Opinion
Case No: 2:03-CR-795.
June 25, 2004
REPORT and RECOMMENDATION on DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
This case is referred to the undersigned magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and is presently before the court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. The court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. At the end of the hearing, Defendant requested additional time to research and brief the issues, and the court set a briefing schedule for both parties. However, Defendant failed to file a brief or otherwise inform the court regarding his legal research on the issues raised during the hearing. Now, having conducted a hearing on the motion, and after reviewing the facts of this case and the relevant law, the court enters this Report and Recommendation to deny Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence.
Hearing on Motion to Suppress Evidence, May 4, 2004.
Facts
The facts recited are as found by the magistrate judge from the testimony at the hearing.
Later that same day, the Lehi police received a call from Mr. Hurst's mother indicating that a gun was missing from the home. In following up on that call, three officers returned to the Hurst residence about 10:30 p.m. They had a brief discussion with the defendant at the door, indicating that they would like to ask him some questions regarding the prior incident and he admitted them to the home. He was dressed in his boxers at the time, and asked if he could change and get some clothes on. They agreed, and an officer accompanied Mr. Hurst to his room where he did change his clothes. Hurst also obtained his identification and provided it to an officer, along with a card indicating his state probation officer's identity.
The three Lehi police officers that responded were Jeff Magnusson, Darren Paul, and Art Henderson. Each officer testified at the hearing.
The officers and Defendant then assembled in the kitchen at or near the kitchen table where a casual conversation ensued about the earlier incident, along with questions about the missing gun. Hurst made some statements in the course of that conversation about the missing gun. At no time during the conversation was Hurst advised of his Miranda rights. At no time during the conversation was he advised that he was under arrest. At no time during the entire encounter at the home that evening was there any restraint, threat, pressure or constraint of any kind on the defendant by the officers apart from their presence.
Analysis
Defendant argues that under the circumstances of this case, the officers had the responsibility to inform him of his rights before questioning. Defendant further contends that regardless of whether this was a custodial interview, he had the right to be advised to remain silent because the police had focused on him as a suspect. Defendant has failed to provide any legal authority to support this position.
It is well established that under Miranda v. Arizona, "law enforcement officers must administer prophylactic warnings regarding the privilege [against self-incrimination] to any person subjected to `custodial interrogation'" "In determining whether an individual was in custody, a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but `the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [was] a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement" of the degree associated with a formal arrest.'" The court's determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances, not the subjective views of the defendant or the police.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
United States v. Erekson, 70 F.3d 1153, 1156 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444).
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (per curium) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)).
See id. at 323.
In this case, Defendant made statements about the missing gun during a conversation with police in his home. Defendant was not placed under arrest or restrained, threatened, or pressured in any way by the officers. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the court finds that the questioning occurred in a non-custodial situation and therefore did not require Miranda warnings even if the investigation had focused on Hurst. Consequently, there is no basis to suppress the statements made by the defendant based on the facts of this case.
See United States v. Erving L., 147 F.3d 1240, 1247 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding that suspects are less likely to be found to have been in custody for Miranda purposes if they were interviewed in their own home).
See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 346-47 (1976) (holding that Miranda would not be extended to cover non-custodial circumstances after a police investigation had focused on the defendant as a suspect).
RECOMMENDATION
Under the totality of the circumstances, Hurst was not in police custody when he made the statements he seeks to suppress. The police officers' presence in the home, their conduct and questioning did not rise to the level of restraint on Defendant's freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Accordingly, the Motion to Suppress Evidence should be denied.
Copies of the foregoing Report and Recommendation are being mailed to the parties, who are hereby notified that they have the right to object to the Report and Recommendation. The parties are further notified that they must file any objections to the Report and Recommendation with the clerk of the district court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), within ten (10) days after receiving it. Failure to file objections may constitute a waiver of those objections on subsequent appellate review.