Opinion
Criminal No. 00-125 (JBS).
February 9, 2001
ROBERT CLEARY, United States Attorney, By: GAIL ZWEIG, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Newark, N.J., for U.S.
EDWARD F. BORDEN, JR., Esquire, Earp Cohn, P.C., Westmont, N.J., Attorney for Defendant.
OPINION
Defendant Haywood Hinton has filed this motion to suppress evidence from being introduced against him at trial. He alleges (1) that his arrest in the parking lot of the Adams Mark Hotel in Philadelphia on March 18, 1999 was warrantless and lacked probable cause; (2) that the custodial statements made by defendant shortly after his arrest should be suppressed as tainted by the alleged illegality of his arrest; (3) that evidence was unconstitutionally seized from his person at the time of his arrest; (4) that evidence he allegedly dropped to the ground at the time of his arrest was not "abandoned," and thus could not be searched or seized without a warrant; and (5) that evidence was illegally seized from his hotel room and rented automobile pursuant to warrantless searches for which he did not give knowing and voluntary consent. This court convened an evidentiary hearing to address each suppression claim on November 2, 9, and 16, 2000, concluded by oral argument on December 7, 2000.
In the meantime, the Court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment as duplicitous, United States v. Hinton , ___ F. Supp. ___, 2000 WL 1860523 (D.N.J. 2000). Pursuant to that opinion and order, the Government obtained a superseding indictment on January 5, 2001. The Superseding Indictment charges defendant with two counts of scheming to defraud federally insured banks by means of false representations in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344. The present suppression motion is now ripe for decision.
For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that defendant's arrest was pursuant to lawful arrest warrants, and that his post-arrest statement was not tainted and was given pursuant to a voluntary waiver of defendant's Miranda rights. Evidence seized from his person was pursuant to a lawful search incident to arrest, and the bag which he discarded was abandoned and lawfully seized. The Court also finds that defendant voluntarily consented to the arresting officers' requests to search his hotel room and his vehicle. Accordingly, the motion to suppress is denied in its entirety.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Haywood Hinton, a/k/a Ameer Hasan, was the subject of investigations conducted in March, 1999, by the U.S. Secret Service in Atlantic City, New Jersey and the Medford Township Police Department in Medford, Burlington County, New Jersey.
Medford Township Police Detective Richard Meder testified that he came into possession of reliable information from an alleged Hinton accomplice, Sakina Street, that Hinton was staying in Room 926 of the Adams Mark Hotel in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Street had been arrested in Medford for attempting to secure false identification documents, and she gave statements implicating Hinton, whom she knew as Ameer. Det. Meder queried the NCIC system database and learned that Hinton was wanted on outstanding warrants from Ocean County, New Jersey and Morris County, New Jersey. He spoke with officials in both counties who confirmed that the warrants were active and that the counties would extradite in the event Hinton was arrested in Pennsylvania.
Detective Meder also called the Secret Service in Atlantic City, seeking to speak with Special Agent William Glady, with whom he had been working in investigating Hinton, to inform him of these developments, but Glady was unavailable. The call was referred to the Philadelphia Office of the Secret Service, where Special Agent Kristy Simononis assisted Meder. S/A Simononis spoke by telephone to S/A Glady. They reached out to Detective Walt Kenney of the Philadelphia Police Department for Philadelphia's assistance in arresting Hinton upon the warrants. Meanwhile, Det. Meder received copies of these warrants by fax, with confirmation that each county would extradite. (Exs. G-1 and G-2.) The NCIC Printouts from Ocean County (Ex. G-7) and Morris County (Ex. G-8), confirming the outstanding warrants, were reviewed by Philadelphia's Det. Kenney prior to embarking upon the arrest.
