Opinion
Criminal No. 02-193 (JRT/FLN)
November 12, 2002
Nathan P. Petterson, Assistant United States Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for plaintiff.
Andrew H. Mohring, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Defendant Diana Lerma ("Lerma") has moved to suppress certain statements made following her arrest on drug charges. In a Report and Recommendation dated August 2, 2002, the United States Magistrate Judge recommended granting this motion. This matter is now before the Court on the government's objections to that portion of the Report and Recommendation. The Court has conducted a de novo review of the government's objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and D. Minn. LR 72.1(c)(2). Although the factual circumstances present a somewhat close call, for the reasons set forth below, the Court sustains the government's objections, and denies Lerma's motion to suppress.
BACKGROUND
On June 3, 2002, Lerma was arrested on drug charges by officers of the St. Paul Police Department and the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension. Lerma was advised of her Miranda rights upon arrest. The following day, Lerma, still in custody, was interviewed by St. Paul Police Officer Scott Payne ("Payne"). Payne again informed Lerma of her Miranda rights, and told her that it would be in her best interest to cooperate and/or tell the truth. This interview took place before Lerma's initial court appearance. Lerma had not yet been appointed counsel, and she did not request counsel during the interview.
ANALYSIS
Lerma argues that the statements she made during the June 4 interview were not made voluntarily. The Magistrate Judge agreed, and recommended that the statements be suppressed. This recommendation was supported by two grounds. First, the Magistrate Judge regarded Payne's statement that it was in Lerma's best interest to cooperate as an implied threat that any silence may be used against her. Second, the Magistrate Judge noted that Payne did not read Lerma the Miranda rights prior to the June 4 interview, but recited them from memory. Thus, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Lerma's statements were involuntary.
The government objects to the Magistrate Judge's determination, and argues that Payne's statements do not constitute threats and are insufficient to render Lerma's statements involuntary. The Court agrees.
"A statement is involuntary when it was extracted by threats, violence, or express or implied promises sufficient to overbear the defendant's will and critically impair [her] capacity for self-determination." Simmons v. Bowersox, 235 F.3d 1124, 1132 (8th Cir. 2001). See also Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30 (1976). In applying this test, the Court looks at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. Simmons, 235 F.3d at 1132.
The Magistrate Judge regarded Payne's statement that it would be in Lerma's best interest to cooperate or be truthful as "both a threat and a promise." (Rep. Rec. at 8.) This statement, the Magistrate Judge found, implicitly told Lerma that any silence would be used against her, and thus "seriously undermines the effectiveness of the Miranda warning." (Id.) If this correctly characterizes Payne's statement, it would indeed contradict the "assurance contained in the Miranda warnings that silence will carry no penalty." Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 290 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court, however, cannot agree with this characterization.
In Simmons, the Eighth Circuit held that although "a promise made by law enforcement is a relevant consideration in assessing police conduct, it . . . does not render a confession involuntary per se." Simmons, 235 F.3d at 1133. In that case, the court held that telling an accused that "it would be in his best interest to tell the truth" was not sufficient to render his statement involuntary. Id. The Eighth Circuit and other courts have also repeatedly held that statements like Payne's do not, on their own, render a statement involuntary. See United States v. Pierce, 152 F.3d 808, 810, 813 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that officer's statement that the defendant could "get off pretty easy" if he cooperated with police was not sufficient to make incriminating statement involuntary); Bannister v. Armontrout, 4 F.3d 1434, 1440 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting argument that officer's "advis[ing defendant] to tell the truth" rendered defendant's statement involuntary); Bolder v. Armontrout, 921 F.2d 1359, 1366 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that officer's statement to defendant that "telling the truth `would be better for him' . . . did not constitute implied or express promises of leniency" and that defendant's confession was voluntary). See also United States v. Ruggles, 70 F.3d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Certainly, statements to the effect that it would be to a suspect's benefit to cooperate are not improperly coercive.")
Payne testified that he did not tell Lerma that it was in her best interest "to talk to [him]," but only that it was "in her best interest to cooperate" and that she was "better off being honest." (Motions Tr. at 63-64, 71.) This Court determines that Payne's suggestion — like similar ones considered by the Eighth Circuit — does not render a statement involuntary.
The parties' arguments are based upon Payne's testimony before the Magistrate Judge.
The Court next turns to the second ground for the Magistrate Judge's recommendation, the government's failure to "establish the specific content" of Payne's June 4 Miranda warning. Lerma does not allege — and the record does not suggest — that the Miranda warning was insufficient or that she did not understand the warning. The only evidence regarding this Miranda warning is Payne's testimony that he delivered it from memory. The Court finds this fact inadequate to call the warning's sufficiency into question. The record demonstrates that Lerma was given the Miranda warnings twice: once by Payne at the June 4 interview, and once upon her arrest the previous day. In the Court's view, the record clearly demonstrates that Lerma was advised of her Miranda rights. This, combined with the harmlessness of Payne's statement and in view of the totality of the circumstances, convinces this Court that Lerma's June 4 statements were voluntary. Accordingly, the government's objections will be sustained.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, all the records, files, and proceedings herein, the Court SUSTAINS the government's objections [Docket No. 52] and REJECTS IN PART and ADOPTS IN PART the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation [Docket No. 45]. The Report and Recommendation is REJECTED to the extent that it grants defendant's Motion to Suppress Statements [Docket No. 37]. In all other respects, the Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendant's Motion to Suppress Statements, Admissions, and Answers [Docket No. 37] is DENIED.
2. Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained as a Result of Search and Seizure [Docket No. 36] is DENIED.