Opinion
Criminal Action No. 03-311-1 (RWR).
July 8, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On January 19, 2005, William Farrell was convicted of a narcotics conspiracy, a money laundering conspiracy, and four substantive narcotics-related offenses. Farrell filed a renewed motion for judgment of acquittal alleging insufficiency of evidence on each count of which he was convicted. Because the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the government permitted a reasonable jury to find the essential elements of all these offenses, defendant's renewed motion for judgment of acquittal will be denied.
BACKGROUND
Defendant William Farrell and three co-defendants charged with a variety of narcotics-related offenses stood trial before a jury. At the close of the government's case, Farrell's motion for judgment of acquittal was denied as to all counts except for the money laundering conspiracy count, as to which this court reserved ruling. On January 19, 2005, the jury found Farrell guilty of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, cocaine base in the form known as crack, and heroin from 1996 to 2003, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000) (Count One); conspiracy to commit money laundering from 1993 to 2001, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count Two); maintaining a residence at 2002 Rosedale Street, N.E., Washington, D.C., for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing and using cocaine, cocaine base in the form known as crack, and heroin, 21 U.S.C. § 856(a) (1) (Count Three); unlawful possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base on or about June 12, 2002, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) (Count Thirteen); and unlawful distribution of cocaine on or about November 25, 2003 and November 26, 2003, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) (Counts Fourteen and Fifteen). The jury found Farrell responsible for 15 kilograms or more of cocaine and 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base as a result of his participation in the narcotics conspiracy. The jury also found that the amount of cocaine base for which Farrell was responsible in Count Thirteen was 5 grams or more, and that the amounts of cocaine for which he was responsible in Counts Fourteen and Fifteen were 100 grams or more and 200 grams or more, respectively. Farrell has renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal on all counts of conviction.
At trial, the government introduced evidence including testimony from FBI agents, experts, and a number of Farrell's alleged co-conspirators in narcotics trafficking and cooperating witnesses including Thomas Jackson, Renaldo Mason, and Ronald Valentine-Bey; recordings of telephone conversations; videotaped transactions; photographs; and physical evidence recovered from various locations searched by law enforcement. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the government's evidence in its case-in-chief established the following facts.
Thomas Jackson was a long-time customer of Farrell and co-defendant Carroll Fletcher. Jackson started buying cocaine powder from Fletcher in late 1996. He later bought cocaine from Farrell, whom Jackson knew as "Brother" and whom he had met through Fletcher in 1998. Jackson made three purchases of powder from Farrell prior to July 2001. The first was in the amount of one kilogram for $26,000 to $27,000, which Jackson cooked into crack. Jackson packaged the crack into ziplocks and sold larger amounts while giving smaller amounts to other friends to sell. In a second deal with Farrell, Jackson bought 500 grams of cocaine powder, and in a third deal, he believed he bought 750 grams of cocaine powder. In July 2001, Jackson bought one kilogram of cocaine powder from Farrell at a recreation center at the intersection of 4th Street and Rhode Island Avenue in Washington, D.C. Jackson paid Farrell $20,000 and then later another $8,000 for the powder. Jackson cooked cocaine powder into crack, and Fletcher was present during times that he cooked crack.
Jackson and Farrell used pagers to set up their drug transactions. Farrell would page Jackson, using a code such as "2*1". The number "2" was the code for Farrell, and the number following the "*" symbol could represent a drug quantity. For example, "2*1" meant one kilogram. Jackson also testified that co-defendant Nathaniel Law had an apartment in 2002 Rosedale Street, N.E., which Jackson had visited three or four times in 1999, 2000, and 2001. Law associated with Farrell and Fletcher. Law was arrested on July 12, 2002 at 2002 Rosedale Street, Apartment 3, and keys found fit the lock on Apartment 4. The evidence recovered from these apartments included, among other items, 15 grams of crack, multiple scales, at least one of which contained cocaine residue, a utility knife and pen knife with white or tannish residue, cloth placemats with white or tannish crumbs, plates and a scale with residue, a Pyrex bowl with cocaine residue, plastic bags with residue, and rubber bands commonly used to package heroin sold on the street.
