Opinion
CRIMINAL NO. 00-10374-RWZ
June 7, 2001
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
In a three count indictment, defendant, Darris Davis, is accused of robbing three different banks on three different dates in three different towns. The last robbery, of the Citizens Bank in West Roxbury, Count 3, allegedly occurred on July 21, 2000 about noon time. It was the last because in the early afternoon defendant was arrested. He was then taken back to the bank to be identified by the teller involved in the robbery and another bank employee, and thereafter transported to the police station for booking. Shortly after the completion of the booking procedures, a number of FBI agents, state police officers and local police officers, most of them members of the Bank Robbery Task Force, with defendant, repaired upstairs to the Detectives' Room where the officers questioned defendant at some length. A second interview took place during the early evening. Defendant now moves to suppress all statements he made to the police on that day on the ground that he was under the influence of drugs and the statements were consequently not voluntary.
Defendant does not seriously dispute that he was given a statement of his rights orally and in writing, and that he signed the writing, although he says he does not remember such. Nor does he claim that the officers were overbearing and aggressive, or that they, in some other way, created a climate of fear and intimidation to which he succumbed. He simply asserts, and so testified, that between the robbery and the arrest he purchased two bags of heroin and two bags of crack cocaine and that he snorted the heroin. The effect of that, he says, is to relax him, to cause him to "nod in and out of sleep." Defendant thus testified that he has no memory of any Miranda formalities and does not know whether he gave up any of his constitutional rights. He does recall the conversation with the booking officers to whom he gave the personal identification information common to that process.
The government offered the testimony of several officers who had observed or participated in the sessions with defendant. In addition, the evidence included the testimony of other officers who had investigated the robbery that day and who had been involved in the chase and arrest of defendant.
Eugene Kee, a lieutenant in the State Police and a member of the Bank Robbery Task Force, testified that he went to the Citizens Bank shortly after the robbery had been reported and spoke with some witnesses. He was also at the bank when defendant arrived there later in the afternoon after his arrest and when the teller and another employee who had observed defendant leaving after the robbery, identified defendant as the robber. Later still Lt. Kee went to the police station where defendant was being processed. Upon completion of the booking process Lt. Kee, in the presence of other law enforcement personnel, spoke with defendant. I credit Kee's testimony that he did read defendant his Miranda rights and that defendant then read the printed document to himself, signed it and acknowledged that he understood it. One of the officers explained to defendant that he did not have to talk to the group. Defendant said he understood but that he would talk. Defendant, somewhat of a veteran of the criminal justice system, is admittedly familiar with its processes and formalities. See United States v. Cruz Jimenez, 894 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding waiver valid when suspect had familiarity with the criminal justice system through prior arrests).
Defendant told the group that he had had a drug habit for some time, that sometimes he would spend $500-600 a day on drug purchases, but that on average it amounted to $200-300 per day. He further stated that he had used two bags, one of cocaine, one of heroin, that day. No one asked defendant what effect these drugs had on him or when he had taken them, but Kee testified that defendant appeared coherent and relaxed. Defendant also told the officers that he had been convicted before and had finally wrapped up his sentence of 15 to 20 years after having been paroled several times. He then admitted not only robbing the Citizens Bank in West Roxbury that day, but he volunteered having robbed a bank in Hyde Park and another in the Milton area and, twice, a Fleet Bank in Lynn. He did not know the name of the Milton bank, but offered to show the officers where it was. Lt. Kee was the person who had investigated the robberies at the Fleet Bank and he testified that the details of these robberies described by defendant during the interrogation jibed with his independent knowledge. These included specifics about the location of the bank and the fact that the teller during the first robbery included with the money a dye pack that exploded and that defendant discarded near the bank along with some or all of the money.
After defendant offered to show the officers the bank whose name he could not remember, one of the group, FBI agent Jeffrey Wood, rounded up two other agents to drive with him and defendant to identify the bank. Here it is necessary to digress briefly. When defendant left the Hyde Park bank immediately after the robbery, he went to the parking lot and drove away in what was later identified as a 2000 Dodge Neon which was apparently owned by one Sharon Jackson. Ms. Jackson and three children were in the car at the time. Defendant drove. After the robbery, all police units in Boston were given a description of the car, and it was eventually seen and chased by one of the units. When it was cornered, defendant jumped out and ran away. Boston Police took the car and Ms. Jackson to the nearest police station, questioned Ms. Jackson and, with her consent, searched the car. Various items of defendant's clothing and other accoutrement were found in the car. Ms. Jackson was not charged and was allowed to go home.
Back to defendant and Agent Wood. As the group was about to leave the police station to find the unnamed bank, defendant asked the agents whether the police had let Sharon go. When the agents assured him that she was free, he said that he would be straight with them, that he did in fact know the name of the bank and would tell all. The group thereupon returned to the Detectives' Room and the interview resumed. Defendant did, in fact, tell about the robbery in Milton and also another in Hyde Park. The particulars accorded with Agent Wood's knowledge gained during his investigations of these incidents. Wood also testified defendant was coherent, with it, and at times even joked with the agents.
Defendant having called into question the propriety of his confessional statements, the government has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he made his statements and waived his Miranda rights voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). For a confession to be involuntary within the meaning of the Due Process Clause, there must be coercive police conduct. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163-64, 167 (1986) (finding confession voluntary where no police coercion even though defendant suffered from psychosis impairing his ability to make free and rational choices). Because the defendant does not even claim that the police engaged in any such coercive conduct, his confession cannot be involuntary. In order for the government to prove that defendant acted knowingly and intelligently, it may use evidence of an explicit written waiver, as well as the conduct and actions of the defendant. See United States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d 349, 352 (1st Cir. 1981) (considering explicit written waiver and defendant's conduct as evidence that defendant acted knowingly and intelligently).
I find that defendant had taken probably two doses of heroin and cocaine on the day of the robbery, although it is more likely that he did so in the morning before the robbery than in the afternoon when he was trying to elude capture. I do not credit his testimony that while waiting for Ms. Jackson with the three children in the car he left to buy the drugs, returned, waited some more, and left again to take the drugs. Defendant's conduct and statements do not suggest a person disabled by drugs. The evidence of his detailed descriptions of earlier robberies with specific references to geographical particulars, problems with dye packs, dates and locations of the banks, permits the inference, which I draw, that defendant was not impaired by drugs or otherwise during these interviews. I find that he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his rights to remain silent and to have counsel.
The motion to suppress is denied.