U.S. v. Norve

Full title: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICHAEL NORVE

Court: United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

Date published: Dec 20, 2004

Criminal Action Number 04-214, Section "L" (3) (E.D. La. Dec. 20, 2004)

Opinion

Criminal Action Number 04-214, Section "L" (3).

December 20, 2004

ORDER REASONS

ELDON FALLON, District Judge

Before the Court is the Defendant Michael Norve's motions to quash count one of the indictment. This motion was taken under submission by the Court on November 24, 2004. For the following reasons. Defendant's motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND:

On July 16, 2004, Defendants James Chancey, Richard Price, and Michael Norve were charged with conspiracy to commit arson, mail fraud, interstate travel to aid racketeering, violation of the federal firearm statute and use of fire to commit a federal felony, as well as the underlying substantive offenses in which the defendants were specifically involved. The 12-count indictment alleges that James Chancey, the owner and operator of Vernon's Cycle Shop, was the organizer and leader of the conspiracy involving five or more participants beginning before February 5, 1998 and continuing through July 16, 2004. Both Richard Price and Michael Norve were allegedly customers of Vernon's Cycle Shop and associates of Chancey. According to the indictment, Chancey organized a conspiracy to commit criminal conduct to benefit the cycle shop and its customers. The conspiracy consisted of instituting a scheme to bill the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office for motorcycle parts never actually delivered or received by the Sheriff's Office from February 1998 to March 2003, attempting to obstruct justice by setting fire to the Plaquemines Parish Courthouse in order to destroy records of state criminal cases pending against Chancey's customers and motorcycle associates, and soliciting and planning arson-for-hire on behalf of Norve and Price. Chancey is also accused of knowingly possessing a machine gun at the cycle shop. The Government claims that all of these acts were part of one single conspiracy.

In the counts alleging obstruction of justice and arson of the Plaquemines Parish Courthouse, the indictment alleges that on or about December 2001, Chancey referred a female employee of the cycle shop to a customer who was the owner and landlord of the building that housed the Plaquemines Parish Detective's Bureau so that the woman could gain access to the Sheriff's office files. The female employee engaged in sexual relations with the customer in order to gain access to the Bureau. At some time around December 2001, the female employee entered the Bureau and removed witness statements from a specific case file. On or about, January 12, 2002. Chancey allegedly set fire to the Plaquemines Parish Courthouse in order to destroy criminal records, causing more than $2,500,000 worth of damage.

According to the Government, as another part of the conspiracy, Chancey allegedly traveled from Louisiana to Mississippi on January 10, 2002 in order to burn down Price's dwelling, for which Chancey received a $5,000 check from Price made payable to Vernon's Cycle Shop. The Government claims that Price then used the U.S. mail to submit an insurance claim to MetLife Auto and Home Insurance, which paid to Price $48,150. The indictment also alleges that Chancey traveled from Louisiana to Mississippi on March 5, 2002 to commit arson of Norve's truck, at Norve's request. Norve allegedly paid Chancey for the job and also used the U.S. mail to submit an insurance claim to Progressive Insurance Company, which paid $13,667.50.

II. MOTION TO QUASH COUNT ONE

Defendant Michael Norve moves the Court to quash count 1 of the indictment, arguing that including Norve in count 1 was an inadvertent error on the part of the U.S. Attorney. Count one of the 12-count indictment charges Norve, along with co-defendants Chancey and Price, with conspiracy to commit several criminal acts. Norve's motion to quash was prompted by this Court's October 7, 2004 Order and Reasons denying Norve's motion to sever his trial from the trial against Chancey and Price involving the courthouse arson scenario, the machine gun possession, and the arson of Price's dwelling. In that Order and Reasons, the Court explained that:

Norve's argument for severance would be compelling if Norve were only charged with truck arson and mail fraud. However, Count 1 of the indictment also charge Norve in the overarching conspiracy to commit all of the underlying offenses in the indictment. (October 7, 2004 Order and Reasons at 5).

Norve now argues that count 1 of the indictment should be quashed and the Court should revisit Norve's motion to sever. Apart from count 1, Norve is only mentioned in counts 10 and 11 of the indictment, which charge him with the substantive offenses of arson of his truck and fraudulent use of the U.S. mail in filing insurance claims. Norve maintains that he is not connected to the other counts in the indictment and should not be charged with the overarching conspiracy to commit those crimes. Norve further argues that the bulk of the charges in the indictment, including the arson of the Plaquemines Parish Courthouse, refer to crimes allegedly committed in Louisiana, which are wholly unrelated to the charges brought against Norve for crimes allegedly committed in Mississippi. According to Norve, the Government cannot meet its duty of showing evidence that Norve was involved in the conspiracy as charged in count 1 of the indictment.

The Government acknowledges that Norve was not involved in all parts of the conspiracy. According to the Government, Chancey organized a multiple-object conspiracy and used various co-conspirators for different purposes. However, the Government maintains that it will be able to prove that Norve was a part of that overarching conspiracy because he agreed to at least one object crime of the conspiracy. Therefore, the Government contends that Norve was properly charged in count 1 of the indictment.

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

To establish conspiracy, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was an agreement between two or more persons, that the agreement was to commit a crime, and that an overt act was committed by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the agreement. U.S. v. Thorn, 917 F.2d 170, 173 (5^th Cir. 1990). In this case, the Government has charged the Defendants in a conspiracy to commit multiple criminal schemes organized by Chancey to benefit Vernon's Cycle Shop and its customers. The Government maintains that these schemes involve the overlapping and similar crimes of using the mail to defraud insurance companies or the Jefferson parish Sheriff's Office, using fire to commit federal felonies by committing arson, and crossing state lines for the purpose of racketeering. See United States v. Rodgers, et al., 624 F.2d 1303, 1307 (5^th Cir. 1980) (explaining that a single, common scheme exists where there are "a common goal, operations carried out in a virtually identical manner, and an overlapping of participants."); see also United States v. Maker, 751 F.2d 614, 625 (3^rd Cir. 1984). The indictment sets forth the elements of the conspiracy charge by identifying the conspirators, the agreement, the purpose, method, and means of the conspiracy, and the overt acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Therefore, on the face of the indictment, the conspiracy charge appears to have been proper. It will be the Government's burden at trial to prove that one overarching conspiracy actually existed.

A defendant may be convicted of conspiracy even if the evidence shows that he only participated at one level of conspiracy charged in the indictment and only played a minor role in the conspiracy. U.S. v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 858 (5^th Cir. 1998); Thorn, 917 F.2d at 173; U.S. v. Gonzales, 866 F.2d 781, 787-88 (5^th Cir. 1989). Therefore, Norve need not have been involved in every aspect, or even most aspects, of the conspiracy. The Government will have to prove that a conspiracy existed, that Norve knew of the conspiracy, and that he voluntarily became a part of it. Thorn, 917 F.2d at 173. If Norve understood the unlawful nature or the purpose of the conspiracy and knowingly or intentionally joined in it on at least one occasion, that is enough to convict him of conspiracy, if a conspiracy existed. Id. It is the Government's contention that it will successfully carry this burden at trial. Given that the indictment sufficiently sets forth the elements of the alleged conspiracy, and asserts that Norve was involved in at least two of the underlying overt acts, the Government has properly named Norve in the conspiracy charge. Therefore, the Court need not reconsider Norve's motion to sever his trial from that of the co-defendants.

IV. CONCLUSION:

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's motion to quash count one of the indictment is DENIED