Opinion
8:02CR427
September 12, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Introduction
The defendant is charged in an indictment with possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The matter before the court is the defendant's objection, Filing No. 22, to the magistrate's report and recommendation, Filing No. 21, in which Magistrate Judge Gossett recommends that the court deny the defendant's motion, Filing No. 11, to suppress evidence seized during a search at the Travel Inn on August 3, 2002. In his objections, McClarty contends the warrantless search of the hotel room and his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. See Filing No. 23, Defendant's Brief, at 4-7. The government did not respond to the defendant's objections.
Standard of Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), the court makes a de novo determination of those portions of the report or recommendations to which the parties object. United States v. Lothridge, 324 F.3d 599, 600-01 (8th Cir. 2003). The court has conducted a careful de novo review of the entire record pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), including the transcript of the suppression hearing, Filing No. 19. The court finds the magistrate's report and recommendation is neither contrary to law nor clearly erroneous. Therefore, the court will adopt the report and recommendation, overrule defendant's objections thereto, and deny the motion to suppress.
Background
The court will specifically adopt the facts as set forth in the magistrate's report and recommendation and thus forgo a lengthy rehearsal of events leading to the arrest and search at issue. See Filing No. 21, Report and Recommendation, at 1-4.
Briefly, the evidence adduced at the hearing shows that Officers Kyler and Baudler along with Recruit Jouppi responded to a call about trespassers at the Travel Inn in Omaha. When the officers arrived, the hotel manager informed them that Room 363 was supposed to be empty, but that he had received information that armed people were in the room smoking crack. Officer Kyler testified that he had no reason to doubt the manager's information because he had been dispatched to the Travel Inn on similar complaints before.
The officers went to the room, listened, and heard people inside the room. They attempted to open the door with a master key which the manager had given them, but the key would not work. When a woman inside the room then opened the door, Officers Kyler and Baudler went inside. They found three or four women, a child, and McClarty. The officers secured the area by placing the adults in handcuffs. When Officer Kyler conducted a pat-down search of McClarty, he found the gun which McClarty now seeks to suppress as evidence. The officers found no other weapons or contraband in the room.
During the pat-down searches, McClarty and the women told Officer Kyler they had a right to be in the room because they had paid for it. Officer Kyler took McClarty to the manager to follow up on this claim, and the manger stated that the party who had rented the room had taken back the money for the room and left.
Analysis
The court agrees with Magistrate Gossett's analysis and conclusions in the report and recommendation. Accordingly, the court adopts the report and recommendation in its entirety and offers only a supplemental analysis to address the defendant's objections.
Standing. McClarty challenges Magistrate Judge Gossett's conclusion that McClarty lacks standing to challenge the search of his person and the motel room. The court does not read the magistrate's recommendation to hold that the defendant does not have standing to challenge the search of his person. With respect to the search of the motel room, McClarty claims he had a sufficient expectation of privacy in the motel room to provide standing because "[t]here was no evidence that he was ever informed by anyone prior to his being handcuffed that someone had 'unrented' the hotel room thereby making him a squatter." Filing No. 23, Defendant's Brief, at 3.
Although McClarty, as a guest, had a reasonable expectation of privacy when the hotel room was rented, the expectation was lost when the room was "unrented." The Eighth Circuit has consistently held that when the rental period has expired, control of the room reverts back to the hotel management, United States v. Rambo, 789 F.2d 1289, 1296 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Larson, 760 F.2d 852, 855 (8th Cir. 1985). The law is the same when a hotel guest is properly evicted, Young v. Harrison, 284 F.3d 863, 869 (8th Cir. 2002). Once hotel management regains control over the room, a guest loses any expectation of privacy and consequently any standing to object to search of the premises. Rambo, 789 F.2d at 1296. See also United States v. Jackson, 585 F.2d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Croft, 429 F.2d 884, 887 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Haddad, 558 F.2d 968, 975 (9th Cir. 1997).
Here, the rental period expired and control of the room reverted back to the manager when the person who originally rented the room asked for and received the rent money back from the manager. No evidence was presented to indicate that a pattern or practice existed that would have made reasonable McClarty's expectation of privacy after the "unrenting" of the room. See, e.g., United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146, 150 (10th Cir. 1986) (legitimate expectation of privacy in motel room after check-out time since guest continued to occupy room and had paid for room late on several occasions); United States v. Watson, 783 F. Supp. 258, 263 (E.D. Va. 1992) (legitimate expectation of privacy since guest had continually paid bill several hours after check-out time). McClarty therefore could claim no expectation of privacy when the officers entered the room. Consequently, the court finds that McClarty lacks standing to object to the search of the hotel room.
Warrantless Search of the Room. As discussed above, McClarty does not have standing to object to the search of the hotel room and consequently cannot contest the officers' search of the hotel room.
Probable Cause to Arrest and Search Incident to Arrest. The defendant also objects to the magistrate's finding that the police had probable cause to arrest him for trespassing. McClarty claims the officers' information and initial investigation prior to the arrest were insufficient to create probable cause for the arrest.
The hotel manager told the officers that Room 363 was supposed to be unoccupied and that he had received information that armed people were in the room smoking crack. Officer Kyler testified that he had been dispatched to Travel Inn in the past for similar problems, so he had no reason, objectively, to doubt the manager or what the manager told him. The officers therefore went to Room 363 to investigate and, as they listened at the door, they heard voices from inside the room. Because the room was supposed to be empty, the officers reasonably believed that the occupants were trespassers — trespassers who might be armed and high on crack.
The court looks at the totality of the circumstances to determine if a search incident to an arrest is valid. United States v. Lucas, 898 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1990). Here, since the totality of the circumstances indicates that the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant for trespassing, the officers were also entitled to conduct a search of the defendant's person incident to that arrest. "[W]hen a person is arrested, law enforcement officers are entitled to conduct a search incident to the arrest. In cases where the arrest occurs in . . . a hotel/motel room, the search is limited to the arrestee's person and those areas within the immediate control of the arrestee." United States v. LaFountain, 252 F. Supp.2d 883, 890 (D.N.D. 2003) ( citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); United States v. Miller, 946 F.2d 1344, 1345 (8th Cir. 1991)). Based on the manager's information that the trespassers were armed and smoking crack, the officers were entitled to protect their own safety as well as that of the other people in the room and of other hotel guests by searching the defendant and the area under his immediate control for weapons and other contraband. The officers' search of McClarty's person incident to his lawful arrest was therefore permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED:
1. The defendant's objection, Filing No. 22, to the report and recommendation, Filing No. 21, is overruled;
2. The report and recommendation, Filing No. 22, is adopted in its entirety; and
3. The defendant's motion to suppress, Filing No. 11, is denied.