Det. Kenney and S/A Simononis traveled late in the afternoon from Philadelphia to Medford and met with Det. Meder and other Medford police officers to review the case. Det. Kenney accepted the responsibility of lead officer for purposes of effectuating the anticipated arrest, since it would occur in Philadelphia. Although Det. Kenney's function was not formally documented, it is clear that his participation in the planning for the arrest, and in the arrest itself, was due to his position with the local arresting authority — the City of Philadelphia where Hinton was believed to be lodged. According to Special Agent Simononis, Det. Kenney was willing to go to the hotel site in Philadelphia to execute the arrest warrants for Hinton, and to hold him for extradition to New Jersey, and Kenney requested the assistance of the Medford and federal officers.
The various officers arrived at the Adams Mark Hotel parking lot as Hinton was departing the hotel, accompanied by alleged accomplice Cleo Huggins. Det. Meder approached Huggins, while Det. Lang and S/A Simononis approached Hinton, joined within a minute by Det. Kenney.
Meanwhile, prior to encountering the arresting officers, Hinton dropped a brown leather tote bag he had been carrying, which had been found by a hotel security officer in shrubbery nearby and given to Det. Lang, who gave it to S/A Simononis. Hinton's testimony that he dropped it at his feet at the moment of his arrest, as he was told to raise his hands into the air, is not credible because no officer saw the leather bag on the ground or nearby, nor did Hinton direct anyone's attention to it. Lang and Simononis were the first to reach Hinton, joined by Kenney who informed him he was under arrest on the two New Jersey fugitive warrants. Det. Sgt. Canale from Medford was also present. Although Det. Kenney did not have the warrants physically in hand, he had reviewed the NCIC report reflecting their existence and relied upon the confirmation of their existence by the Medford Township P.D. before arrest. Det. Kenney took Hinton into custody and arranged for his transport by the Philadelphia Police Department to the local police precinct station. Det. Kenney independently verified the existence and validity of the Morris and Ocean County warrants and the willingness of each county to extradite. (Tr. Nov. 9, 2000 at 83:18 to 84:18.) Det. Kenney produced the confirmatory documentation from Morris and Ocean Counties at the hearing. (Id. at 87:23 to 88:15.)
As the officers effected the arrest, they placed handcuffs on Hinton and searched his person incident to arrest. Detective Lang and S/A Simononis found a quantity of cocaine, a rental car key, and $3,800 in cash in his pockets. Simononis explained that the reason for the search incident to arrest was to check if he hand any weapons on him.
The discovery of the rental car key prompted a request by the officers for Hinton's consent to allow them to search his car. Simononis recalled that Det. Kenney made the request, in the presence of herself, Det. Lang, Det. Meder, and Det. Canale, and that Hinton responded that he "didn't have a problem with that." (Tr. Nov. 2, 2000 at 79:9-19.) Later, Simononis testified that it was Det. Lang and Det. Kenney who asked Hinton's consent to search the vehicle (Tr. Nov. 9, 2000 at 32:16-22), and that it was Det. Kenney who actually asked Hinton. (Id. at 33:6-8). Simononis's incident report (Ex. J-1) indicates that Hinton gave Simononis verbal consent to search the car and his hotel room. (Id. at 33:17 to 34:18.) Her testimony about the hotel search was to the effect that Det. Kenney secured Hinton's permission by asking Hinton "if he had a problem if we looked around the hotel room, and [Hinton] responded that he didn't have a problem with that." (Tr. Nov. 2, 2000 at 81:19 to 82:3.) The specific room was described and Hinton placed no restrictions on his consent, as S/A Simononis testified. (Id. at 82:2-6.)
Det. Kenney testified he was not the officer who obtained Hinton's consent to the car search, and he did not recall which officer actually asked for consent. (Tr. Nov. 9, 2000 at 78:18- 22.) He didn't recall whether Hinton consented to the vehicle search. (Id. at 79:3-6.) He has a clearer memory of the consent to search the hotel room. (Id. at 79:7 to 80:3.) He recalls it was a male officer who asked for Hinton's consent to search the room, perhaps Det. Lang or Det. Canale. (Id. at 79:19 to 80:3.) Det. Kenney indicated that Hinton was cooperative, under no duress, and inquiring why he was being arrested, which Det. Kenney explained was due to the two New Jersey warrants. (Id. at 80:16-22.)