Valentine-Bey, who had known Farrell since 1998, bought cocaine powder from Farrell beginning in 2000. He made 30 drug deals with Farrell, involving a total quantity of fifteen to twenty-five kilograms of cocaine powder. Valentine-Bey traveled to New York with Farrell multiple times between around 1998 and May 2003, where Farrell met his sources of cocaine.
Cooperating witnesses made two controlled drug purchases involving Farrell in November 2003. On November 25, 2003, Mason called Law on his cell phone to discuss buying 125 grams of cocaine powder. The conversation was recorded. Agents photocopied $3,500 in currency that they gave Mason for the purchase. Mason met Law at Law's aunt's house, where Mason gave Law the $3,500 in Mason's car. Law told Mason to meet him at the Shiloh Baptist church at 4:45 p.m. At 4:46 p.m., Farrell and Law walked out of the church together and got into Farrell's van. Mason arrived, and Law then got into Mason's car and gave Mason the cocaine. Some of the bills comprising the $3,500 were found inside Farrell's residence during the execution of a search warrant.
Another controlled purchase by a cooperating witness occurred on November 26, 2003. Valentine-Bey saw Farrell on the prior evening and asked to buy 250 grams of cocaine powder. Farrell agreed to make the sale for $6,500 the next day. On November 26, 2003, FBI agents gave Valentine-Bey $6,500 and a body recorder and followed him to the meeting with Farrell in the area of 9th and P Street. Farrell got into the car and sold the cooperating witness the cocaine and was videotaped leaving Valentine-Bey's car.
Between January 1993 and September 2001, Farrell made monthly mortgage payments on the apartment building at 2002 Rosedale Street. However, it was Karlene Thomas who owned the apartment building from November 28, 1989 until July 18, 2002. She had paid monthly mortgage expenses on the building of between $598 and $632 to Payne Webber Mortgage Company or Columbia National Mortgage Company between approximately January 1990 and January 1993. After January 1993, she turned over the management of the building to her former boyfriend, Nathaniel Moore. She understood that Farrell and co-defendant Carroll Fletcher, whom she referred to as "Chop," were maintaining control of the property during the period between January 1993 and September 2001. Between 1993 and 2001, Farrell periodically told her that he was making the mortgage payments and had her come to the recreation center to get cash or money orders to pay the mortgage or sanitation fines levied on the property. She had conversations with Fletcher once or twice a year about getting money to pay the mortgage, and he told her that he would contact Farrell and that he and Farrell would pay the mortgage expenses.
Agents found inside Farrell's residence receipts for the mortgage payments on the Rosedale Street building, dated in 1996 and 1997. Some receipts bore the name of Karlene Thomas as the purchaser. Thomas had neither purchased money orders relating to these receipts nor authorized anyone else to buy such money orders in her name or use them to pay the mortgage. On September 7, 2001, Farrell told Thomas in an intercepted telephone call that he had been paying the mortgage the last four or five years, and that he intended to pay off the remaining $32,000 that was owed on the mortgage.
Furthermore, Farrell and others maintained exclusive control over the 2002 Rosedale Street apartment building between 1993 and 2001 and took actions to prevent Thomas's access to it while maintaining her name on the property. In an intercepted communication between Farrell and a tenant named "Chico," Farrell suggested to Chico that he should not let Thomas in the building. Farrell refused to provide Thomas with keys to gain entry into the apartment building between 1993 and September 2001, Farrell told Thomas in 2002 that she did not own the building, and Moore became belligerent when she confronted him about Farrell's control of the building. In addition, Farrell told her he would get his cousin Ramona Montgomery to purchase the building for him.
