Opinion
Case No. 05-80669-CIV-ZLOC H.
December 23, 2005
ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Defendant Evangelos Lena's Motion To Dismiss, Or In The Alternative, Motion For More Definite Statement (DE 10). The Court has carefully reviewed said Motion and the entire court file and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.
The Court notes that the instant Motion (DE 10) purports to be filed on behalf of all Defendants, but is signed only by Defendant Evangelos Lena, who does not appear to be an attorney.
On July 25, 2005, Plaintiff United States of America (hereinafter "Plaintiff") filed a Complaint (DE 1) seeking to reduce to judgment alleged unpaid federal tax liabilities assessed against Defendants Evangelos Lena and Joanne Lena, to foreclose federal tax liens and for the sale of real property. On August 24, 2005, Defendant Evangelos Lena (hereinafter "Defendant") filed the instant Motion (DE 7) wherein he moves the Court to dismiss the above-styled cause for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or, in the alternative, to order Plaintiff to file a more definite statement. In short, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has failed to plead facts in support of Defendant's alleged tax liabilities.
The Court notes that only a generalized statement of facts needs to be set out to comply with the liberal pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). A classic formulation of the test often applied to determine the sufficiency of the Complaint was set out by the United States Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), wherein the Court stated:
. . . In appraising the sufficiency of the Complaint we follow . . . the accepted rule that a Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
The Court adds that a Complaint may not be dismissed because a plaintiff's claim does not support the legal theory he relies on since the Court must determine if the allegations provide relief on any possible theory. See Robertson v. Johnston, 376 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1967); see also Linder v. Protocarrero, 963 F.2d 332, 334 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). Moreover, for the purposes of this Motion (DE 10) the Court must accept the allegations contained in the Complaint (DE 1) as true. See Linder, 963 F.2d at 334 (citation omitted). Here, the Court notes that the Complaint (DE 1) at issue clearly notifies Defendants of the claim at issue and the grounds for that claim. Moreover, the Complaint (DE 1) clearly states a claim for relief. As such, the Complaint (DE 1) is properly pled and the instant Motion (DE 10) must, therefore, be denied.
As for Defendant's request for a more definite statement, the Court notes that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) states that:
If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired.
However, federal courts generally disfavor motions for a more definite statement in light of the liberal pleading and discovery requirements. See Mitchell v. E-Z Way Towers, Inc., 269 F.2d 126, 130-31 (5th Cir. 1959); Bazal v. Bedford Trucking Co., Inc., 442 F. Supp. 1089, 1101-02 (S.D. Fla. 1977). Here, the Court is unable to find that the count set forth in the Complaint (DE 1) is so vague or ambiguous that Defendant cannot reasonably be expected to respond. Therefore, Defendant's request that the Court enter an Order ordering Plaintiff to file a more definite statement is denied.
Accordingly, after due consideration, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant Evangelos Lena's Motion To Dismiss, Or In The Alternative, Motion For More Definite Statement (DE 10) be and the same is hereby DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED.