Opinion
05-22-00085-CV
01-31-2023
IN RE THE COMMITMENT OF DARNELL IVEN ADAMS
On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 199-00764-2021
Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Nowell, and Kennedy
MEMORANDUM OPINION
NANCY KENNEDY, JUSTICE
Chapter 841 of the Texas Health and Safety Code, known as the Texas Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act (the "SVP Act"), addresses a civil commitment procedure for long-term supervision and treatment of a small group of sexually violent predators who suffer from behavioral abnormalities deemed to be a threat to society. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 841.001-.153. Pursuant to Chapter 841, the State filed a civil petition to commit Darnell Iven Adams for involuntary treatment and supervision as a sexually violent predator. A jury found Adams to be a sexually violent predator as defined in Section 841.003 of the Texas Health and Safety Code, and the trial court rendered a final judgment and a civil commitment order in accordance with the jury's verdict.
In two issues, Adams challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that he is a repeat sexually violent offender, one of the required elements for commitment under the SVP Act. Id. § 841.003(a). We conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the challenged finding. Accordingly, we overrule Adams's issues and affirm the judgment and the order of civil commitment. Because all issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex.R.App.P. 47.4.
Background
On February 11, 2021, the State filed a petition seeking to commit Adams for treatment and supervision under the SVP Act. The State alleged that Adams had previously been convicted of two sexually violent offenses, triggering statutory eligibility for civil commitment. The State further alleged that an expert had performed a clinical assessment of Adams and found he suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.
At trial, the State introduced into evidence penitentiary packets and other certified documents showing Adams had previously been convicted of sexual assault and burglary of a habitation, during which he committed an additional sexual assault. Adams pleaded guilty to both offenses and judgments were entered in each case on April 5, 1991, adjudicating him guilty of the charged offenses and sentencing him to life imprisonment. Both offenses occurred on the same date, involved the same victim, and occurred after Adams entered the victim's home without her consent. With respect to the sexual assault conviction, Adams stipulated and judicially confessed that on the 6th day of November, 1989, he "intentionally and knowingly cause[d] penetration of the female sexual organ of [victim], a person not my spouse, without the consent of the victim by means of my male sexual organ." With respect to the burglary of a habitation conviction, Adams stipulated and judicially confessed that on the 6th day of November, 1989, he "intentionally and knowingly, without the effective consent of [victim], the owner thereof, enter[ed] a habitation and committed sexual assault, to-wit: by penetrating the anus of [victim]."
The charging instrument stated that Adams "intentionally and knowingly, without the effective consent of [victim], the owner thereof, enter[ed] a habitation, and committed sexual assault, to-wit: by penetrating the anus of victim."
At trial, Adams acknowledged that he is serving two life sentences, one for sexual assault, and one for burglary of a habitation, having entered a home without the owner's consent and sexually assaulting her. He testified he burglarized the woman's home and refused her offers of money, telling her that he wanted sex. Dr. Timothy Proctor evaluated Adams and testified at trial that it is his opinion that Adams suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.
After the State rested, Adams moved for a directed verdict arguing his conviction for burglary of a habitation did not qualify as a sexually violent offense. The State responded that Adams was convicted of entering the victim's home and committing sexual assault, and, thus, the burglary of a habitation conviction qualifies as a sexually violent offense for purposes of the SVP Act. The trial court denied Adams's motion and submitted the case to the jury.
The jurors unanimously found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Adams is a sexually violent predator, a repeat sexually violent offender who suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. In accordance with the jury's verdict, the trial court rendered a final judgment and an order of civil commitment. Adams filed a motion for new trial arguing the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support a finding that he is a sexually violent predator. The trial court denied Adams's motion and this appeal followed.
Discussion
I. Standard of Review - Challenge to Sufficiency of Evidence in Civil Commitment Case
The commitment of a person as a sexually violent predator is a civil proceeding. In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637, 645-53 (Tex. 2005). Nevertheless, because the SVP Act requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person is a sexually violent predator, we review the legal sufficiency of the evidence using the appellate standard of review for criminal cases. In re Commitment of Anderson, No. 05-17-00769-CV, 2018 WL 3968499, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 20, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re Commitment of Harris, 541 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the elements required for commitment. In re Commitment of Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d 665, 674 (Tex. 2020). We assume the jury resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so and disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible. Id. We may not disregard undisputed facts that do not support the finding. Id.