During the government's case-in-chief, Farrell highlighted evidence that he had licit sources of revenue during the period between January 1993 and September 2001. In intercepted phone calls, Thomas told Farrell in 2001 that he had roomers who were paying him money, and Farrell acknowledged to Chico that Chico paid Farrell an unspecified amount of money to live in one of the apartments. The government had introduced an August 25, 2001 residential lease between Farrell and James Westray, in which Westray agreed to pay $400 per month for an apartment. Thomas also testified that her apartment building had four one-bedroom units, each of which rented for $450, and that there were tenants in the building from whom she received no money during the relevant time period. In his own case, Farrell introduced records of disability payments he received in the years 1994 to 2001, in the following amounts: $9,591 in 1994, $9,871.99 in 1995, $10,023.59 in 1996, $10,476.85 in 1997, $10,567.11 in 1998, $7,052.24 in 1999, $5,370.75 in 2000, and $5,425.51 in 2001. Farrell also introduced evidence that he had cashed mutual funds or bonds.
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to Rule 29(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant may renew a motion for judgment of acquittal after a guilty verdict has been returned. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c). "If `any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt' based on the evidence before the trier of fact, the district judge properly denies a motion for judgment of acquittal[.]"U.S. v. Gilliam, 167 F.3d 628, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quotingJackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Where a court has reserved decision on a motion made at the close of the government's evidence for judgment of acquittal on a count, the motion on that count must be decided on the basis of the evidence at the time the ruling was reserved. Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(b). Otherwise, "[a]lthough a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the government's case-in-chief [that is denied] is decided on the basis of only that evidence so far introduced at trial . . . a court must look at the entire record when ruling on the same motion made after trial." United States v. Byfield, 928 F.2d 1163, 1165-66 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). The evidence, both direct and circumstantial, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the government. Gilliam, 167 F.3d at 637.
I. NARCOTICS VIOLATIONS
A. Count One: conspiracy to violate narcotics laws, 21 U.S.C. § 846
The jury found Farrell guilty of Count One, which charged a narcotics conspiracy spanning eight years. In moving for judgment of acquittal at trial as to Count One, Farrell argued generally that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction. His renewed motion does not supplement his basis for the motion on this count or provide any further briefing as to this count.
To establish the existence of a conspiracy in violation section 846, the government must show an agreement or mutual understanding between at least two people to violate narcotics laws, and knowing and intentional participation in the conspiracy. See United States v. Hines, 398 F.3d 713, 718 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied sub nom. Edwards v. United States, ___ S.Ct. ___, 2005 WL 1223189 (June 20, 2005). Here, the government argued the existence of a "chain" conspiracy. "Courts have long recognized that participants in a continuous drug distribution enterprise can be parties to a single conspiracy even if they do not all know one another, so long as each knows that his own role in the distribution of drugs and the benefits he derives from his participation depend on the activities of the others." United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 709-710 (D.C. Cir. 1995). "[W]hile proof of conspiracy requires proof of an agreement, the jury may infer this agreement from the defendant's knowing participation in a distribution network organized along division of labor principles — in which his own role necessarily depends on the cooperation of other parties to that network. . . ." Id. at 710.
In this case, Jackson made at least four purchases of cocaine powder from Farrell in the years between 1998 and 2001. He cooked this powder into crack, packaged it for resale, and sold it to other individuals. Valentine-Bey similarly bought cocaine powder from Farrell approximately 30 times involving a total quantity of 15 to 25 kilograms. Valentine-Bey also traveled to New York with Farrell where Farrell met his sources. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, this testimony was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Farrell was involved not merely in buyer-seller relationships but in an ongoing conspiracy whereby Farrell supplied cocaine powder to individuals including Valentine-Bey and Jackson, to cook the powder into crack, package it and sell it.
B. Count Three: maintaining a residence at 2002 Rosedale Street for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, and using controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. § 856
The jury also convicted Farrell of Count Three, which charged him with maintaining apartments at 2002 Rosedale Street for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing and using cocaine, cocaine base, and heroin. The government had to prove that Farrell (1) knowingly (2) opened or maintained a place (3) for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using cocaine, cocaine base, or heroin. See 21 U.S.C. § 856 (a) (1); United States v. Basinger, 60 F.3d 1400, 1404 (9th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Lancaster, 968 F.2d 1250, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (setting forth the elements of a violation of § 856 (a) (1) as "namely, that the defendant open or maintain a place with the purpose that drugs be manufactured, distributed or used there").
