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noting "the district court's discretion to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination based on, inter alia, unfair prejudice, needless delay, or marginal relevance"
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No. 09-1213-CR.
December 2, 2010.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Allyne R. Ross, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the amended judgment entered on February, 27, 2009, is AFFIRMED.
Gary Villanueva, Esq., New York, NY, for Appellant.
Evan M. Norris, Assistant United States Attorney (Susan Corkery, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Appellee.
Present: JOSEPH M. McLAUGHLIN, REENA RAGGI, GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
SUMMARY ORDER
Defendant Prudence Carmen Jeffers was convicted, following a jury trial, of eight counts of social security fraud, see 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B), and one count of student loan fraud, see 20 U.S.C. § 1097(a). Jeffers challenges the district court's preclusion of defense cross-examination of Anthony Hicks, her ex-boy-friend and a cooperating witness, regarding alleged domestic violence. We review a judge's evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Whitten, 610 F.3d 168, 182-83 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Thompson, 528 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2008). In doing so, we assume the parties' familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
The district judge vacated Jeffers's convictions of three counts of aggravated identity theft, see 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), prior to sentencing.
Jeffers does not dispute the district court's discretion to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination based on, inter alia, unfair prejudice, needless delay, or marginal relevance. See Fed.R.Evid. 403; Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); United States v. Figueroa, 548 F.3d 222, 227 (2d Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, Jeffers maintains that the district court abused this discretion and violated her Sixth Amendment confrontation right because the precluded cross-examination on domestic abuse (1) undermined Hicks's credibility and (2) rebutted the portrayal of Hicks as a good father unmotivated to testify falsely based on child custody concerns. We are not persuaded.
We identify no abuse of discretion in the district court's determination that the purported prior acts of violence were not probative of Hicks's credibility. See Fed.R.Evid. 608(b); United States v. Flaharty, 295 F.3d 182, 191 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting prior involvement in murder not probative of truthfulness). Moreover, even if the alleged abuse was somehow relevant to Hicks's motivations for testifying, which is not clear, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that any probative value was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice and the need for a mini-trial on domestic disputes. See Fed.R.Evid. 403; United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 313 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding preclusion of cross-examination necessitating "mini-trial" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, the district court permitted extensive cross-examination on Hicks's child custody concerns, providing the jury with sufficient information to "make a discriminating appraisal" of this purported bias. United States v. Singh, 628 F.2d 758, 763 (2d Cir. 1980).
In any event, any potential error was harmless considering the wide-ranging cross-examination of Hicks and the circumstantial evidence corroborating Hicks's direct testimony regarding Jeffers's intent, including her fraudulent applications and repeated lies about her citizenship and birthplace. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431; United States v. Figueroa, 548 F.3d at 231-32.
We have considered Jeffers's other arguments on appeal and conclude that they lack merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the amended judgment of the district court.