Although factual sufficiency review has been abandoned in criminal cases, see Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), as an intermediate appellate court with final authority over factual sufficiency challenges in civil cases, we perform a factual sufficiency review in civil commitment cases when the issue is raised on appeal. In re Commitment of Dever, 521 S.W.3d 84, 86 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2017, no pet.). The standard for reviewing factual sufficiency of the evidence in a civil commitment case was recently clarified in Stoddard. 619 S.W.3d at 678. "The appellate standard governing a factual-sufficiency review of a finding that a person is a sexually violent predator is whether, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the verdict, along with undisputed facts contrary to the verdict, is so significant that the factfinder could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory elements were met." Id.
II. Civil Commitment
For a person to be civilly committed as a sexually violent predator, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person (1) is a repeat sexually violent offender, and (2) suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes the person likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. Health & Safety § 841.003(a). A person is a repeat sexually violent offender if he has been convicted of more than one sexually violent offense and a sentence was imposed for at least one of the offenses. Id. §§ 841.002(6), 841.003(b). A "behavioral abnormality" is "a congenital or acquired condition that, by affecting a person's emotional or volitional capacity, predisposes the person to commit a sexually violent offense, to the extent that the person becomes a menace to the health and safety of another person." Id. § 841.002(2). A "predatory act" is one that is "directed toward individuals, including family members, for the primary purpose of victimization." Id. § 841.002(5).
Adams does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding he suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes him more likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. Rather, he contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to establish he has been convicted of more than one sexually violent offense to support the jury's finding he is a repeat sexually violent offender.
A. Sexually Violent Offense
The SVP Act defines a "sexually violent offense," in relevant part, as an offense under the following Penal Code sections: section 21.02 (continuous sexual abuse of a child), section 21.11(a)(1) (indecency with a child younger than seventeen), section 22.011 (sexual assault), or section 22.021 (aggravated sexual assault). See id. § 841.002(a)(A). The SVP Act also identifies an offense under Penal Code section 30.02 (burglary) as a sexually violent offense "if the offense is punishable under Subsection (d) of that section [identifying when a burglary is a first-degree felony] and the person committed the offense with the intent to commit" an offense listed in Paragraph (A) (including sexual assault) or (B) (aggravated kidnapping). See id. § 841.002(8)(C) (emphasis added). In addition, the definition of sexually violent offense includes not only current statutory offenses but also "an offense under prior state law that contains elements substantially similar to the elements" of the offenses listed in Paragraphs (A) through (E) of section 841.002(8). Id. § 841.002(8)(F).
Section 841.002(8)(C) does not track the language of any version of the burglary of a habitation statute. The current version, and the version of the statute in effect when section 841.002(8) was enacted in 1999, provides an offense under section 30.02 is a felony of the first degree if:
(1) the premises are a habitation; and
(2) any party to the offense entered the habitation with intent to commit a felony other than felony theft or committed or attempted to commit a felony other than felony theft.Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(d); Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 218, § 8, eff. Sept. 1, 1995.
When Adams committed the offenses in 1989, the burglary statute provided: A person commits an offense if, without the effective consent of the owner, he:
(1) enters a habitation, or a building (or any portion of a building) not then open to the public, with intent to commit a felony or theft; or
(2) remains concealed, with intent to commit a felony or theft, in a building or habitation; or
(3) enters a building or habitation and commits or attempts to commit a felony or theft[,] and made burglary a first-degree felony if:
(1) the premises are a habitation; or
(2) any party to the offense is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon; or
(3) any party to the offense injures or attempts to injure anyone in effecting entry or while in the building or in immediate flight from the building.Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974; see also Moreno v. State, 702 S.W.2d 636, 639 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). On appeal, for the first time, Adams asserts the statute in effect at the time he committed the offense of burglary of a habitation is not substantially similar to any offense listed in Paragraphs (A) through (E) of Section 841.002(8). Even assuming Adams's argument is properly before us on appeal, it fails to recognize that the facts of his conviction, specifically that he "intentionally and knowingly, without the effective consent of [victim], the owner thereof, enter[ed] a habitation, and committed sexual assault, to-wit: by penetrating the anus of victim," meet the elements of the current version of section 30.02(d), which is the subject of Paragraph (C).
Adams concedes he has been convicted of sexual assault and burglary of a habitation and that his conviction for sexual assault qualifies as a sexually violent offense. He contends his burglary of a habitation conviction does not qualify as a sexually violent offense because he actually committed sexual assault, rather than just intending to commit the offense. Thus, claims Adams, his conviction for burglary of a habitation is not a proper predicate offense enumerated in section 841.002(8) of the Texas Health and Safety Code and cannot be considered in determining whether he has been convicted of more than one sexually violent offense.