In moving for judgment of acquittal at trial as to Count Three, Farrell also argued generally to have this count dismissed based on insufficient evidence. His renewed motion does not supplement his basis for the motion on this count or provide any further briefing as to this count.
Here, the government introduced evidence recovered from the 2002 Rosedale apartments of crack cocaine, scales, and other items containing cocaine residue which the government's expert witness testified were tools commonly used in narcotics trafficking. The government also presented evidence linking Farrell to the 2002 Rosedale building in the relevant time period. In addition to the evidence that Farrell was paying the mortgage on the 2002 Rosedale building between January 1993 and September 2001, the government also introduced evidence of Farrell exercising control over the building, including trying to preclude Thomas, the building's owner, from having access to it. Furthermore, the evidence showed that Nathaniel Law was living in Apartment 3 and had keys to Apartment 4. Evidence including the November 2003 controlled purchases from Law and Farrell showed that Farrell and Law were involved together in the drug trafficking network and that Farrell was a source of drugs for Law during this time period. Cf. United States v. Lucas, 67 F.3d 956, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (evidence was insufficient to support conviction under § 856(a) (2) where "appellant had very little connection to the apartment"; he had moved out seven years before, did not have a key, rarely entered the apartment and stayed only briefly when he did, and the government's only evidence that he might have entered the apartment anytime close to the raid was an ambiguously dated receipt). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, it was sufficient for a jury to conclude that Farrell knowingly maintained the 2002 Rosedale Street, N.E. premises for the purposes of manufacturing, distributing, or using cocaine, cocaine base, or heroin.
C. Count Thirteen: possession with intent to distribute 5 grams or more of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1)
The jury also found Farrell guilty of possession with intent to distribute the crack that was recovered from Apartment Four at the 2002 Rosedale Street building on July 12, 2002. For Count Thirteen, the government had to prove that Farrell knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine base, in the form known as crack, with the specific intent to distribute it. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1); United States v. Burch, 156 F.3d 1315, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Farrell specifically argued with respect to Count Thirteen during his original motion for judgment of acquittal that no evidence suggested that Farrell had any involvement with 2002 Rosedale Street by July 12, 2002. He has not supplemented that argument in his renewed motion. Evidence of this charge included 15 grams of crack recovered from the 2002 Rosedale building, as well as evidence of Farrell's exercise of control over the building, and Farrell's associations in narcotics trafficking with Law, who lived in the building. Although Thomas did resume making mortgage payments on 2002 Rosedale Street in September 2001, the building was not actually sold until July 18, 2002.
In arguing for its motion for judgment of acquittal at trial, defense counsel also argued that the government's evidence had not met the standard set forth by the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Brisbane, which requires that when an individual is indicted with a charge involving the distribution of cocaine base, in the form known as crack, the government prove that the substance distributed was smokeable and that it was crack. 367 F.3d 910, 914 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 342 (2004). The chemist who analyzed the substance recovered from Apartment Four concluded that it contained cocaine base. The government's expert about the narcotics trade testified that the off-white substance bore the appearance of crack cocaine after a chemist's analysis, and that it originally would have been a hardened, larger rock type substance, sold on the streets as crack cocaine, and smoked. He also testified generally that the only form in which he knows cocaine base to be used is as a hardened substance that is then placed in a smoking device and smoked. Farrell's counsel also conceded that there was some evidence of smokeability.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Farrell knowingly and intentionally possessed with intent to distribute 5 grams or more of crack cocaine on or about July 12, 2002. See United States v. Eli, 379 F.3d 1016, 1020-21 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that the substance the defendant sold was crack, where the government chemist testified, and the defendant did not dispute, that the defendant's drugs tested positive for cocaine base, the DEA lab report stated that the drugs recovered in the sales were "rock-like," and the chemist indicated that the drugs were smokeable and properly identified as crack cocaine).
D. Counts Fourteen and Fifteen: distribution of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a) (1)
The jury convicted Farrell of unlawful distribution of cocaine on or about November 25, 2003, in the amount of 100 grams or more, and of unlawful distribution of cocaine on or about November 26, 2003, in the amount of 200 grams or more. For Counts Fourteen and Fifteen, the government had to prove that Farrell knowingly and intentionally distributed a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, also referred to as cocaine hydrochloride or powder cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1); Criminal Jury Instructions for the Dist. of Columbia § 4.30 (4th ed. revised 2004).
