Summary
explaining that an appeal from a district court order denying a motion to recuse or disqualify was not an "appealable" order
Summary of this case from North Carolina v. DavisOpinion
No. 10-7577.
Submitted: April 29, 2011.
Decided: May 16, 2011.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, District Judge. (2:07-cr-00068-RBS-JEB-1).
Linwood Cola Parker, Appellant Pro Se. Gurney Wingate Grant, II, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia; Darryl James Mitchell, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
Linwood Cola Parker seeks to appeal the district court's order denying his motion to recuse or disqualify. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2006); Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The order Parker seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED.