Summary
finding that "as long as a police officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, any other reason the officer might have in his mind for the stop is irrelevant"
Summary of this case from U.S. v. FarmerOpinion
CR. NO. 03-172-N
February 5, 2004
Crowell Pate DeBardeleben, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant CALVIN LAVALLE COUCH
Debra Hollis, Debra Hollis Associates, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant CALVIN LAVALLE COUCH
Roianne Houlton Conner, Law Office of Roianne HoultonConner, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant JOSEPH ADAM SULLIVAN
Jeffery C. Duffey, Law Office of Jeffery C. Duffey, St.Montgomery, AL, for Defendant JASON AGLES
Kyla Groff Kelim, Alec Brown Associates, Alexander City, AL, for Defendant, DANIEL O'SULLIVAN
Maryanne Melko Prince, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant BRIAN SEXTON
ORDER
Defendant Calvin Lavalle Couch was charged in a 16-count indictment with one count of conspiring to distribute, and to possess with the intent to distribute, 50 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1); three counts of possessing with the intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of § 841(a)(1); four counts of distributing a controlled substance in violation of § 841(a)(1); one count of using or carrying a firearm, during and in relation to, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of, a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(1)(A); and one count of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1).
On February 2, 2004, at the outset of his trial, Couch made an oral motion to suppress evidence. After hearing the evidence and the arguments of counsel, the court denied Couch's motion. This order more fully explains the court's reasoning.
I. FACTUAL FINDINGS
On the date in question, Officer Todd Mims received information from an Officer Hurst that, according to an informant, there would be a Mazda 929 at a specified address in Elmore County, Alabama and that there would be methamphetamine in the Mazda. At the time he received this information, Officer Mims did not know the informant and knew nothing about the informant's reliability. Officer Mims met Officer Hurst near the specified residence to conduct surveillance, and they confirmed the presence of the Mazda at the residence. Officer Mims did not search the Mazda because he did not believe, at that time, that he had probable cause to do so.
Officer Mims ran a computer search on the Mazda's tag through the National Crime Information Center and uncovered that the car's tag had been switched from another vehicle. While the two officers watched, a number of people walked out of the residence and walked around the vehicles parked outside the residence. Officer Mims saw nothing suspicious while observing the residence, however, and he still did not feel like he had probable cause to search the Mazda based solely on his observation.
At some time during the officers' surveillance, Couch left the residence in the Mazda. Officer Mims followed the Mazda in an unmarked patrol car and pulled it over on the highway on the basis of the switched tags, for at that time Officer Mims believed he had probable cause for an actual on-the-road traffic violation. Mims asked Couch to get out of the car and asked him for his driver's license. Couch appeared nervous when he exited the Mazda, and he did not have his license.
Within three minutes of when Mims stopped Couch, a canine unit arrived at the scene of the traffic stop with a trained drug-detection dog. Officer Hurst, the other officer working with Officer Mims, had contacted the canine unit prior to the traffic stop with the intent that it would perform the stop. Officer Hurst contacted the canine unit because he and Officer Mims wanted a "marked" vehicle at the traffic stop. The drug-detection dog began smelling Couch's car while Officer Mims was speaking to Couch about his driver's license. At the same time the dog-detection dog was investigating Couch's car, Officer Mims asked Couch and the passenger in the Mazda where they were going. Couch and his passenger gave inconsistent answers.
The drug-detection dog alerted to the presence of drugs in Couch's car. At that point, Officer Mims searched Couch's car and uncovered methamphetamine under a cup holder between the front seats and in the ashtray. Officer Mims then arrested Couch and read him hisMiranda rights. Couch's car was subsequently taken to the office of the Central Alabama Drug Task Force, where a further search of car was conducted and more methamphetamine was found. After the additional drugs were found, Officer Mims went to the Elmore County jail to interview Couch further. There, Officer Mims read Couch hisMiranda rights again and had him complete a waiver form. Officer Mims then interviewed Couch by himself. At that time, Couch made a statement that was recorded.
II. DISCUSSION
Couch made an oral motion to suppress (1) the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia found in the white Mazda 929 and (2) the statements he made to Officer Mims. Couch raised three arguments with respect to the evidence found in the Mazda. First, Couch argued that the stop of the Mazda was unconstitutional because Officer Mims's intent in stopping the car was actually to search for drugs. Second, Couch, relying on United States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965 (11th Cir. 2003), argued that the officers unconstitutionally prolonged the traffic stop. Third, Couch challenged whether the use of the drug-detection dog at the traffic stop was justified.
Couch did not make entirely clear the nature of his objection to the admission of his statement to Officer Mims. In the interest of being thorough, the court considered both the possibility that the statements were the `fruit' of an illegal seizure or search of Couch's car and the possibility that the statements were not preceded by theMiranda warnings or were not voluntarily given. For the reasons below, Couch's motion was denied.
A. Basis of the Traffic Stop
First, Couch argued that the stop of his Mazda was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Officer Mims testified that he pulled Couch over because his car had switched tags. Couch's argument appeared to be that that Officer Mims's stated reason for stopping him was a mere pretext and that Officer Mims actually stopped him as a way to search for drugs. Under well-settled law, this argument is unavailing.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable search and seizure. U.S. Const. amend IV. A warrantless traffic stop is constitutionally reasonable when "the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred."Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996); see also United States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937, 940 (11th Cir. 1990)("a police officer may stop a vehicle when there is probable cause to believe that a driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations relating to the operation of motor vehicles") (internal quotations and alterations omitted). For example, police officers can constitutionally pull over a vehicle when they have probable cause to believe the car is speeding,see, e.g., Riley v. City of Montgomery, 104 F.3d 1247, 1252-53 (11th Cir. 1997), probable cause to believe the car ran a stop sign, see, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 172 F.3d 775, 778 (11th Cir. 1999), or probable cause to believe the vehicle had illegally altered tags or expired tags, see, e.g., United States v. Long, 320 F.3d 795, 798 (8th Cir. 2003). Further, as long as a police officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, any other reason the officer might have in his mind for the stop is irrelevant. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, 116 S.Ct. at 1774;Riley, 104 F.3d at 1252. In the Eleventh Circuit's words, "the constitutional `reasonableness' of a traffic stop is determined irrespective of `intent,' either of the individual officer involved or any theoretical `reasonable officer'. . . . The only question is whether the suspect's behavior gave rise to probable cause sufficient to justify the seizure." Id.
Officer Mims's stop of Couch's car meets the requirements of the Fourth Amendment as articulated in Whren. Officer Mims determined that Couch's car had tags registered to another vehicle. Under Alabama law, "it is unlawful for any person . . . to use upon any motor vehicle any tags, plates, or validation stamps in imitation of or substitution for authorized issued tags, plates, or validation stamps." 1975 Ala. Code § 40-12-265. Thus, Officer Mims had probable cause to pull Couch over based on his violation of § 40-12-265. Further, even if Officer Mims had in mind searching for drugs when he pulled Couch over, this is constitutionally irrelevant. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, 116 S.Ct. at 1774; Riley, 104 F.3d at 1252. Thus, Couch's motion to suppress is meritless on this theory.
B. Duration of the Stop
Couch also challenged the search of his car on the ground that Officer Mims's stop extended beyond what was reasonable for a traffic stop. The stop at issue in this case was constitutionally permissible.
A traffic stop is a `seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396 (1979); United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001). Because traffic stops are limited seizures, they are analyzed under the rules of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968). United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1573 (1985); Purcell, 236 F.3d at 1277. "UnderTerry, an officer's actions during a traffic stop must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. Furthermore, theduration of the traffic stop must be limited to the time necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. The traffic stop must not last any longer than necessary to process the traffic violation unless there is articulable suspicion of other illegal activity." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Couch challenges the duration of the stop that led to his arrest.
It is first necessary to determine the relevant portion of the total time that Couch was detained to which the above rules apply. The traffic stop began, of course, when Officer Mims pulled Couch over, so the question is at what point the stop ceased being a traffic stop. When the drug-detection dog alerted to the presence of drugs in Couch's car, Officer Mims had probable cause to search the car, United States v. Glinton, 154 F.3d 1245, 1257 (11th Cir. 1998); Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547, 1551 n. 7 (11th Cir. 1995) ("an alert by a narcotics trained dog establishes probable cause to believe a car contains illegal narcotics"), and thus reasonable suspicion to detain Couch further. Therefore, the stop ceased being a traffic stop at the point in time when the drug dog alerted to the drugs, and the relevant time period for determining reasonableness is the time between when Officer Mims first stopped Couch and when the dog alerted. See Purcell, 236 F.3d at 1279 (relevant time period for determining whether duration was reasonable was time between when the officer stopped the car and when the driver gave consent to search the car). After Officer Mims pulled Couch over, the canine unit arrived within three minutes. Officer Mims did not testify to exactly how long it was after the canine unit arrived that the drug dog alerted to the presence of drugs, but the evidence taken as a whole shows that the dog alerted shortly after it arrived at the scene. Therefore, the court finds that the portion of the total stop to be treated as a traffic stop lasted no longer than five to seven minutes.