In moving for judgment of acquittal at trial as to Counts Fourteen and Fifteen, Farrell argued generally to have these counts dismissed based on insufficient evidence. His renewed motion does not supplement his basis for the motion on these counts or provide any further briefing as to these counts.
Here, the government introduced evidence of Farrell's association with Law, Mason's controlled purchase of 125 grams of cocaine powder from Farrell through Law on November 25, 2003, and the recovery of some of the purchase money from Farrell's home. The government also introduced recorded evidence of Valentine-Bey's controlled purchase of 250 grams of cocaine powder directly from Farrell on November 26, 2003. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Farrell knowingly and intentionally distributed cocaine on or about November 25, 2003 and November 26, 2003.
II. CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MONEY LAUNDERING
Farrell was convicted of conspiracy to commit money laundering. The jury was instructed as follows:
Defendant Farrell is charged in Count Two of the indictment with unlawfully conspiring with other individuals not indicted in this case to engage in certain kinds of financial transactions commonly known as money laundering. Specifically, defendant Farrell is charged with conspiring to conduct or attempting to conduct financial transactions which in fact involve the proceeds of a drug trafficking conspiracy, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956.
It is a federal crime for anyone to conspire or agree with someone else to do something which, if actually carried out, would be a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956. An individual violates Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956 if that person, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of a drug trafficking conspiracy, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of a drug trafficking conspiracy, knowing that the transaction is designed to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of a drug trafficking conspiracy. . . .
For you to find defendant Farrell guilty of the money laundering conspiracy charged in Count Two, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that between in or about January 1993 and September 2001, an agreement or mutual understanding existed between at least two people to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan to commit money laundering, as charged in the indictment, that is, to conduct financial transactions with the proceeds of a drug trafficking conspiracy in order to disguise the nature of the proceeds.
Second, that defendant Farrell, knowing the unlawful purpose of the plan, willfully joined in it.See Pattern Crim. Jury Instr. 11th Cir. Offense Instr. 70.5 (2003); United States v. Puche, 350 F.3d 1137, 1143 (11th Cir. 2003).
Here, the government argues that the evidence at trial established that Farrell used money derived from drug trafficking to conduct financial transactions for payment of the mortgage on the 2002 Rosedale Street apartment building, and that Farrell intended to conceal or disguise his status as the source of the proceeds paying these expenses. Farrell argues that there was no evidence that he paid the mortgage on the 2002 Rosedale Street building with the proceeds of narcotics trafficking. Farrell concedes that the evidence did establish that he was involved in narcotics trafficking but asserts that he also received legitimate income, in the form of rent payments and disability payments, that more than covered the mortgage payments at issue.
There is no direct evidence that any of the mortgage payments made on the building at 2002 Rosedale Street stemmed from the proceeds of the narcotics trafficking conspiracy. Indeed, as the government's own indictment charged and evidence suggested, Farrell collected rents from tenants; that could easily have been the source of the mortgage payments. For part of the last year alone of the charged conspiracy (2001), the evidence suggested that Chico and Westray paid some rent, and that Farrell did not refute Thomas's assertion that Farrell had tenants paying him money. Thomas also said that during the period of Farrell's control of the building, there were tenants in the apartments that rented for $450 per month, and that she received none of the proceeds. Moreover, defendant's evidence showed that from just after the last year (1993) in which Thomas paid the roughly $632 per month mortgage through 2001, Farrell cumulatively collected in disability payments enough to cover the likely mortgage payments. "That [Farrell] dealt drugs is not sufficient proof that his every penny derived from drug sales." See United States v. McDougald, 990 F.2d 259, 261 (6th Cir. 1993).
The government insists that Farrell's failure to declare any disability payments on his income tax returns is clear proof that he did not collect the payments. However, it seems to be clear proof of only the fact that Farrell did not declare any such income.
