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U.S. v. Miller

United States District Court, D. Utah, Central Division
Feb 14, 2003
No. 2:02-CR-580W (D. Utah Feb. 14, 2003)

Opinion

No. 2:02-CR-580W

February 14, 2003


MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS


This matter is before the court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. On December 11, 2002, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion. Thereafter, on December 13, 2002, the Court permitted the government to supplement its evidence with the brief testimony of one additional witness. Defendant James Dean Miller ("Miller") was present with his counsel, Stephen R. McCaughey. The government was represented by Michael P. Kennedy. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ordered a transcript as well as supplemental briefing from the parties. After thorough review and consideration of the pleadings submitted by the parties and the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, and the videotape introduced as Govt's Ex. 1, the court enters the following memorandum decision and order.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The court finds the relevant facts as follows. Trooper John Sheets has been employed by the Utah Highway Patrol (UHP) for three years. and has been a law enforcement officer for seventeen years. (Tr. I at 6.) His primary function with UHP is to enforce the traffic laws of the State of Utah, and he has extensive training specific to that function. (Tr. I at 7.) On the night of August 31 and morning of September 1, 2002, Trooper Sheets was assigned to the Cedar City area in Iron County, Utah. (Tr. I at 7.) After completing a traffic stop near milepost 57 on north-bound 1-15, at approximately 1:45 am. on September 1, Trooper Sheets observed a purple Chrysler LHS sedan pass his location. (Tr. I at 8.)

Reference to the transcript of the evidentiary hearing conducted on December 11, 2002, will be cited as "Tr. I at ___." Reference to the transcript of the hearing conducted on December 13, 2002, will be cited as "Tr. II at ___."

Trooper Sheets testified that as the vehicle passed, although the license plate was lit, he observed what appeared to be a black outline over the plate which drew his attention. (Tr. I at 8.) Trooper Sheets pulled out behind the vehicle and noticed that it had a trailer hitch. (Tr. I at 8.) Trooper Sheets was offset to the left side of the vehicle and noted that from this angle the trailer hitch obstructed some of the license plate's numbers. Trooper Sheets testified that he had to "jockey for position" and pull in directly behind the vehicle in order to read the entire license plate. (Tr. I at 8-9.) Trooper Sheets testified that he is familiar with § 41-1a-404 of the Utah Code which pertains to the display of license plates, and that he understand the statute as requiring the plate to be in a place and position to be "visible and unobstructed, clean." (Tr. I at 11) Trooper Sheets testified that as he observed the vehicle he believed it was not in compliance with the statute because he had to move around in order to see all the numbers. (Tr. I at 11.)

The vehicle exited 1-15 at the milepost 59 exit and Trooper Sheets followed. The vehicle stopped at a stop sign at the bottom of the off ramp and Trooper Sheets stopped behind it. Although the freeway was dark, the off-ramp was well lit. (Tr. I at 11, 24.) In addition, the headlights from the patrol car were shining through the vehicle. (Tr. I at 24.) While stopped behind the vehicle, Trooper Sheets observed that the driver and front-seat passenger were not wearing seatbelts. (Tr. I at 12.) Trooper Sheets testified: "When I am looking for seatbelt violations and to verify they are not wearing them, I [look for] the buckle that hangs." (Tr. I at 23.) The seatbelts in the vehicle were the type which cross the torso and the lap in one piece, and Trooper Sheets testified that he observed the tongue of the buckle hanging from the belt on both sides of the vehicle. (Tr. I at 21, 23.)

When Trooper Sheets stopped behind the vehicle at the off-ramp the driver looked side to side and the passenger looked back toward the trooper. (Tr. I at 25.) Trooper Sheets testified that he was able to get a "good look" at the front-seat passenger, and that he appeared to be under age 19. Trooper Sheets testified that Utah seatbelt law requires all vehicle occupants to be belted, and failure of a person under 19 years of age to be belted is a primary violation for which a vehicle may be stopped. (Tr. I at 12.)

After observing what he believed were two separate violations of Utah law, Trooper Sheets initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle as it turned from the off ramp onto the access road and into a Chevron gas station. (Tr. I at 13, 19.) Trooper Sheets testified that he based his stop on both the license plate violation and the seatbelt violation, and he believed that both allowed him to stop the vehicle. (Tr. I at 23-24.) The vehicle stopped and the driver and front-seat passenger both exited and began walking toward the gas station. Trooper Sheets asked them to return to the vehicle and they complied. When he approached. Trooper Sheets learned that the vehicle actually had three occupants. (Tr. I at 15-16.) In addition to the driver and juvenile front-seat passenger, there was a third individual who appeared to be sleeping in the back seat. The individual in the rear seat was not wearing a seatbelt. (Tr. I at 16.)

The driver was identified as the defendant, James Dean Miller. The front-seat passenger was identified as Miller's 15-year-old son. The individual in the back seat was identified as Rob Pederson. (Tr. I at 16, 18, 22, 27.)

Miller testified that both he and his son were wearing seatbelts when they exited 1-15 and pulled onto the off ramp. Miller further testified that the trailer hitch attached to the vehicle was factory installed, and that it was on the vehicle when he purchased it. (Tr. I at 26-27.)

