Opinion
No. 09-30172.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a)(2).
Filed January 26, 2010.
Ryan Archer, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Billings, MT, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Mark S. Werner, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Defenders of Montana, Billings, MT, for Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana, Richard F. Cebull, Chief District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 1:07-cr-00171-RFC.
Before: BEEZER, TROTT, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Doyle Justin Lyons appeals from the 360-month sentence imposed following his jury-trial conviction for aggravated sexual abuse of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a) and 2241(c). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Lyons contends that the mandatory minimum sentence required by 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) unconstitutionally violates his right to equal protection. This contention fails because § 2241(c) does not discriminate against Native Americans, either on its face or as applied. See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). Any disproportionate impact § 2241 has on Native Americans simply reflects the different treatment of criminals under the Major Crimes Act who commit crimes in a federal enclave. See United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645, 648-49, 97 S.Ct. 1395, 51 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977) (holding that federal legislation, although relating to Indian tribes, is not based upon impermissible racial classifications; and that it is of no consequence that the federal scheme differs from a state criminal code.)
Lyons also contends that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Lyons' sentence is not so disproportionate as to be unconstitutional, and the sentence does not become "cruel and unusual" simply because it is mandatory. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991); see also Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374, 102 S.Ct. 703, 70 L.Ed.2d 556 (1982) (per curiam) (concluding that federal courts should be reluctant to review legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment.)