In theory, Farrell's argument could have more force if it were directed at a conviction of a substantive money laundering violation which required proof that the money involved in the mortgage payments represented drug trafficking proceeds. However, the government, perhaps understandably, did not charge Farrell with money laundering nor does he stand convicted of it. He stands convicted of a conspiracy to commit money laundering in which the government's required proof included simply the existence of the unlawful agreement and Farrell's willful joinder in it. Proof of even a substantive money laundering offense, however, can include circumstantial evidence. The D.C. Circuit has found that if the government presents sufficient evidence, including circumstantial evidence, from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the money involved in a financial transaction flowed directly from narcotics trafficking, then sufficient evidence exists to support a conviction for a substantive count of money laundering. See United States v. Wynn, 61 F.3d 921, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The D.C. Circuit has declined to read Congress's use of the word "involve" in the money laundering statute as imposing the requirement that the government trace the origin of all funds to determine which funds were used for what transaction. See United States v. Braxtonbrown-Smith, 278 F.3d 1348, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 2002). "Allowing the mere commingling of legitimate funds to defeat a money laundering conviction so easily would wholly undermine Congress's intent and effectively nullify the offense." Id. Circumstances supporting an inference that the money involved in the transactions had an illegal source is sufficient to support a money laundering conviction. See Wynn, 61 F.3d at 926.
In Wynn, defendant Wynn was convicted of money laundering violations stemming from his purchase of two expensive Range Rover automobiles on behalf of a notorious drug dealer named Lewis whom Wynn misrepresented as his nephew. Id. at 923, 925, 926. For the first Range Rover, Wynn used cash to buy four cashier's checks from different banks, each in amounts of less than $10,000. Wynn challenged the sufficiency of the evidence that the cash used to purchase the cashier's checks constituted the proceeds of illegal activity, particularly in the face of trial evidence that he had legally won $150,000 in the lottery during the relevant time period. Id. at 925-26. The court held that although the jury was free to believe that the Range Rovers were gifts from Wynn to Lewis, reasonable jurors could conclude from the testimony that Lewis funded the Range Rover purchases, since "the method of payment and the clear attempt to disguise Lewis's identity strongly suggest that Lewis used Wynn as a middleman for . . . injecting illegal proceeds into the stream of commerce while obfuscating their source." Id. at 926. The court further held that the government had presented sufficient evidence that the money Wynn used to purchase the cashier's checks did flow directly from Lewis's narcotics trafficking activities: Wynn purchased the cashier's checks with cash, and for each of the Range Rover purchases, he purchased two or more cashier's checks from different banks, suggesting an intent to disguise the total amount of cash involved from the banks, which are required to report cash transactions of $10,000 or more.Id.
While proof of the joint commission of the very substantive offenses a conspiracy is aimed at committing can be the strongest proof of the conspiracy, it is not a prerequisite to a conviction. Here, the government had to prove only an agreement to conduct financial transactions with drug proceeds in order to disguise the nature of the proceeds, and Farrell's willful participation in this agreement. The government presented circumstantial evidence of these very elements. The evidence, not seriously disputed here, is that Farrell reaped many thousands of dollars over the years in sales of cocaine powder, working closely with Fletcher. Thomas testified that Farrell and Fletcher were maintaining control of the property during the period between January 1993 and September 2001, that she had conversations with Fletcher once or twice a year about getting money to pay the mortgage or fines, and that he told her he would contact Farrell and he and Farrell would pay those expenses. This evidence could support an inference of an agreement and that the money to be used to pay the mortgage had an illegal source.
Farrell ultimately exercised control over the 2002 Rosedale Street building during the relevant time period and made the mortgage payments, yet he maintained the building in Thomas's name and the money order receipts of payments to the mortgage company that Farrell kept falsely named Thomas as the purchaser. Farrell also vowed to have his cousin purchase the building for him. This evidence could convince a reasonable jury that Farrell, in making the mortgage payments, sought to conceal the illegal nature, source, or control of the money used to make them.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Because the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the government permitted a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of all these offenses, it is hereby
ORDERED that the defendant's renewed motion for judgment of acquittal [#221] be, and hereby is, DENIED.