Officer Mims's five-to-seven-minute traffic stop was reasonable in duration. The Eleventh Circuit has upheld traffic stops lasting much longer than five-to-seven minutes. See, e.g.,Purcell, 236 F.3d at 1279 (14-minute traffic stop is reasonable); United States v. Hardy, 855 F.2d 753, 761 (11th Cir. 1988) (50-minute traffic stop is reasonable). Thus, based on this authority alone, Officer Mims's traffic stop of Couch was not unconstitutionally long. Further, the present case is analogous toUnited States v. Holloman, 113 F.3d 192 (11th Cir. 1997), in which the Eleventh Circuit upheld an automobile search preceded by a traffic stop and dog-sniff. Holloman was stopped for a minor traffic violation by the St. Petersburg, Florida Police Department, and, while the officers spoke to Holloman, a drug-detection dog alerted to the presence of drugs in Holloman's car. 113 F.3d at 196. The drug-detection dog began sniffing Holloman's car while the officers were talking to him about the traffic stop. Id. The stop was of a reasonable duration, the Eleventh Circuit held, because Holloman was not delayed beyond the time necessary to process the traffic violation. The same is true in this case: Officer Mims was still talking to Couch about his driver's license when the drug dog alerted, and therefore the stop was not extended beyond the time necessary to process the traffic violation. Purcell, 236 F.3d at 1277.
C. Basis of the Search of the Mazda
Third, Couch argued that the search of his car was unconstitutional because the officers had no justification for calling in the canine unit. Again, this argument is foreclosed by well-established law.
It is true that before law enforcement officers may search an automobile without a warrant, they must have probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2172 (1982); United States v. Watts, 329 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003). However, the use of a drug-detection dog to smell the exterior of a car is not a `search' for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2645 (1983);Glinton, 154 F.3d at 1257; Holloman, 113 F.3d at 194. Accordingly, the police are not required to have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to use drug-detecting dogs.Merrett, 58 F.3d at 1553; United States v. Williams, 784 F. Supp.2d 1553, 1559-60 (M.D. Fla. 1991). Thus, Officer Mims was not required to have any amount of suspicion before calling in the drug-detecting canine unit.
The Holloman case is again analogous. As noted above, Holloman was pulled over in his truck by the St. Petersburg, Florida Police Department for a minor traffic offense, and, after he refused to consent to a search of his truck, the police used a narcotics detection dog on his truck. 113 F.3d at 193. The dog `alerted' to the presence of narcotics, and the police subsequently searched Holloman's truck and found nearly 700 grams of crack cocaine. Id. In denying Holloman's motion to suppress the crack, the court wrote that "the canine sniff that provided probable cause to search [the defendant's] pickup truck . . . does not qualify as a search for Fourth Amendment purposes."Id. at 194. The same is true here.
D. Couch's Statements
Finally, Couch challenged the admissibility of the statements he made to Officer Mims after his arrest. As stated above, Couch's argument was not crystal clear. However, the court treated his argument as being two-fold: that his statement was the fruit of an unlawful search and that his statement was either not preceded by the Miranda warnings or not made voluntarily.
With respect to the first theory that Couch may be advancing, it is true that a statement can be suppressed — under the `fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine — if it came about as a result of an illegal search. See, e.g., United States v. Patzer, 277 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002) (suppressing voluntary statement made by motorist after illegal arrest). However, for the reasons given above, the court held that the traffic stop and subsequent search of Couch's car were legal. Therefore, his statement cannot be suppressed as the `fruit' of an illegal search.See, e.g., United States v. Herrera, 711 F.2d 1546, 1556 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Having determined that the seizure and search . . . was permissible under the fourth amendment, it follows that the district court's suppression of various statements the appellee made prior to and during the search cannot be supported on the ground that the statements were the fruits of an illegal search."); United States v. Williams, 267 F. Supp.2d 1130, 1137 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (Thompson, J.) ("statements that Williams made to officer Herman in her first interview should not be suppressed because they did not derive from any unlawful seizure").
Couch's second possible theory is meritless as well. The government may not introduce statements stemming from a custodial interrogation unless it can show that the suspect was given the familiar Miranda warnings, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966); United States v. Jones, 32 F.3d 1512, 1516 (11th Cir. 1994), and that the suspect made his statement voluntarily,United States v. Connelly, 379 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S.Ct. 515, 522 (1986); United States v. Grimes, 143 F.3d 1342, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998). The determination of whether a statement is voluntary depends on whether, under all of the surrounding circumstances, the statement was the product of the accused's free and rational choice. Jones, 32 F.3d at 1516. The evidence shows that Officer Mims read Couch hisMiranda rights twice, once on the side of the road immediately after arresting him and once at the Elmore County jail before questioning him. The evidence also shows that, prior to being questioned by Officer Mims at the Elmore County jail, Couch initialed a form indicating that he understood each of his Miranda rights. This is sufficient to satisfy both the Miranda requirement and the voluntariness requirement. See Jones, 32 F.3d at 1517 (suspect's confession was voluntary when suspect was advised of his Miranda rights twice and signed waiver form prior to interrogation).
III. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, it is ORDERED that defendant Calvin Lavalle Couch's motion to suppress, made in open court on February 2, 2004, is denied.