Indeed, there is no evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that any officer or circumstance placed Mr. Hinton under undue duress, nor that Mr. Hinton experienced such duress or threats, during the arrest and consents to search the car and hotel room given in the hotel parking lot. He was handcuffed and several officers surrounded him as he stood in the public parking lot, but no guns were drawn and no threats were uttered. While Hinton observed that the officers already had his car key (and he testified that they had also found his plastic credit-card type room key in his pockets) no officer indicated that they would go ahead and use these keys anyway if he didn't consent.
Hinton testified falsely in this court's view, that Det. Lang threatened him with robbery. He testified that during the search incident to arrest "Detective Lang from the Medford Police Department was the one that made me think that I wasn't going to get my jewelry or property back unless I said something also. . . . [W]hen he took my jewelry from around my neck, he whispered we need your cooperation on this and you can get this back." (Tr. Nov. 16, 2000 at 37:5-15.) He added that "it appeared to me to be like when the approached me it was a robbery in front of the Adams Mark Hotel." ( Id . at 38:2-4.) This testimony is incredible and is belied by the scrupulous inventory of all items seized from defendant, as well as the prompt return of all non-evidence items. (See Tr. Nov. 16, 2000 at 42:2-21, in which Hinton acknowledges that the property receipts accurately listed his jewelry.)
Mr. Hinton's testimony regarding consent to search the room and car is not especially divergent. He recalled that Det. Lang approached him at the time of his arrest and searched his pockets finding the drugs, money, and rental car key. (Tr. Nov. 16, 2000 at 27:23 to 28:11.) According to Hinton, S/A Glady introduced himself and requested permission to search the room and car, asking, "Do you mind if we search the car and the hotel room?" (Id. at 29:19-20.) Hinton recalls giving a response (that the court regards as affirmative, if somewhat flip): "I says you didn't ask my permission to search me, plus you already have the keys already, you already took the keys from me already, so why would you ask me to search? But you do what you want to do, you know, I says . . . ." (Id. at 29:20-24.) Hinton testified that he added a request to be present, "if you want to look in any of those places, I would like to be there with you to make sure no evidence is manufactured, because there's nothing illegal in the car or in the hotel room." (Id. at 29:24 to 30:2.)
After obtaining Hinton's consent, the officers searched the car and the hotel room and found illegal drug paraphernalia and counterfeit checks and other inculpatory documents, as detailed in the various police inventory reports. Thus, it turned out that Hinton lied to the officers when he told them nothing illegal would be found in those places. Det. Kenney also decided to book Hinton on Philadelphia charges for drug possession, and he arranged for two officers to transport him to the precinct station at 55th and Pine Streets within about 10 minutes. Hinton was not present during the search of the car or the hotel room.
The court finds that Hinton gave knowing and voluntary consent to the search of his room and rental car. He does not assert that he was coerced nor that he lacked the opportunity to refuse. He had registered at the hotel under a false name, but there is no doubt it was his room and that he had the authority to consent to its search. The rental car was likewise rented under a different name, but he was the one with the key, which was found on his person, so again he had authority to consent. He understood his permission was sought for both searches, and that he could refuse, which he reiterated on cross-examination (Tr. Nov. 16, 2000 at 56:21 to 58:1.) That he stated, according to his own testimony, that the officers would find nothing illegal in either location, further supports that he assented to their request. Moreover, defendant testified that he had been arrested in the past and that he was familiar with his constitutional rights to decline an officer's request to search a particular area, stating that he knew "[he] d[id]n't have to give consent." (Tr. Nov. 16, 2000 at 58:17-24.)
