U.S. v. Mier-Godinez

Full title: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JUAN CARLOS MIER-GODINEZ, Defendant

Court: United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Western Division

Date published: Sep 29, 2004

No. CR99-4019-MWB (N.D. Iowa Sep. 29, 2004)

Opinion

No. CR99-4019-MWB.

September 29, 2004

ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE

MARK BENNETT, Chief Judge, District

I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In a one-count indictment returned on June 16, 1999, defendant Juan Carlos Mier-Godinez was charged with possession with intent to distribute approximately 2366 grams of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). Defendant Mier-Godinez entered a plea of guilty to the charge and he was sentenced to 120 months imprisonment. Defendant Mier-Godinez did not appeal his conviction. Instead, defendant Mier-Godinez filed his current motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody. In his motion, Mier-Godinez challenges the validity of his conviction and sentence on the following grounds: (1) that his conviction was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights because his plea was not knowing and voluntarily made; (2) that his sentence was based on facts that he did not admit at his plea hearing that were later proved by a preponderance of the evidence at the sentencing hearing and so he was improperly sentenced; and (3) that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS A. Standards Applicable To § 2255 Motions

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has described 28 U.S.C. § 2255 as "the statutory analogue of habeas corpus for persons in federal custody." Poor Thunder v. United States, 810 F.2d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 1987). In Poor Thunder, the court explained the purpose of the statute:

[Section 2255] provides a remedy in the sentencing court (as opposed to habeas corpus, which lies in the district of confinement) for claims that a sentence was `imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.'

Id. at 821 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255). Of course, a motion pursuant to § 2255 may not serve as a substitute for a direct appeal, rather "[r]elief under [this statute] is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised for the first time on direct appeal and, if uncorrected, would result in a complete miscarriage of justice." United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996).

The failure to raise an issue on direct appeal ordinarily constitutes a procedural default and precludes a defendant's ability to raise that issue for the first time in a § 2255 motion. Dejan v. United States, 208 F.3d 682, 685 (8th Cir. 2000); Swedzinski v. United States, 160 F.3d 498, 500 (8th Cir. 1998); Matthews v. United States, 114 F.3d 112, 113 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 730 (1998); Bousley v. Brooks, 97 F.3d 284, 287 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 31 (1997); Reid v. United States, 976 F.2d 446, 447 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 945 (1993) (citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982)). This rule applies whether the conviction was obtained through trial or through the entry of a guilty plea. United States v. Cain, 134 F.3d 1345, 1352 (8th Cir. 1998); Walker v. United States, 115 F.3d 603, 605 (8th Cir. 1997); Matthews, 114 F.3d at 113; Thomas v. United States, 112 F.3d 365, 366 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). A defendant may surmount this procedural default only if the defendant "`can show both (1) cause that excuses the default, and (2) actual prejudice from the errors asserted.'" Matthews, 114 F.3d at 113 (quoting Bousley, 97 F.3d at 287); see also United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996).

B. Analysis Of Issues

1. Validity of plea

Defendant Mier-Godinez contends that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made because the court failed to inform him of all the elements of the offense to which he was pleading guilty. Defendant Mier-Godinez, however, did not raise this issue on direct appeal and does not contend that the failure to raise this issue was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Issues that could have been, but were not, raised on direct appeal are waived and cannot be asserted for the first time in a collateral § 2255 action absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice, or a showing of actual innocence. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982); Dejan, 208 F.3d at 685; Swedzinski, 160 F.3d at 500; Matthews, 114 F.3d at 113; Bousley, 97 F.3d at 287. Thus, the court concludes that defendant Mier-Godinez's claim regarding his plea was not appropriately raised in a § 2255 motion because it could have been raised on direct appeal and was not. See Frady, 456 U.S. at 167-68. Therefore, this part of defendant Mier-Godinez's motion is denied on the ground that it has been procedurally defaulted.

2. Validity of sentence

Defendant Mier-Godinez further contends that he was improperly sentenced based on facts that he did not admit at his plea hearing but that were later proved by a preponderance of the evidence at his sentencing hearing and used in calculating his sentence. Again, defendant Mier-Godinez did not raise this issue on direct appeal and does not contend that the failure to raise this issue was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus, the court concludes that defendant Mier-Godinez's claim that his sentence was invalid was not appropriately raised in his § 2255 motion because it could have been raised on direct appeal and was not. See Frady, 456 U.S. at 167-68. Therefore, this part of defendant Mier-Godinez's motion is denied on the ground that it has been procedurally defaulted.

