Opinion
No. 98 Cr. 1038 (SWK).
January 19, 2005
OPINION AND ORDER
On June 9, 2004, the defendant, pursuant to a plea agreement, pled guilty before this Court to one count of conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 5 kilograms and more of a mixture and substance containing cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Defendant now moves, pursuant to Rule 11(d)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to withdraw that guilty plea. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.
By 2002 amendment to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the provision on plea withdrawal prior to sentencing was moved from former Rule 32(e) to Rule 11(d). Accordingly, the pre-amendment cases cited in this opinion refer to the former Rule 32(e).
I. Factual Background
On June 18, 2004, nine days after pleading guilty, the defendant wrote a letter to the Court in which he claimed that his counsel "pressured me from the very beginning into accepting a plead [sic] bargain which I was always against."See Ramos Letter, dated June 18, 2004 ("Def. Ltr."), at 1. In the same letter, the defendant contended that his counsel,inter alia, "never presented my charges [sic] or any discovery information." Id. at 2. Finally, Ramos claimed that his lawyer coerced him into pleading guilty by telling him that the Court would become "angry" and impose a harsher sentence if the defendant chose not to plead. Id.
To address the issues raised by the defendant's letter, the Court held a conference on July 7, 2004. At that conference, the defendant claimed that he was "pressured, totally pressured" by counsel to plead guilty. See July 7, 2004 Transcript ("7/7/2004 Tr.") at 2. Critically, at that same hearing, defendant's counsel stated that, "It's true that I rushed him to take a plea. He wanted more time and I apologize to him for that." Id. at 3. In light of this admission, the Court appointed new CJA counsel for the defendant.
II. Applicable Law
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B) provides that a defendant who has pled guilty may withdraw his plea before he is sentenced if he shows "a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal." In determining whether there is a "fair and just reason" to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing, a district court should consider: (1) whether the defendant has asserted his legal innocence; (2) the amount of time that has elapsed between the plea and the motion; and (3) whether the Government would be prejudiced by a withdrawal of the plea. See Fed.R. Cr. P. 32(d), Advisory Committee Notes (1983 Amendment); United States v. Torres, 129 F.3d 710, 715 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Rosen, 2004 WL 1234037 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2004). Additionally, courts should consider the circumstances surrounding the plea, including the nature and background of the defendant, and whether the plea was knowing and voluntary. See United States v. Fernandez, 734 F. Supp. 599, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing United States v. Figueroa, 757 F.2d 466, 475 (2d Cir. 1985)), aff'd, 932 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1991).
A defendant seeking to withdraw his guilty plea bears the burden of demonstrating valid grounds for withdrawal. See United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 261 (2d Cir. 1998). Ultimately, in order to withdraw a guilty plea, a defendant "must raise a significant question about the voluntariness of the original plea." Torres, 129 F.3d at 715. These stringent standards reflect a recognition that "[s]ociety has a strong interest in the finality of guilty pleas, and allowing withdrawal of pleas `undermines confidence in the integrity of our [judicial] procedures, . . . increas[es] the volume of judicial work, [and] delays and impairs the orderly administration of justice.'" United States v. Sweeney, 878 F.2d 68, 70 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979)).
III. The Defendant Has Met His Burden of Demonstrating a Fair and Just Reason For Withdrawal
Of the factors a district court should consider in deciding a motion to withdraw, all weigh in favor of the defendant. First, the defendant maintains his legal innocence in the affidavit submitted with his motion to withdraw. Second, unlikeUnited States v. Rosen, 2004 WL 1234037 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2004), in which the defendant waited four months to attempt withdrawal, Ramos's attempt to withdraw occurred only nine days after entering his plea. Third, it is difficult to conceive of any prejudice to the Government if withdrawal is permitted given that the charges against the other defendants in this case have already been adjudicated. Put differently, the strength of the Government's case against the defendant today is the same as it was June 9, 2004, prior to the defendant's guilty plea. Finally, the information that has come before the Court since the June 9 plea, i.e., the defendant's June 18 letter and the transcript of the July 7 hearing, raises a significant question about the voluntariness of the original plea.
Although the Government claims that the defendant's motion is undermined by the fact that he did not proclaim his innocence in his June 18 letter to the Court, Ramos's statement in that letter that "I never had the opportunity of merely knowing my charges and therefore be [sic] able to fight for my freedom and defend myself by having a fair trial," Def. Ltr. at 3, could certainly be construed as maintaining one's innocence. In any event, Ramos's affirmation of innocence in the December 20, 2004 affidavit is sufficient to tip the first factor in his favor.
In opposing the defendant's motion, the Government points repeatedly to the transcript of Ramos's June 9 plea, claiming that it establishes that the plea was knowing and voluntary. The Court disagrees. In light of the defendant's contention, supported by his lawyer's admission and subsequent apology, that the very plea itself was the product of his having been rushed and not provided with discovery, the June 9 plea proceeding cannot be analyzed in a vacuum, as it is by the Government.
The Government rightfully points out that at the plea proceeding, inter alia, the defendant stated that no one had threatened or forced him into pleading guilty, that he was satisfied with his counsel, that the appointment of other counsel was unnecessary, and that he understood he was waiving his right to trial by jury by pleading guilty.
While a defendant "may not withdraw his guilty plea simply on a lark" and must not be permitted to "degrade the otherwise serious act of pleading guilty into something akin to a move in a game of chess," United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 676-77 (1997), when a defendant's lawyer acknowledges on the record that he "rushed" his client into pleading and "apologizes for that," withdrawal is plainly appropriate. In this instance, the case for withdrawal is only made stronger by the fact that the defendant's counsel did not provide him with critical discovery, a point that the Government concedes.
See Government Opposition Memo ("Gov. Opp.") at 3, n 1.
A defendant's guilty plea and corresponding waiver of the constitutional right to trial by jury is a serious and solemn act; when his own lawyer fails to provide him with the charging instrument, admits to rushing him into pleading, apologizes to his client in open court, and then, only nine days later, the defendant requests to withdraw his plea, such a request is justified.
Accordingly, the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea is granted. The parties are ordered to appear for a pretrial conference on February 23, 2005 at 10:30 a.m.
SO ORDERED.