The lack of clarity about the officer's identity who actually requested the consent is understandable at this hearing nearly two years after the arrest. It was a male and it actually occurred, by all accounts. Hinton recalls it was Glady, but it was most likely Lang, who had searched the pockets and questioned about the rental car from the key he found. Hinton is probably incorrect in his recollection it was Glady, since no document or testimony places Glady at the scene of the arrest until the hotel search was later underway. Hinton's confusion about Glady may come from the fact that it was Glady who later Mirandized Hinton and obtained his waiver of rights before interrogation, as discussed next.
At the precinct station, Special Agents Glady and Simononis and Det. Meder were present with Hinton. S/A Glady took the lead advising Hinton of his rights, according to Meder (Tr. Nov. 2, 2000 at 53:11-20) and S/A Simononis. (Id. at 84:21-24/ 85:6-12). The questioning took place in an open area in a corner of the detective bureau. The precinct detective room was a large second floor space with about a dozen officers at desks and on computers, working on other cases. S/A Simononis confirmed that S/A Glady read the warnings on the Miranda form to Hinton to advise him of his rights. (Id. at 86:6 to 87:10.) He asked Hinton if he understood it and if he wanted to waive those rights. (Id. at 87:11-13.) He said he was willing to do so. (Id. at 87:11 to 88:2.) Hinton signed the form in two places (Ex. G-3), as witnessed by Glady and Simononis, at 8:51 P.M. The interview lasted about one-half hour, concluding with Hinton indicating he was willing to cooperate in the investigation. (Tr. Nov. 2, 2000 at 87:20-25.)
Hinton understood his Miranda rights and waived them knowingly, and he knew he was free not to sign and not to speak to the agents. (Tr. Nov. 16, 2000 at 68:13-24.) He gave oral statements, and he chose not to make a written statement, according to the testimony. (Id. at 68:23 to 69:11.)
LEGAL DISCUSSION
I. Hinton's Arrest Was Valid
Law enforcement officers must act lawfully during the execution of a validly issued arrest warrant. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). The subjective motivation of the law enforcement officer effectuating the lawful arrest, however, is irrelevant. See United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding that officer's pretextual reason for stopping vehicle not important where the actions of the officers were otherwise legal and authorized).
The law enforcement officers involved in the arrest of defendant, as detailed in the factual findings of this opinion, were lawfully acting pursuant to two outstanding arrest warrants from Ocean County, New Jersey and Morris County, New Jersey. That the officers' subjective motivation for arresting defendant may have differed from the subject of the New Jersey warrants does not controvert the legality of those warrants. Defendant's arrest, therefore, was valid. His motion to suppress evidence resulting from an unlawful arrest will therefore be denied.
II. The Search of Hinton's Person Incident to Arrest was Lawful
A search is permissible as incident to arrest so long as the arrest was lawfully made on the basis of, for example, a valid arrest warrant. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 56, [ 395 U.S. 752] 70 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); 3 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 667, at 653 n. 3 (2d ed. 1982 and Supp. 2000). The Supreme Court has further written that, in general, "[t]he constitutionality of a search incident to an arrest does not depend on whether there is any indication that the person arrested possesses weapons or evidence. The fact of a lawful arrest, standing alone, authorizes a search." Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 2631, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979). There are certain limits on the scope of a search incident to arrest, none of which are applicable in defendant's case. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-772, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1834-36, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (requiring a strong showing of necessity and reasonable administration of a search that intrudes into the body of an arrested person, such as a blood test); see also 3 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 667, at 657 n. 15.
Based on the facts found by this Court, the search of defendant conducted incident to his valid arrest was lawful. Defendant's motion to suppress the quantity of cocaine, rental car key, and $3,800.00 in cash will be denied.
