Opinion
No. 09-4691-cr.
November 2, 2010.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Hall, J.).
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the judgment of the district court be and hereby is AFFIRMED.
Steven B. Rasile, Law Offices of Mirto Rasile, West Haven, CT, for Defendant-Appellant.
Sandra S. Glover, Assistant United States Attorney (Nora R. Dannehy, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for David B. Fein, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, New Haven, CT, for Appellee.
SUMMARY ORDER
Defendant-appellant Tyree Robinson appeals from an order of contempt entered November 2, 2009 (Hall, J.) sentencing him to 4 months' imprisonment to be served consecutively to his sentence of 16 months' imprisonment for violating the terms of his supervised release. We assume the parties' familiarity with the facts and procedural history of this case.
On appeal, Robinson argues that the district court erred by applying the summary contempt procedure of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b) because it waited almost two months between the contemptuous conduct and its imposition of a summary contempt sanction. Robinson contends that, in this circumstance, the district court should have applied the normal contempt procedure of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a). The government responds that Robinson has waived this argument because he expressly agreed to the summary contempt procedure. We agree with the government.
"[W]aiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right." United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where a defendant indicates that the district court's proposed resolution of an issue is satisfactory, he waives his right to appeal that resolution. See United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 153 (2d Cir. 2009) (concluding that the defendant waived his right to challenge a jury instruction that he had indicated to the district court was satisfactory).
Here, Judge Hall specifically raised the issue of whether she could proceed under Rule 42(b) "because [the district court] did not take any action at the time" of the contemptuous conduct. J.A. 122 ("I wonder if under Rule 42, I'm past the point of summarily addressing contempt."). After a lengthy discussion of the case law with the defense attorney and the prosecutor, Judge Hall queried: "I think the only question as a matter of the record is does the defendant raise the issue? . . . [I]s there an objection to it being before me?" J.A. 126. After yet more discussion of whether it would be more appropriate to proceed immediately before Judge Hall or transfer the case to a different district judge, Judge Hall gave Robinson's attorney an opportunity to confer with Robinson. J.A. 127. After the conference, Robinson's attorney stated: "Your honor, after discussions with Mr. Robinson, we're going to proceed today." Id. Judge Hall responded: "I wanted to be certain that we got it right. I don't want to have him go through it twice. . . . As long as he's okay, we'll proceed." J.A. 127-28. Robinson plainly indicated that he did not object to proceeding before Judge Hall immediately and thus waived any objection to Judge Hall's use of the summary contempt procedure of Rule 42(b).
We have reviewed Robinson's remaining arguments and conclude that they lack merit. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.