Opinion
No. 04 Cr. 1177 (DAB).
March 29, 2005
Memorandum Order
Defendant Samih Ghannam ("Ghannam") moves to dismiss the Indictment against him as defective and without legal basis. For the reasons that follow, Defendant Ghannam's Motion is DENIED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In October, 2004, Defendant Ghannam was indicted by a federal grand jury on two counts of conspiracy. Specifically, the Indictment charges Ghannam with conspiracy to use, produce, transfer and possess false identification documents, and conspiracy to attempt and execute a scheme and artifice to defraud a financial institution, whose deposits were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. (Indictment ¶¶ 2, 5.) The Indictment alleges two overt acts: (1) on or about February 26, 2004, Defendant met with the Cooperating Witness ("CW") in order to obtain information from the CW for the purpose of obtaining a counterfeit driver's license for the CW; and (2) Defendant met with the CW in New York, New York to receive payments for checks Defendant had previously given the CW. (Id. ¶ 3a, 6a.)
At the November 29, 2004 conference before the Court, the Government indicated that discovery had been turned over to defense counsel, consisting of documents, audiotapes and videotapes. (Trans. of Nov. 29, 2005 at 2.)
Defendant Ghannam moved to dismiss the Indictment on February 28, 2005. The Government submitted a letter response on March 17, 2005.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Dismissal of the Indictment
Defendant Ghannam moves to dismiss the Indictment, claiming that it is defective and without legal basis. Ghannam asserts that the Government has not shown the existence of another person who shared the defendant's alleged criminal intent. Ghannam acknowledges that the Indictment alleged the existence of "others known and unknown."
According to Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, "[t]he indictment . . . must be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. . . ." Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1).
It is well-settled law that "[t]o satisfy the pleading requirements of Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c) (1), `an indictment need do little more than to track the language of the statute charged and state the time and place (in approximate terms) of the alleged crime.'" United States v. LaSpina, 299 F.3d 165, 177 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, 693 (2d Cir. 1992)); see also United States v. Alfonso, 143 F.3d 772, 776 (2d Cir. 1998).
There is no requirement that the Indictment name co-conspirators, and courts in this district have repeatedly denied bills of particulars requesting such information. United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F.Supp. 2d 225, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (denying request for bill of particulars where the defense sought detailed information on how the conspiracy was formed, when each participant was alleged to have joined, and the "when, where, how, and with whom" of the conspiracy); United States v. Rodriguez, No. 99 CR 367, 1999 WL 820558 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1999) (denying motion for a bill of particulars identifying known co-conspirators where the indictment coupled with discovery allowed a defendant "both to prepare his defense and to avoid prejudicial surprise at trial"); United States v. Jimenez, 824 F.Supp. 351, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (motions in conspiracy cases for the "whens," "wheres," and "with whoms" are routinely denied because the Government should not be compelled to provide a preview of its evidence and give away its case before trial).
Ghannam claims that the Indictment is defective and without legal basis because "the government has not shown, other than merely alleging `others known and unknown,' another person who shared the defendants alleged criminal intent as relates to the substantive offenses contained in the indictment." (Ghannam Mem. of Law at 2.)
Paragraphs 1, 2, 4 and 5 of Indictment clearly allege conspiracies between Defendant Ghannam and "others known and unknown." Moreover, the Sealed Complaint in this matter provides further detail concerning the role of other co-conspirators. For example, in Paragraph 8(b) of the Sealed Complaint, Ghannam "promised" the CW "to speak with his associates who had supplied him with the [stolen] check." In the next paragraph, the Complaint alleges that on or about February 21, 2004, Ghannam received a phone call on his cellphone during a meeting with the CW "and advised the CW that the caller was one of his check sources who had approximately $20,000 worth of additional checks." Furthermore, Ghannam introduced the CW to another co-conspirator, not named as a defendant in this matter, but identified as CC-1 in the Complaint. CC-1 "explained to the CW how he could obtain drivers' licenses from Michigan through an inside connection in the Department of Motor Vehicles there. . . ." (Sealed Complaint ¶ 8(g).) The Complaint further alleges that Ghannam mentioned the CC-1 to the CW two more times with regards to the charged conspiracy.
This is not a case where the Government is only alleging a conspiracy with the Cooperating Witness. The Government, in its Indictment and in the Sealed Complaint, have sufficiently alleged conspiracies between Defendant Ghannam and others known and unknown, aside from the Cooperating Witness. Accordingly, the Court finds no defect in Indictment and Defendant Ghannam's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment is DENIED.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant Ghannam's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment is DENIED.
The Court finds that in the interests of justice, time is excluded until April 25, 2005 at 10:30 AM. The next status conference in this case shall take place at that time.
SO ORDERED.