The Amarillo Court of Appeals recently addressed and rejected an argument that is similar to the one Adams presents here. See In re Commitment of Wiley, No. 07-20-00039-CV, 2021 WL 3540777 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Aug. 11, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.). In that case, Wiley asserted that his 1995 burglary conviction did not qualify as a sexually violent offense because he was charged under the theory that he "attempted to commit and committed" aggravated sexual assault and not under the theory that he entered the habitation "with the intent to commit" aggravated sexual assault. See In re Commitment of Wiley, No. 07-20-00039-CV, 2021 WL 5173397, at *1 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Nov. 4, 2021) (setting forth Wiley's specific argument). In its order denying Wiley's first motion for en banc reconsideration, the court noted, "Not only is the element of intent to commit a sexual assault subsumed within the offense charged, Wiley's argument is [an improper] collateral attack on the judgment of conviction." Id. And in denying Wiley's second motion for en banc reconsideration, the court stated "the offense of burglary, punishable under subsection (d) of section 30.02 of the Texas Penal Code is, by definition, a sexually violent offense. It is simply not any more complicated that that." See In re Commitment of Wiley, No. 07-20-00039-CV, 2021 WL 5895670, at *1 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Dec. 7, 2021). We conclude our sister court correctly interpreted and applied section 841.002(8) to Wiley's burglary conviction, and, as set forth below, we likewise conclude that Adams's burglary of a habitation conviction qualifies as a predicate offense for the application of the SVP Act.
As stated supra, and relevant to the facts presented here, sexual assault is a sexually violent offense and burglary is a sexually violent offense if punishable as a first-degree felony and the person committed the offense with the intent to commit sexual assault. Health & Safety § 841.002(8)(A), (C). Adams concedes that sexual assault is a sexually violent offense. He nevertheless latches on to section 841.002(8)(C)'s reference to "with the intent to commit" to assert his burglary of a habitation conviction could only constitute a sexually violent offense if he did not follow through with the physical assault. We conclude that the phrase "with the intent to commit," as used in Paragraph (C) of section 841.002(8), is not such a limiting factor in determining whether a burglary of a habitation conviction qualifies as a sexually violent offense. It is apparent that the legislature endeavored to protect people from predators who enter others' homes without the owners' consent and with sexual assault on their minds. See id. § 841.002(8)(C) (naming burglary of a habitation as a sexually violent offense when it is committed with just the intent to commit sexual assault). Actually, following through with the intent does not change the nature of the offense. Any other interpretation of the statute would lead to the absurd result that a sexual assault, which the legislature individually identified as a sexually violent offense in Paragraph (A) of Section 841.002(8), but not a sexual assault committed in connection with the burglary of a habitation, is a sexually violent offense.
A person commits sexual assault if the person intentionally or knowingly causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of another person by any means, without that person's consent. Penal § 22.011(a)(1)(A).
The Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have cautioned that if one reasonable interpretation of a statute yields absurd results while the other interpretation yields no such absurdities, the latter interpretation is preferred. See Life Partners, Inc. v. Arnold, 464 S.W.3d 660, 667 (Tex. 2015); Griffith v. State, 116 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Accordingly, as the Amarillo Court of Appeals indicated in Wiley, we conclude the element of intent to commit a sexual assault is subsumed within the burglary of a habitation charge to which Adams stipulated and judicially confessed, including that he sexually assaulted the victim. Thus, Adams's burglary of a habitation conviction qualifies as a predicate offense for the application of the SVP Act.
The evidence presented at trial established Adams has two convictions for sexually violent offenses and he received life sentences in both cases. Consequently, we conclude, when viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Adams is a repeat sexually violent offender. Thus, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury's finding. We overrule Adams's first issue.
With respect to the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we note that the central dispute in this case is whether the burglary of a habitation conviction, which included a finding that Adams committed sexual assault during the course of the burglary, constitutes a sexually violent offense. As stated supra, we conclude it does. The judgment in Adams's burglary of a habitation case and his stipulation are evidence that the burglary of a habitation conviction is a sexually violent offense. In addition, his testimony that he refused the victim's offers of money because he wanted sex is proof of his intent to commit sexual assault during the burglary. Accordingly, we conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to support the jury's finding Adams is a repeat sexually violent offender. We overrule Adams's second issue.
Conclusion
We conclude the State proved Adams is a repeat sexually violent offender beyond a reasonable doubt. Adams's challenges to the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence on appeal fail. We affirm the trial court's judgment and order of civil commitment.
JUDGMENT
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal.
Judgment entered.