3. Ineffective assistance of counsel claim

Defendant Mier-Godinez also asserts a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel did not make a request for a downward departure on the basis that defendant Mier-Godinez would be subject to deportation after the completion of his sentence and would not resist such deportation. This claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not raised on direct appeal. However, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel normally are raised for the first time in collateral proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United States v. Martinez-Cruz, 186 F.3d 1102, 1105 (8th Cir. 1999) (reiterating that ineffective assistance of counsel claims are best presented in a motion for post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255); United States v. Mitchell, 136 F.3d 1192, 1193 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting ineffective assistance of counsel claims more properly raised in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion) (citing United States v. Martin, 59 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating ineffective assistance of counsel claims "more appropriately raised in collateral proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255")); United States v. Scott, 26 F.3d 1458, 1467 (8th Cir. 1994) (declining to consider ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for first time on direct appeal where claim not raised in a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255). In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a convicted defendant must demonstrate that (1) "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness;" and (2) "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 687; Furnish v. United States of America, 252 F.3d 950, 951 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that the two-prong test set forth in Strickland requires a showing that (1) counsel was constitutionally deficient in his or her performance and (2) the deficiency materially and adversely prejudiced the outcome of the case); Garrett v. Dormire, 237 F.3d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 2001) (same). Trial counsel has a "duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. Indeed, "counsel must exercise reasonable diligence to produce exculpatory evidence[,] and strategy resulting from lack of diligence in preparation and investigation is not protected by the presumption in favor of counsel." Kenley v. Armontrout, 937 F.2d 1298, 1304 (8th Cir. 1991). However, there is a strong presumption that counsel's challenged actions or omissions were, under the circumstances, sound trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see Collins v. Dormire, 240 F.3d 724, 727 (8th Cir. 2001) (in determining whether counsel's performance was deficient, the court should "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance . . .") (citing Strickland). With respect to the "strong presumption" afforded to counsel's performance, the Supreme Court specifically stated:

Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be considered sound trial strategy."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citations omitted).

To demonstrate that counsel's error was prejudicial, thereby satisfying the second prong of the Strickland test, a habeas petitioner must prove that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. The court need not address whether counsel's performance was deficient if the defendant is unable to prove prejudice. Apfel, 97 F.3d at 1076 (citing Montanye v. United States, 77 F.3d 226, 230 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 318 (1996)); see also Pryor v. Norris, 103 F.3d 710, 712 (8th Cir. 1997) (observing "[w]e need not reach the performance prong if we determine that the defendant suffered no prejudice from the alleged ineffectiveness."). The Supreme Court has stated that "[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

Here, the court is compelled to conclude that defendant Mier-Godinez has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by his counsel's alleged error. The court finds that Mier-Godinez has not shown that effective counsel should have moved for a downward departure based on his immigration status as a resident alien. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a sentencing court may grant a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 for a defendant's willingness to waive resistance to deportation. See United States v. Cruz-Ochoa, 85 F.3d 325, 325-26 (8th Cir. 1996). The decision to depart or not is within the district court's discretion. See United States v. Jauregui, 314 F.3d 961, 963 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Hernandez-Reyes, 114 F.3d 800, 803 (8th Cir. 1997). More importantly, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a trial counsel's failure to move for a downward departure for a deportable alien's willingness to waive resistance to deportation did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. United States v. Sera, 267 F.3d 872, 873-75 (8th Cir. 2001). Therefore, this part of defendant Mier-Godinez's motion is also denied.

C. Certificate Of Appealability

Defendant Mier-Godinez must make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right in order to be granted a certificate of appealability in this case. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1039 (2003); Garrett v. United States, 211 F.3d 1075, 1076-77 (8th Cir. 2000); Mills v. Norris, 187 F.3d 881, 882 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1999); Carter v. Hopkins, 151 F.3d 872, 873-74 (8th Cir. 1998); Ramsey v. Bowersox, 149 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 1998); Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 834 (1998). "A substantial showing is a showing that issues are debatable among reasonable jurists, a court could resolve the issues differently, or the issues deserve further proceedings." Cox, 133 F.3d at 569. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court reiterated in Miller-El that "`[w]here a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.'" Miller-El, 123 S. Ct. at 1040 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). The court determines that Mier-Godinez has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, and therefore, does not make the requisite showing to satisfy § 2253(c). See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); FED. R. APP. P. 22(b). With respect to Mier-Godinez's claims, the court shall not grant a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).

III. CONCLUSION

Defendant Mier-Godinez's § 2255 motion is denied, and this matter is dismissed in its entirety. Moreover, the court determines that Mier-Godinez has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); FED. R. APP. P. 22(b). Accordingly, a certificate of appealability will not issue.

IT IS SO ORDERED.