Opinion
Cr. No. 10-184-1 S.
June 30, 2011
OPINION and ORDER
The United States has petitioned the Court for a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum for the person of Defendant Jason W. Pleau, and Defendant Pleau has filed a motion for miscellaneous relief, asking the Court not to issue the writ.
I. Background
The charges against Pleau arise from the September 20, 2010 murder of David Main outside of a bank in Woonsocket, Rhode Island. Pleau is currently incarcerated at the Rhode Island Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI), where he is serving state sentences for a parole violation and the violation of a suspended sentence.
On November 18, 2010, the United States filed a criminal complaint against Pleau in this Court, and that same day, a magistrate judge issued a warrant for his arrest. Shortly thereafter, the United States Marshal Service lodged a detainer against Pleau with the ACI. On December 14, 2010, a federal grand jury indicted Pleau for conspiracy to commit robbery affecting commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (the Hobbs Act); robbery affecting commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); and possessing, using, carrying, and discharging a firearm in relation to a crime of violence with death resulting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) (j)(1). On May 10, 2010, the Court issued a second warrant for Pleau's arrest; this warrant was returned unexecuted two weeks later.
On May 25, 2010, at the request of the United States, the Court entered an order transmitting the United States's request for temporary custody of Pleau under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IADA or Agreement). In essence, the United States requested temporary custody of Pleau so that he could stand trial in federal court on the charges alleged in the Indictment.
Some background on the IADA is necessary to appreciate the events which followed. Congress enacted the IADA in 1970, joining the United States and the District of Columbia with the 46 enacting states under the Agreement, in order to "encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints." 18 U.S.C. App. 2 § 2, art. I; see also United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 343 (1978).
Article IV of the Agreement provides that a prosecutor is entitled to have a prisoner made available in accordance with Article V of the Agreement, upon the prosecutor's "written request for temporary custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the State in which the prisoner is incarcerated." The United States is considered a "State" under the Agreement. 18 U.S.C. App. 2 § 2, art. II(a); see also Mauro, 436 U.S. at 354 ("[T]he United States is a party to the Agreement as both a sending and a receiving State."). Under the Agreement, a "Sending State" is defined as "a State in which a prisoner is incarcerated at the time . . . that a request for custody or availability is initiated [under the Agreement]," and a "Receiving State" is a "State in which trial is to be had on an indictment, information, or complaint pursuant to [the Agreement]." 18 U.S.C. App. 2 § 2, art. II (b), (c). Article IV(a) further provides that,
there shall be a period of thirty days after receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored, within which period the Governor of the sending State may disapprove the request for temporary custody or availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion of the prisoner.Id.
On June 23, 2011, the Governor of Rhode Island, Lincoln D. Chafee, sent a letter to the United States denying its request for Pleau's temporary custody under the IADA. (See Ex. A to Def.'s Mot., Letter from Lincoln D. Chafee to Peter Neronha, U.S. Attorney, June 23, 2011.) Four days later, on June 27, 2011, the United States and Pleau filed the petition and motion, respectively, now before the Court.
According to news accounts, the Governor's decision to deny the request for temporary custody was a statement against capital punishment, which the United States may seek in this case. See Katie Mulvaney, Will federal death penalty come into play in case of Woonsocket killing?, Providence Journal, June 25, 2011,available at
II. Discussion
In its petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, the United States requests Pleau's presence for his arraignment in this Court and the consequent prosecution under the Indictment. The United States contends that the Governor's dishonoring of its request under the IADA does not affect the issuance of the writ and that Pleau does not have standing to contest the Court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.
A. Standing
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5), a federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to secure temporary custody of a state prisoner for the prisoner's federal prosecution. Flick v. Blevins, 887 F.2d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 1989). "Upon receipt of such a writ, state authorities deliver the prisoner in accordance with its terms and in compliance with § 2241." United States v. Kenaan, 557 F.2d 912, 916 (1st Cir. 1977).
For a discussion of the distinction between a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum and a detainer under the IADA, see United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 358-59 (1978).
Numerous federal courts have held that it is axiomatic that "a state prisoner is without standing to contest a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum." Derengowski v. United States Marshal, 377 F.2d 223, 223 (8th Cir. 1967) (emphasis in original); see also Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 260 (1922); United States v. Harden, 45 Fed. Appx. 237, 239 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Horton, No. 95-5880, 1997 WL 76063, at *3 (4th Cir. Feb. 24, 1997) (mem.).