III. The Custodial Statements Made by Defendant at the Police Station were Pursuant to a Lawful Arrest and Given After a Voluntary Waiver of Miranda Rights
As discussed in section I of this opinion, plaintiff's arrest was validly and lawfully made pursuant to two outstanding warrants. The Supreme Court of the United States in Miranda v. Arizona, ruled that issuance of warnings to a defendant, or a voluntary and knowing waiver thereof, are a prerequisite to the admissibility of any such statement.See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1629, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); 2A Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 413, at 101 n. 4 (3d ed. 2000). Defendant's "subsequent willingness to answer questions after acknowledging that [he] understood [his] Miranda rights is sufficient to constitute an implied waiver . . . ."United States v. Valasquez, 626 F.2d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 1980).
The facts as found by this Court indicate that plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights prior to making statements to the law enforcement officers at the police station in Philadelphia. Indeed, defendant makes no argument that his rights under Miranda were violated. In addition to verbally waiving his Miranda rights, defendant signed the waiver form in two places (Ex. G-3), which was witnessed by Glady and Simononis. Additionally, testimony indicated that defendant was questioned for approximately one-half hour, in an open space without any hostility or duress. Defendant himself testified that his interviewers were courteous.
The Court finds that the government has met its burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff was advised of, and voluntarily waived, his legal rights, see Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972), and defendant's motion to suppress the post-arrest statements will be denied.
IV. The Seizure of Defendant's Abandoned Bag was Lawful
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution creates certain "constitutionally protected areas" in which people have an expectation of privacy. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 1883, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967). Such protection does not extend to property that has been voluntarily abandoned. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241, 80 S.Ct. 683, 698, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1989); 3 Wright, Federal Practice Procedure, § 663, at 595-97.
The test for abandonment in the context of the Fourth Amendment is different from the test in the context of property law. With respect to the Fourth Amendment test, "it is possible for a person to retain a property interest in an item, but nonetheless . . . relinquish his or her reasonable expectation of privacy in the object." Thomas, 864 F.2d at 845. If an abandonment occurs during a police pursuit or investigation, the abandonment is not necessarily deemed involuntary. Thomas, 864 F.2d at 846-47 (finding abandonment where subject left bag on the floor of a public hallway after seeing police officers); United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). A court should focus on the intent of the person alleged to have abandoned the item in question in order to determine whether he or she relinquished the reasonable expectation of privacy in the object. Thomas, 864 F.2d at 845. (citations omitted).
In this case, based on the testimony before and fact-finding of this Court, defendant abandoned the brown bag which was subsequently found by a hotel security officer and given to Det. Lang. Because none of the officers involved in the initial apprehension of defendant saw the bag at his feet, where he claims he dropped it when the officers placed him under arrest, this Court finds that defendant earlier abandoned the bag in the shrubbery in front of the hotel, when he first saw the officers in the parking lot. He had proceeded only a few more steps away from the front of the hotel and into the beginning of the parking lot when the officers reached him and arrested him. Because defendant dropped the bag in a public and high traffic area, he therefore sufficiently abandoned any expectation of privacy he might have had in the bag.
No finding has been made with respect to the chain of custody of this bag. In fact, no testimony was presented identifying the hotel security officer who initially found the bag. The chain of custody of the bag will still need to be proved by the government at the time of trial if the bag is sought to be introduced into evidence. At this suppression hearing, however, hearsay testimony as to the abandonment of the bag, and (more pertinently) to the circumstance then known to the officers seizing the bag and its contents, was sufficient and credible.
Based on the law of abandonment and this Court's findings of fact in this case, the seizure of defendant's brown bag by officers was proper because defendant relinquished any property and privacy interests in the bag when he discarded it in the hotel shrubbery as officers approached. Defendant's motion to suppress the bag and its contents will therefore be dismissed.
