada an average of two times a week for recreation or to buy horse feed. Defendant claims that his annual gross income is $25,000. The Indictment, however, alleges that Defendant has been involved in an ongoing drug smuggling enterprise with co-conspirators in Canada and that he has obtained substantial income and resources from this enterprise. See Indictment. Despite Defendant's representations to the contrary, this Court finds that there is sufficient evidence that Defendant has the personal and financial resources to sustain himself outside of the United States for a prolonged period of time.
With respect to Defendant's other characteristics, this Court acknowledges the following. According to the Pretrial Services Report, Defendant Stevens advised his Probation Officer that he only consumes one or two beers two times a week. However, when Defendant and his wife were arrested by federal agents, they were allegedly passed out from excessive alcohol consumption in their vehicle in a restaurant parking lot. Further, in 1983, Defendant was convicted in New York State on a plea of guilty to Attempted Assault in the Third Degree, a Class B Misdemeanor. Apparently, the alleged victim of this crime was a police officer, as Defendant was initially charged with Assault with Intent to Cause Physical Injury to an Officer. Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that Defendant's history and personal characteristics weigh in favor of detention.
This Court has relied on Defendant's Pretrial Services Report in determining whether he should be detained. Several facts derived from Defendant's Pretrial Services Report are contained in the foregoing pages. Such reports are routinely prepared by the United States Probation Office to assist the Court in assessing whether a defendant presents a risk of non-appearance and/or danger if released. The Pretrial Services Report has been made available to the Government, Defendant and the Court in this case. However, based on the confidential nature of the information contained in the Report, it is not normally filed and has not been filed in this matter.
Fourth, Defendant's release clearly presents a danger to Louis Russo, as evidenced by the conversation between Defendants Stevens and Bruneau discussing Russo's elimination. This Court is not persuaded by Defendant's argument that the statements "once [Russo] turns [Stevens] in, he's done," or "it's over" or "[h]e'll die" or "[t]here will be no witness," is mere posturing and hyperbole, or was taken out of context. Detention Order, p. 5; Def.'s Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Revoke Det. Order, p. 21. The government has established the following facts by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the fact that Defendant Stevens was convicted in 1983 of Assault in the Third Degree; (2) the fact that Louis Russo was arrested with hundreds of pounds of ephedrine in July of 2002; Russo Criminal Compl.; (3) the fact that following Russo's arrest, Defendants Stevens and Bruneau, the alleged leaders of this drug conspiracy, had the foregoing conversation regarding what would happen to Russo, if he cooperated with the authorities against Stevens; Detention Order, p. 5; and (4) the fact that Defendants Stevens and Bruneau were thereafter indicted for this alleged conspiracy in the Western District of New York. See Indictment. The foregoing facts establish that Defendant Stevens has the disposition, motive and intent to harm Louis Russo. As such, this Court finds the nature and seriousness of the danger to Russo if Defendant Stevens is released weigh in favor of detention.
In light of the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that no set of release conditions will adequately guard against the risks that Defendant Stevens' release presents. In this Court's view, the bond, electronic monitoring, and home confinement suggested by defense counsel are simply insufficient. Cf. United States v. Orena, 986 F.2d 628, 632-33 (2d Cir. 1993). In so finding, this Court acknowledges that a resourceful defendant can circumvent even the most stringent release conditions, and that such measures can often be a drain on government resources.See United States v. Millan, 4 F.3d 1038, 1049 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[h]ome detention and electronic monitoring at best elaborately replicate a detention facility without the confidence of security such a facility instills.") (quoting United States v. Gotti, 776 F. Supp. 666, 672 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (internal quotations omitted)). Thus, Defendant's future appearance and the safety of Louis Russo can only be reasonably assured by Defendant's continued pretrial detention.
While Defendant set forth sufficient evidence to rebut the statutory presumption against detention, this Court nonetheless finds that the Government has met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant is a risk of flight,Jackson, 823 F.2d at 5, and its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he is a danger to another person and the community. Ferranti, 66 F.3d at 542. Accordingly, this Court finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure Defendant's appearance as required and the safety of any other person and the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
E. Lengthy Pretrial Detention
Consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the government may detain a defendant prior to trial "so long as confinement does not amount to punishment of the detainee." Millan, 4 F.3d at 1043 (internal quotations and citations omitted). When of a reasonable duration, pretrial detention of a defendant serves important regulatory purposes, including prevention of flight and the protection of the community from a potentially dangerous individual. Id.;see also United States v. Gonzalez Claudio, 806 F.2d 334, 338 (2d Cir. 1986) (prevention of flight is a valid regulatory goal). "However, when detention becomes `excessively prolonged,' it may no longer be reasonable in relation to the regulatory goals of detention," and may constitute a violation of due process." Millan, 4 F.3d at 1043 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2102, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1987)).
To determine whether the length of pretrial detention has become unconstitutionally excessive, the court must weigh the following three factors: (1) the length of detention; (2) the extent to which the prosecution is responsible for the delay of trial; and (3) the strength of the evidence upon which the defendant's detention is based; that is, the evidence concerning risk of flight and danger to the safety of any other person or the community. United States v. El-Hage, 213 F.3d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 200); see also Orena, 986 F.2d at 630 (applying test to dangerousness); United States v. Ojeda Rios, 846 F.2d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 1988) (per curium) (applying test to risk of flight and dangerousness). On the facts of this case, this Court finds no due process violation at this time.
With respect to the length of pretrial detention, Defendant has been in custody since September 15, 2004, less than six months. However, detentions of eight months or more have been upheld by the Second Circuit on the basis of risk of flight alone. See United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 820 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 1987) (19 months); United States v. Berrios-Berrios, 791 F.2d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 1986) (8 months). Accordingly, this Court finds that Defendants Stevens' detention, thus far, does not constitute a violation of due process.
As to the second factor, it does not appear that the government bears responsibility for any pretrial delay. Most recently, it was Defendant Stevens' counsel who moved Judge Schroeder for a sixty day adjournment of the pretrial motion deadline. As the Second Circuit has stated, "when the government moves for pretrial detention, it has an obligation to arrange for trial as quickly as possible, using extraordinary means if necessary."Jackson, 823 F.2d at 8 (internal quotations and citations omitted). While this Court views the Government's obligation quite seriously, at this time it cannot be said that the government bears any responsibility for the delay in this case.Id.
Finally, turning to the strength of the evidence indicating risk of flight or danger to another person, this Court finds that the government has made a very strong showing of both. Given that Defendant Stevens cannot demonstrate excessive pretrial delay or the government's substantial responsibility for such delay, this Court finds that his continued detention does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this Court finds that no release condition or combination of release conditions would reasonably assure Defendant Stevens' appearance as required, or the safety of any other person or the community. Further, this Court finds that Defendant Stevens' continued detention does not constitute a due process violation at this time. Accordingly, Defendant Stevens' Motion to Revoke Judge Schroeder's Detention Order is denied.
V. ORDERS
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that Defendant's Motion to Revoke Judge Schroeder's Detention Order (Docket No. 29) is DENIED.FURTHER, that the pretrial detention of Defendant Stevens shall be maintained pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
SO ORDERED.