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holding that a judicial finding of a defendant's mental incompetence to stand trial under § 3161(h) resulted in excludable delay until such time as the court found the defendant restored to competency, notwithstanding that some of the delay relative to the defendant's transportation would otherwise have been presumed unreasonable under § 3161(h)(H)
Summary of this case from U.S. v. LewisOpinion
Criminal No. 04-100.
May 18, 2004
MEMORANDUM
I. Introduction
The issue presented is whether the finding of the Court that Defendant was mentally incompetent to stand trial under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(4) results in excludable delay under the Speedy Trial Act, notwithstanding some of the delay would be presumed unreasonable under § 3161(h)(1)(H). Presently before the Court is Frances Degideo's ("Defendant") Motion to Dismiss the Government's Indictment pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-64 ("the Act"). In bringing this motion, Defendant argues that the government delayed too long in filing its indictment, thereby requiring the Court to dismiss it.
The Act requires that "[a]ny information or indictment charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). However, several exclusions exist, including "any period of delay resulting from the fact that the Defendant is mentally incompetent." § 3161(h)(4). Because the Court holds, in view of the fact that this Defendant has been found mentally incompetent, the delay complained of in this case constitutes excludable time under the Act, it will deny Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment.
II. Facts
The facts relevant to this motion are not in dispute. On November 5, 1999 a complaint and warrant were filed against Defendant, charging Defendant with the assault and attempted murder of a Federal Protective Service officer under 18 U.S.C. §§ 111 and 1114. That same day, Defendant appeared before a Magistrate Judge, and was Ordered to undergo treatment and evaluation, on November 10, 1999, for her mental condition. Then, on or about November 15, 1999 the Magistrate Judge found Defendant to be incompetent to stand trial and committed her to the custody of the Attorney General for further medical treatment. In accord with this Order, on or about February 9, 2000, Defendant was transferred from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to the Federal Medical Center Carswell in Forth Worth, Texas. On February 23, 2000 an Order was entered stating that the time between Defendant's November 10, 1999 competency hearing and the date of her next scheduled competency hearing should be excluded under the Act. The next competency hearing took place on August 14, 2000. Defendant concedes that, under the Act, the period of time up to August 14, 2000 is excludable. (Def's Mot. to Dismiss Indictment at 3.)
At the August 14, 2000 hearing, the Magistrate Judge again found Defendant to be incompetent and recommitted her to the custody of the Attorney General. The Court further Ordered, in an Order dated August 23, 2000, that the time between Defendant's August 14, 2000 competency hearing and her next competency hearing, (which was held on January 25, 2001), be excluded.
Unfortunately, after being recommitted to the custody of the Attorney General at the August 14, 2000 hearing, Defendant was not immediately transferred to the Federal Medical Center Caswell ("FMC — Caswell"). Due to an administrative oversight, Defendant received no care during the period of time between August 14, 2000 and January 25, 2001. The government brought all these facts to the Court's attention in a Motion for Continued Evaluation, filed on January 23, 2001. On January 25, 2001, a hearing was held before Chief Magistrate Judge Melinson, who ordered that Defendant be recommitted to the custody of the Attorney General. In issuing this Order, Chief Magistrate Judge Melinson further held that the time from August 14, 2000, until the Defendant was found competent, was excludable:
Title 18 United States Code, §§ 3161(h)(1)(A), 3161(h)(3)(a) and 3161(h)(4) provide that excludable periods of delay in computing the time within which an information or an indictment must be filed shall include respectively, "delay resulting from any proceeding, including any examinations, to determine the mental competency or physical capacity of the defendant . . .;" delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the defendant . . .;" or "delay resulting from the fact that the defendant is mentally incompetent of physically unable to stand trial."
Therefore, it is ORDERED that the time from the date of the commitment of the defendant for mental examination on August 14, 2000 until such time that the defendant has returned to this District and, after a hearing conducted pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d), the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has recovered to such an extent that she is able to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against her and to assist properly in her defense, is excluded from all computation under the Speedy Trial Act ( 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161 and 3164).
(Order Jan. 25, 2001.)
Following the issuance of this Order, defense counsel corresponded with Chief Magistrate Judge Melinson's Chambers by way of letter dated January 31, 2001. In the letter, defense counsel stated that she wants to preserve her right to litigate "the Speedy Trial Act violation in this matter." (Def's Ex. A.) The letter further claims:
The issue of whether or not the period of time from the date of the commitment of the defendant for mental examination on August 14, 2000 until such time that the defendant has returned to this District and a determination is made that the defendant has recovered from her mental illness and is competent for trial purposes, is an issue I intend to raise in a pretrial motion. The government nor I had an agreement with respect to this issue.
* * *
I merely wish that this letter serve as an objection for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act.
(Id.)