V. The Evidence Seized from the Hotel Room and Car were the Product of Defendant's Knowing and Voluntary Consent to Search those Places
One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring law enforcement officers to obtain a warrant prior to conducting a search is where the subject voluntarily consents to a warrantless search. As the Supreme Court wrote in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, "a search pursuant to consent may result in considerably less inconvenience for the subject of the search, and, properly conducted, is a constitutionally permissible and wholly legitimate aspect of effective police activity." 412 U.S. 218, 228, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2048, 36 L.Ed. 854 (1973). To be effective, a subject's consent to be searched must be freely and voluntarily given.Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1792, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968). Although there is no bright line test for voluntariness, the Supreme Court has articulated a guiding rule:
Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances, and while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent.Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 248-49, 93 S.Ct. at 2059; see United States v. Scott, 590 F.2d 531, 534 (3d Cir. 1979). The government has the burden of proving that the consent to search occurred, that it was knowing and that it was voluntary, since a search by consent is an exception to the Fourth Amendment's requirement for probable cause and a warrant.
The testimony given before this Court during the suppression hearings indicates that defendant freely and voluntarily consented to the officers' requests to search both his rental car and hotel room. Subsequent to finding the rental car key on defendant's person during the valid search incident to arrest, one of the officers verbally asked Hinton, in the presence of S/A Simononis, whether he objected to the officers looking around his hotel room. The testimony of the officers and S/A Simononis indicates that defendant stated, "he didn't have a problem with that" (Tr. Nov. 2, 2000 at 81:19 to 82:3), but Hinton testified that he told them "you didn't ask my permission to search me, plus you already have the keys already . . . so why would you ask me to search? But you do what you want to do, you know." (Tr. Nov. 16, 2000 at 29:20-24). When he was asked permission to search the car, defendant did not object. (Tr. Nov. 16, 2000 at 58:25 to 59:1.)
Considering defendant's own testimony that he advised the officers that they could "do what [they] want[ed] to do" in response to their request to search his rental car and hotel room, in light of the situation as found by this Court, defendant's consent to search was voluntarily given. There was no testimony suggesting that the officers would have searched the defendant's car and room without his consent simply because they had physical possession of the keys to those areas. Moreover, defendant testified that the officers could search the room "because there's nothing illegal in the car or in the hotel room." (Tr. Nov. 16, 2000 at 29:24 to 30:2.) That testimony indicates that defendant knowingly and willfully consented to the officers' search of the car and the hotel room.
That illegal narcotics and other evidence were ultimately found in Hinton's hotel room and rental car does not negate the validity of his consent to search. Although Hinton attempted during his testimony to suggest that he knew better than to consent if he actually were in possession of illegal or incriminating things, such argument was squarely rejected by the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Mendenhall , where they wrote "the question is not whether the respondent acted in [his] ultimate self-interest, but whether he acted voluntarily." 446 U.S. 544, 559, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1880, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). As discussed, supra, this Court finds that Hinton consented voluntarily.
Lastly, the fact that the officers did not specifically advise defendant that he could refuse their requests to search his hotel room and car does not render the consent involuntary or unknowing. While the defendant's awareness of his or her power to withhold consent is a factor to be considered when determining the voluntariness of the consent, it is not the sole factor. In any event, Hinton well knew he could refuse to consent. In his own testimony, Hinton stated that he had been arrested approximately fifteen times over the past thirty years and that he was well aware that "[he didn't] have to give consent" (Tr. Nov. 16, 2000 at 58:24) to a search by law enforcement officers. His consent was knowing, since the object and purpose of the searches were clearly described, and he knew he could refuse.
Considering all of the circumstances surrounding defendant's consent to search his car and hotel room, this Court finds that such consent was voluntary, and the searches valid. Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence collected from those areas will therefore be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to suppress evidence contained in statements and items seized from his person, hotel room and vehicle will be denied. The accompanying Order is entered.
ORDER
This matter came before the Court upon motion of defendant Haywood Hinton to suppress evidence; and
The Court having convened a hearing and received testimony and other evidence and arguments of counsel on November 2, 9 and 16 and December 7, 2000; and
For reasons stated in the Opinion of today's date;
IT IS this ___ day of February, 2001 hereby
ORDERED that defendant's motion to suppress evidence shall be, and hereby is, DENIED.
____________ Date
_______________________________ Jerome B. Simandle U.S. District Judge