In an attempt to refute this well-established proposition, Pleau points to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bond v. United States, No. 09-1227, 2011 WL 2369334 (U.S. June 16, 2011). In Bond, the Supreme Court held that a defendant has standing to bring a constitutional challenge on federalism grounds against a statute under which he was indicted. Id. at *3. Pleau, however, challenges the issuance of the writ; he does not challenge the statute authorizing a federal court to issue a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, nor any statute under which he has been indicted. Under these circumstances, Bond is inapposite, and Pleau clearly lacks standing to challenge this Court's issuance of the writ. See Derengowski, 377 F.2d at 223.
B. The Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum
It appears that this is the first time a governor has dishonored a request by the United States under the IADA for temporary custody of a state prisoner. For this reason, although Pleau does not have standing to challenge the Court's issuance of the writ, both the federalism principles implicated by these novel circumstances and the practical consequences arising from them warrant some further discussion.
The Supreme Court has made plain that once a detainer is lodged against a state prisoner, the subsequent issuance of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum does not relieve the United States of its duty to provide the prisoner with the procedural safeguards set forth in the IADA. Mauro, 436 U.S. at 362; see also Bloomgarden v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 09-56670, 2011 WL 1301541, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 6, 2011) ("[I]t must be conceded that: . . . a detainer, once filed, brings the Act into play whereas a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, standing alone, would not." (quoting United States v. Schrum, 504 F. Supp. 23, 25 (D. Kan. 1980))). In short, the issuance of an ad prosequendum writ does not nullify the invocation of the IADA and its concomitant procedural protections.
Pleau argues that United States v. Scheer, 729 F.2d 164, 170 (2d Cir. 1984), stands for the proposition that the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum cannot override the 30-day waiting period provided for in the IADA, where the United States has previously invoked the IADA. Here, however, because the United States petitions the Court for a writ after the 30-day waiting period has elapsed, the Court need not decide the issue.
Indeed, the United States concedes in its petition that "the speedy trial provisions of Article IV(c) of the [IADA] and the anti-shuttling provisions of Article IV(e) of the [IADA] will apply to [Pleau]." (U.S. Pet. for Writ 3.)
But while the invocation of the IADA serves to extend procedural protections to a prisoner transferred from state to federal custody, it does not turn well-grounded and immutable principles of federalism and federal supremacy on their head. That is, the proviso in Article IV allowing a governor 30 days to refuse a request for temporary custody under the IADA does not, and could not, confer upon a governor the authority to dishonor a federal court's writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.
The Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution states that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby." U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. The federal statute authorizing a federal court to issue an ad prosequendum writ grants federal habeas jurisdiction when "[i]t is necessary to bring [a prisoner] into [federal] court to testify or for trial," 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5). This grant of authority can be traced back to Chief Justice Marshall's explication of the writs available to federal courts in Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 98 (1807), in which the Supreme Court recognized the power of a federal court to issue a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum "when it is necessary to remove a prisoner, in order to prosecute" him.
Article IV's proviso was intended "to do no more than preserve previously existing rights of the sending States, not to expand them. If a State has never had authority [under the Supremacy Clause] to dishonor an ad prosequendum writ issued by a federal court, then this provision could not be read as providing such authority." Mauro, 436 U.S. at 363. Not only does the legislative history of the IADA suggest that the Agreement merely preserved a governor's pre-existing authority to dishonor the request for temporary custody by another IADA State, see id. at 363 n. 28 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 91-1018, p. 2 (1970); S. Rep. No. 91-1356, p. 2 (1970)), but also there can be no question that a State's dishonoring of a federal writ violates the Supremacy Clause. See Kenaan, 557 F.2d at 916 n. 8 (noting that no state has refused to honor a writ under § 2241(c)(a), but that "[in] the unlikely event of such a confrontation, we are confident that the writ would be held [enforceable]"). The Court therefore concludes that where the IADA has been invoked and a detainer lodged against a state prisoner, Article IV may afford the governor of the sending State the right to dishonor the request to transfer (as occurred here) but, in all events does not empower him, or his agents, to disobey a federal court's writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum as to that prisoner.
III. Conclusion
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5), it is hereby ordered that the United States's petition for writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum for the person of Jason W. Pleau be granted and that the Clerk of the Court issue a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum in accordance with the United States's petition; Defendant's motion for miscellaneous relief is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
http://www.projo.com/news/content/PLEAU_FOLLOW_06-25-11_JSOR13F_v15.43142.html (last accessed June 29, 2011).