The letter was not docketed. However, on January 31, 2001, Chief Magistrate Judge Melinson did enter an Amended Order which did not change any of the terms of the January 25, 2001 Order, bud did provide for the prompt transfer of the Defendant to FMC — Caswell or another facility deemed suitable by the Bureau of Prisons for the examination and treatment of the Defendant. This Order did reiterate the prior finding that the Defendant is mentally incompetent:
The government does not dispute that the letter of January 31, 2001, addressed to Chief Magistrate Judge Melinson's chambers, has preserved Defendant's position under the Speedy Trial Act, and does not assert that Defendant's current Motion to Dismiss the Indictment is untimely. Also, on February 5, 2001 the Defendant, pro se, filed an "appeal" (Docket No. 29) which was denied by Judge Bartle, without opinion, on February 20, 2001 (Docket No. 32). The appeal does not raise any issues under the Speedy Trial Act, but claims Defendant is innocent.
1. Following an evidentiary hearing on January 25, 2001 and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is suffering from a mental disease and defect rendering her mentally incompetent to the extent that she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against her, or to assist properly in her defense. The Court accordingly ordered that the defendant be committed to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment at FJC-Carswell or another suitable facility for further treatment for such a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months, as is necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future she will attain the capacity to permit the trial to proceed and the defendant be conveyed.
III. Discussion
Defendant now argues that Chief Magistrate Judge Melinson's exclusion of time from August 14, 2000 "until such time that the Defendant has returned to this District" was improper. The record shows that the Defendant was returned to the Federal Medical Center Carswell on February 14, 2001, and was periodically examined by officials there, who periodically reported that she was still suffering from a mental defect or disease which rendered her incompetent to stand trial. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246, on December 18, 2001, Judge McBryde of the Northern District of Texas issued a commitment order, finding Defendant to be incompetent to stand trial. On November 19, 2003, Dr. James Shadduck of the Federal Bureau of Prisons at Carswell, Texas reported that the Defendant had recovered from her mental defective disease and was now competent to stand trial; he proposed a conditional release for Defendant on December 23, 2003, which recommended that Defendant be permitted to reside with her son in Phoenixville, Pennsylvania and receive treatment in the area. Defendant was returned to this district in January 2004 and the government filed an indictment against her on February 26, 2004. The Defendant has been on pretrial release and subject to specific conditions. The Court held a competency hearing on March 19, 2004, and found the Defendant to be competent to stand trial.
Defendant contends there have been a total of 200 non-excludable days, from August 14, 2000, the date of her initial commitment, to February 14, 2001, the date she was transferred to FMC-Caswell.
The Court is presented with two provisions of law that can arguably apply to the delay Defendant experienced in this case. The first provision, favored by Defendant, deals with delays resulting from transportation. The second provision, advanced by the government, deals with delays resulting from a defendant's mental incompetency. The relevant provisions read as follows:
(h) The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which any information or an indictment must be filed, or in computing the time within which the trial of any such offense must commence:
(1) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to —
* * *
(H) delay resulting from transportation of any defendant from another district, or to and from places of examination or hospitalization, except that any time consumed in excess of ten days from the date an order of removal or an order directing such transportation, and the defendant's arrival at the destination shall be presumed to be unreasonable;
* * *
(4) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that the defendant is mentally incompetent or physically unable to stand trial.18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)-(4).
Defendant argues that § 3161(h)(1)(H) should apply based on Defendant's contention that the government unreasonably delayed transporting her to the Federal Medical Center Carswell between August 14, 2000 and February 14, 2001, which far exceeded ten days. In opposition, the government maintains that the Court should apply § 3161(h)(4) based on the government's argument that the statute provides that once the Court declares Defendant's mental incompetency, all time is excludable.
In different factual contexts, accord: U.S. v. Evans, 704 F. Supp. 81 (E.D. Pa. 1989), U.S. v. Moores, 620 F. Supp. 241 (D.P.R. 1985).
The Court holds that the government presents the more compelling argument. The parties do not dispute that Defendant had been declared mentally incompetent in November of 1999 and was not declared mentally competent until March of 2004. As such, the delay between August 14, 2000 and February 14, 2001, which Defendant complains of, was primarily the result of this Court's finding of mental incompetency, which is explicitly excluded under § 3161(h)(4). The delay in treatment was subsidiary to the prior finding that Defendant was mentally incompetent.
This result is dictated by a plain language reading of the Act. By drafting § 3161(h)(4), Congress clearly intended to create a specific period of excludable time when a Defendant is mentally incompetent. As such, when a defendant has been declared mentally incompetent, § 3161(h)(4) trumps other sections of the Act, including § 3161(h)(1)(H), the provisions of which do not require a finding of mental incompetency.
Additionally, § 3161(h)(4) imposes no limitation on the amount of time that may be excluded while a Defendant is mentally incompetent. Unlike § 3161(h)(1)(H), which allows only a reasonable delay — not to exceed ten days — § 3161(h)(4) does not impose such a restriction on the amount of time the trial of a Defendant can be delayed. Thus, the Court must conclude that Congress did not intend to impose such a restriction. To graft such a restriction onto the clear language of § 3161(h)(4) would do damage to the intent of Congress. Any delays, regardless of reasonableness, which are incurred while a Defendant is incompetent, are excludable.