On December 13, the court heard additional testimony from Rob Pedersori, the rear seat passenger in the vehicle. Pederson has known Miller for ten to fifteen years. Pederson testified that to his knowledge, no one in the vehicle wore seatbelts during the trip from California. (Tr. II at 9.) Pederson testified that it was not his habit to wear a seatbelt, and he did not believe Miller had a habit of wearing a seatbelt. (Tr. II at 9.) Near Las Vegas, Pederson switched seating positions with Miller's son; the son then sat in the front seat and Pederson moved to the back seat to sleep. (Tr. II at 9.) Before going to sleep, Pederson did not see Miller's son buckle his seatbelt. (Tr. II at 9-10.)

Pederson also testified that he is familiar with the vehicle and its history. Pederson testified that the vehicle did not have a trailer hitch when Miller purchased it, and that the hitch was installed later, in California, for the purpose of moving furniture. (Tr. II at 11.)

DISCUSSION

The parties have stipulated that the sole issue in this case is whether the traffic stop was justified at its inception. (Tr. I at 4.) In the Tenth Circuit, a traffic stop "is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment at its inception if the officer has either (1) probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred or (2) a reasonable articulable suspicion that `this particular motorist violated any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations of the jurisdiction.'" United States v. Ramstad, 308 F.3d 1139, 1144 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Ozbim, 189 F.3d 1194, 197 (10th Cir. 1999)).

In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), the Supreme Court explained that "[a]s a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." Id. at 810. The Tenth Circuit has "rejected the notion that Whren implicitly overruled prior tenth Circuit precedent holding that reasonable suspicion, as opposed to the higher standard of probable cause, is required to justify a traffic stop."United States v. Ramstad, 308 F.3d 1139, 1144 n. 1 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1286-87 (10th Cir. 2001)). The Tenth Circuit explained: "while Whren and other Supreme Court decisions 'indicate that probable cause is a sufficient ground for a stop, none of them indicates that it is necessary for a stop.'" Ramstad, 308 F.3d at 1144 n. 1 (quoting Callarman, 273 F.3d at 1286)).

Trooper Sheets testified that he observed two separate traffic violations. The first violation he observed was what he perceived as an obstructed rear license plate. Section 41-1a-404 of the Utah Code pertains to the location and position of license plates. It provides that vehicle license plates shall at all times be "in a place and position to be clearly visible." Utah Code Ann. § 41-1a-404(3)(a)(iii) (1998).

In this case, Trooper Sheets testified that he had difficulty reading the license plate and that he had to "jockey for position" and move around in order to see all of the numbers. While the license plate in this case happened to have a space in the center area where the ball of the trailer hitch covered. Trooper Sheets had no way of knowing whether this was the case. Had the license plate been of a different format, a format with a letter or number in the center, the ball of the trailer hitch certainly would have obstructed at least one character on the plate. The format of license plates and the placement of characters on a license plate is not standard; it varies not only from state to state but within states as well. Accordingly, when an officer observes a license plate that has the ball of a trailer hitch extending into and obscuring the center of that plate, that officer has no way of knowing whether that particular plate has a number, letter, picture or a space in the center.See Def's Ex. A. Common sense suggests that if you cannot tell if you can see all the characters of a license plate then that particular plate may not be "clearly visible" as required by the statute.

In addition, after Trooper Sheets began to follow the vehicle, but before initiating the stop, he observed a seatbelt violation. Section 41-6-182 of the Utah Code provides that failure of a person under 19 years of age to wear a properly adjusted and fastened safety belt is a primary violation for which a vehicle may be stopped. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-182(5)(2000).

Section 41-6-182 provides in pertinent part: (1) The driver of a motor vehicle operated on a highway shall: (a) wear a properly adjusted and fastened safety belt; . . . (c) provide for the protection of each person five years of age up to 16 years of age by using an appropriate child restraint device to restrain each person in the manner prescribed by the manufacturer of the device by securing, or causing to be secured, a properly adjusted and fastened safety belt on each person. . . . (5) For a person 19 years of age or older who violates Subsection (1)(a) or (2), enforcement by a state or local law enforcement officer shall be only as a secondary action when the person has been detained for a suspected violation of Title 41, Motor Vehicles, other than Subsection (1)(a) or (2), or for another offense.

Trooper Sheets testified that under good lighting conditions he specifically looked for and observed the hanging buckles on both sides of the vehicle, indicating that neither occupant was wearing a seat belt. He also observed that the front-seat passenger appeared to be, and in fact was, under the age of 19. The court has no reason to disbelieve or discredit Trooper Sheets' testimony.

The trooper's testimony concerning the seatbelt violation, although contrary to that of Miller, was somewhat corroborated by the vehicle's rear-seat passenger, Rob Pederson, who testified that he never saw Miller's son buckle the seatbelt when they changed places in Las Vegas, and that Miller did not have a habit of wearing his seatbelt. In addition, Pederson's testimony also contradicted Miller's testimony that the trailer hitch was original equipment on the vehicle.

Trooper Sheets relied on two observed traffic violations for the stop of Miller's vehicle. Only one is required. Accordingly, the court concludes that the stop was justified at its inception.

Therefore, based on the foregoing and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's motion to suppress is DENIED.


Summaries of

U.S. v. Miller

United States District Court, D. Utah, Central Division
Feb 14, 2003
No. 2:02-CR-580W (D. Utah Feb. 14, 2003)
Case details for

U.S. v. Miller

Case Details

Full title:United States of America, Plaintiff, vs. James Dean Miller, Defendant

Court:United States District Court, D. Utah, Central Division

Date published: Feb 14, 2003

Citations

No. 2:02-CR-580W (D. Utah Feb. 14, 2003)