Opinion
Civil File No. A3-96-55
July 14, 2003
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR CORRECTION OF SENTENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 35(A)
Before the Court is a motion by Yorie Von Kahl to Correct an Illegal Sentence pursuant to Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (doc. #70). Plaintiff has filed a brief in opposition (doc. #74). Defendant filed a reply brief (doc. #81).
BACKGROUND
The events leading up to the present motion began in 1977. In that year, Yorie Kahl's father, Gordon, was convicted on two counts of failing to file income tax returns. After being released from prison, Gordon violated the terms of his probation and then refused to appear in court on the matter. A warrant for his arrest was issued.
On Sunday, February 13, 1983, the United States Marshal's Office located Gordon, who was with a group of people that included Yorie and Scott Faul. United States v. Faul, 748 F.2d 1204, 1208 (8th Cir. 1984). The marshals attempted to arrest Gordon. Id. at 1209. A shootout started and two marshals were killed. United States v. Udey, 748 F.2d 1231, 1234 (8th Cir. 1984). On May 28, 1983, a jury found Yorie guilty of two counts of second degree murder, assaulting United States Marshals and other law enforcement officers, conspiracy to assault, and harboring and concealing a fugitive. Faul, 748 F.2d at 1207. The court imposed two concurrent life terms for the second degree murders. Id.
ANALYSIS
Former Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a) stated that a court may "correct an illegal sentence at any time." United States v. Landrum, 93 F.3d 122, 125 (4th Cir. 1996). This rule applies to all sentences imposed for offenses committed before November 1, 1987. Id. A jury convicted Yorie of offenses committed in 1983, so the Court has jurisdiction to decide the present motion. See id. (stating that a court may correct an illegal sentence at any time for offenses committed before November 1, 1987).
The purpose of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 is to "permit correction at any time of an illegal sentence." Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 430 (1962). An illegal sentence available for correction under this rule is a sentence not authorized by the judgment of conviction. United States v. Peltier, 312 F.3d 938, 942 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506 (1954)). Situations where a sentence is illegal include when the punishment is in excess of that prescribed by statute and when multiple terms of incarceration are imposed for the same offense. Hill, 368 U.S. at 430. If the court had the discretion to impose the challenged term of incarceration, it is not an illegal sentence. Peltier, 312 F.3d at 942.
Yorie argues that his sentence is illegal because the court did not have jurisdiction to try him for murder. He argues that the federal government only has criminal jurisdiction on the high seas or on property owned by the United States. Since the murders in this case did not happen on the high seas or on property owned by the United States, Yorie argues that the federal court lacked jurisdiction.
These arguments do not relate to the legality of the sentence imposed because Yorie is not arguing that his sentence is in excess of that authorized by statute, or that he received multiple terms of incarceration for the same offense, or that it was legally or constitutionally invalid in any other respect. Peltier, 312 F.3d at 942. The relevant statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1111, allows a court to impose a life sentence on an individual found guilty of second degree murder. Since Kahl's sentence was authorized by statute, it is not illegal.
Even if Kahl's motion were properly before the Court, his arguments fail on their merits. It is well-settled that the same act may constitute an offense against the United States and an offense against a state. Crossley v. California, 168 U.S. 640, 641 (1898). Congress has the power to pass laws that "provide for the punishment of all crimes and offenses against the United States." Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 283 (1892). The unlawful killing of a federal officer is an offense against the United States, and 18 U.S.C. § 1114 gives federal courts jurisdiction to try those cases. United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153, 1173 (5th Cir. 1985). For the definitions of murder, 18 U.S.C. § 1114 incorporates the definitions found in 18 U.S.C. § 1111. 18 U.S.C. § 1114(1).
The definitions portion of 18 U.S.C. § 1111 is found at subsection (a), which contains a mens rea element and the different degrees of murder. The "special maritime" and "territorial jurisdiction" language of 18 U.S.C. § 1111 is not incorporated by 18 U.S.C. § 1114(1) because 18 U.S.C. § 1114(1) only incorporates the definition and punishment portions of 18 U.S.C. § 1111. See United States v. Young, 248 F.3d 260, 274-74 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that when a federal statute refers to the definition portion of 18 U.S.C. § 1111, it is only referring to subsection (a)). The "special maritime" and "territorial jurisdiction" language of subsection (b) of 18 U.S.C. § 1111 is another independent jurisdiction clause. Id. at 275. Since that portion of subsection (b) is not incorporated by 18 U.S.C. § 1114, the government did not have to prove that the crime took place within the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
Kenneth Muir and Robert Cheshire were federal officers who were killed while performing their official duties, therefore the federal court had jurisdiction to try the case. 18 U.S.C. § 1114; see also Logan, 144 U.S. at 283 (stating that Congress has the authority to pass laws that punish crimes against the United States). Yorie's argument that the court lacked jurisdiction is frivolous, United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 200 (9th Cir. 1978), and without merit, United States v. Deering, 179 F.3d 592, 597 (8th Cir. 1999); Barrett v. United States, 82 F.2d 528, 534 (7th Cir. 1936).
Yorie also appears to find significant a difference in the wording between the first degree murder charge and the second degree murder charge on the verdict form. The first degree murder charge includes the words "as charged in the indictment" while the second degree murder charge does not include that language. The Court fails to see the significance of this difference. The language on the verdict form specifically states that the jury found Yorie guilty of the "offense of second degree murder of Kenneth B. Muir" and the "offense of second degree murder of Robert S. Cheshire, Jr." The verdict form identifies both men by name and states the charge. Muir and Cheshire were both officers or employees of the United States engaged in official duties when they were killed. Therefore, the court had jurisdiction over this case, 18 U.S.C. § 1114, so the judgment is not void.
DECISION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant Yorie Von Kahl's Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence pursuant to Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is DENIED. Defendant's Motion for extension of time to file the reply brief and for an order compelling the United States to provide legal opinions and records (doc. #80) is moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.