This holding is consistent with the reasoning applied by the Supreme Court in Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 330, 90 L. Ed. 2d 299, 106 S. Ct. 1871 (1986). In Henderson, the Supreme Court interpreted § 3161(h)(1)(F), dealing with the disposition of motions, as not imposing a "reasonableness" requirement. Based on the plain language of the provision, the Supreme Court held that § 3161(h)(1)(F) excludes "all time between the filing of a motion and the conclusion of the hearing on that motion whether or not a delay in holding that hearing is reasonably necessary." Henderson, 476 U.S. at 333. If Congress intended to exclude only "reasonable" periods of delay, the Supreme Court held, it would have so provided. Id. at 326-27. Instead, Congress left § 3161(h)(1)(F) silent as to the issue of reasonableness.
The Court concludes that it would be error to make § 3161(h)(1)(H) an exception to § 3161(h)(4). In § 3161(h)(4), Congress excluded all delay during the time a defendant is mentally incompetent. In the present case, Defendant has consistently been found to be mentally incompetent. See the Orders of November 16, 1999, August 23, 2000, January, 25, 2001 and January 31, 2001. Just as the Supreme Court refused to impose a "reasonableness" requirement on any delays incurred while motions were pending, in Henderson, this Court will not construe § 3161(h)(4) to be limited by § 3161(h)(1)(h). As with § 3161(h)(1)(F), at issue in Henderson, § 3161(h)(4) contains no language regarding the reasonableness of delays.
The Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in United States v. Vasquez, 970 F.2d 1280 (2d Cir. 1992). There, the Court held that "since the delays complained of by [Defendant] arose from proceedings to determine his competency and were prior to the conclusion of the hearing thereon, they must be excluded from the calculation of the speedy trial clock whether or not they are reasonable." Vasquez, 970 F.2d at 333.
In reaching this conclusion, Vazquez interpreted § 3161(h)(1)(A) which excluded "delay resulting from any proceeding, including any examinations, to determine the mental competency . . . of the defendant." The Second Circuit, inVazquez, also looked to the Supreme Court's holding inHenderson for guidance. Like §§ 3161(h)(1)(F) and 3161(h)(4), § 3161(h)(1)(A) contained no provision regarding the reasonableness of delay. As such, the Second Circuit held that no such limitation applied.
The cases cited by Defendant are distinguishable because in those cases there was no finding that the defendant was incompetent. For example, in United States v. Bauer, 286 F. Supp. 2d 31 (D.D.C. 2003), the District Court for the District of Colombia held that, where the government failed to transport a defendant to a mental health facility, the transportation time in excess of ten days was required to be excluded pursuant to § 3161(h)(1)(H). However, in reaching this conclusion, the court explicitly noted that, unlike the defendant in the present case, the defendant, in Bauer, had not yet been declared incompetent.Bauer, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 33. Rather, the court, in Bauer, had Ordered the government to transport the defendant to a mental health facility in order to determine whether or not the defendant was mentally competent. Based on this, the court clearly expressed, in dicta, the opinion that had the Defendant first been found to be mentally incompetent, a different result would have been appropriate.
Similarly, in United States v. Castle, 906 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1990) and United States v. Noone, 913 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1990), although both the Fifth and First Circuits held that the government's delays in transporting defendants to be unreasonable, in neither case did the trial court first find the defendants to be mentally incompetent to stand trial. Castle, 906 F.2d at 135; Noone, 913 F.2d at 23. Instead, both trial courts Ordered the defendants sent to medical centers in order to determine the extent of their mental competency. As stated above, this fundamentally contrasts with the facts of the present case, where the Defendant had already been deemed, by the Court, to be mentally incompetent.
The Court also finds instructive the fact that Congress, in drafting § 3161(h)(4) placed delays resulting from a defendant's mental incompetency side by side with delays resulting from a defendant's physical incapacity. Where a defendant is physically incapable of attending trial, § 3161(h)(4) permits the Court to delay the proceedings indefinitely. Simply put, a trial cannot proceed if the defendant is physically incapable of attending. The same is true regarding mental incompetency. By drafting § 3161(h)(4) in the disjunctive, and equating mental incompetency with physical inability to stand trial, Congress clearly found that when a defendant's mental state prevents the defendant from meaningfully participating in her trial, the Speedy Trial Act does not impact on a court's ability to delay the proceedings indefinitely until the defendant recovers, regardless of any other reason for delay.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the although the government failed to transfer Defendant to the Federal Medical Center Carswell for an extended period of time, this failure occurred while Defendant was mentally incompetent. Consequently, this delay must be treated as excludable time and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment will be denied.
An appropriate Order follows.