Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-3057
May 15, 2002
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff, the United States of America (the "United States") brings this action against Defendant Exide Corporation ("Exide") alleging that under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq., Exide is liable for costs incurred by the United States in response to the release of hazardous substances at the Hamburg Lead Superfund Site in Berks County, Pennsylvania. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. By order dated February 27, 2002, the Court found for the United States and against Exide on the question of liability. Presently before the Court is Exide's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting Judgment on Liability or, in the Alternative, for Certification Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). For the reasons stated below, Exide's motion is DENIED.
I. Reconsideration Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)
The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. See Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171 (1986). A court should grant a motion for reconsideration only "if the moving party establishes one of three grounds: (1) there is newly available evidence; (2) an intervening change in the controlling law; or (3) there is a need to correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice." Drake v. Steamfitters Local Union No. 420, No. 97-585, 1998 WL 564486 at *3 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 3, 1998) (citing Smith v. City of Chester, 155 F.R.D. 95, 96-97 (E.D.Pa. 1994). "Because federal courts have a strong interest in finality of judgments, motions for reconsideration should be granted sparingly." Continental Casualty Co. v. Diversified Indus., 884 F. Supp. 937, 943 (E.D.Pa. 1995).
Exide seeks reconsideration in this case in order to correct alleged clear errors of law and to prevent manifest injustice. However, a motion for reconsideration is not properly grounded on a request that the court simply re-think a decision that it has already made. See Glendon Energy Co. v. Borough of Glendon, 836 F. Supp. 1109, 1122 (E.D.Pa. 1993). With regard to the thicket of questions resolved by the Court in its February 27, 2002 memorandum — both in ascertaining the proper law of CERCLA successor liability and then applying it — that is precisely what Exide asks the Court to do in its motion. The Court declines to do so. Exide's only new argument is that the Court did not view the evidence in the light most favorable to Exide with regard to the continuity (or lack thereof) of Price Battery's corporate name and management at the Hamburg Plant after its transaction with General Battery. However, while both the United States and Exide proffered evidence on these issues, neither party's evidence directly contradicted the other's. In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Exide, the Court need not ignore undisputed evidence offered by the United States.
The Court therefore declines to reconsider its decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the United States and against Exide.
II. Certification of Interlocutory Appeal Under 29 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
In general, a matter may not be appealed to a court of appeals until a final judgment has been rendered by the district judge under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) creates an exception to the final judgment rule by authorizing a district court to certify an order for interlocutory appeal only if the court finds that: (1) the order involves a controlling question of law, (2) the order presents a question on which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion, and (3) an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. See Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 754 (3d Cir. 1974). The decision to certify an appeal rests with the sound discretion of the trial court. See Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 1132, 1142 (E.D.Pa. 1993). The burden is on the movant to demonstrate that a 1292(b) appeal is warranted. See Rottmund v. Continental Assurance Co., 813 F. Supp. 1104, 1112 (E.D.Pa. 1992).
The Court declines to certify a § 1292(b) interlocutory appeal since Exide has not met its burden of demonstrating that an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, such as required by the third factor. In evaluating this factor, courts have focused on whether an appeal would (1) eliminate the need for trial, (2) eliminate complex issues so as to simplify the trial, or (3) eliminate issues to make discovery easier and less costly. See Zygmuntowicz v. Hospitality Invs., Inc., 828 F. Supp. 346, 353 (E.D.Pa. 1993). In this case, in its February 27, 2002 memorandum, the Court did not reach the issue of General Battery's direct liability, a separate theory of recovery which would also render Exide (General Battery's admitted successor) liable to the United States. Therefore, even if Exide were successful on an interlocutory appeal, such a decision would not eliminate the need for a trial on liability and damages. Such an appeal would also not necessarily either simplify any trial needed or reduce the expense of discovery. In cases where triable issues would remain even after a successful appeal, courts routinely deny certification of § 1292(b) appeals because such an appeal will not materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. See, e.g., Orson, Inc., v. Miramax Film Corp., 867 F. Supp. 319, 322 (E.D.Pa. 1994) ("[i]n this case, an immediate appeal would not eliminate the need for a trial");Zygmuntowicz, 828 F. Supp. at 353-354; Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 836 F. Supp. 269, 272 (E.D.Pa. 1993) ("significantly, several claims may proceed to trial regardless of the disposition"); Rottmund, 813 F. Supp. at 1112 ("where the issue involved in the interlocutory order is only one of many triable issues, an interlocutory appeal will not provide a more efficient disposition of the litigation").
All three of the requirements under § 1292(b) must be met in order for a court to grant certification for appeal. See Piazza, 836 F. Supp. at 270. Therefore, the Court need not address the first and second factors. However, the Court notes that Exide is persuasive as to whether the order presents questions on which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion, as required by the second factor.
In any case, even if all three factors under § 1292(b) were met (and they are not here), the Court would still be required to exercise its discretion mindful of the strong policy against piecemeal appeals.See Orson, 867 F. Supp. 319 at 321 (citing Zygmuntowicz, 828 F. Supp. at 353). The 1292(b) appeal is the exception, to be used only in the rare case where an immediate appeal would "avoid expensive and protracted litigation." Id. In other words, the court should consider the potential consequences of both granting and denying the appeal. As describedsupra, granting an appeal at this time would not eliminate need for a trial in this Court on both liability and damages, so it would not materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Additionally, however, neither party suggests that the result of denying the appeal and moving to the damages phase before an appeal is taken will be a particularly expensive or protracted process.
Because Exide has not met its burden of demonstrating that an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, the Court declines to certify its February 27, 2002 order for a § 1292(b) interlocutory appeal.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 15th day of May 2002, upon consideration of Defendant Exide Corporation's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting Judgment on Liability or, in the Alternative, for Certification Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (Docket No. 27), Plaintiff the United States' response thereto (Docket No. 28), and Exide's Reply (Docket No. 29), it is hereby ORDERED that Exide's motion is DENIED.