Opinion
2:00-0083.
September 18, 2001
MIKE BOTHWELL, Counsel for Plaintiff-Relator, Sean Bledsoe.
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff-Relator, Sean Bledsoe ("Relator"), filed this action originally in the Northern District of Georgia under the False Claims Act ("FCA"), 31 U.S.C. § 3129 through 3133 against the defendants: Community Health Systems, Inc. ("CHSI"), Forstman Little Co. ("FLC"), CHSI's parent; Theodore Forstman, FLC's chief executive officer; Thomas H. Lister, FLC's general partner; E. Thomas Caney, former president and chief executive officer of CHSI; Ernest Bacon, president and chief executive officer of CHSI; Barney Stumark, chief financial officer of CHSI; and the Cookeville Regional Medical Center ("CRMC"), a not-for profit corporation.
The original complaint also referred to John Doe defendants. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize as parties fictitious defendants merely identified as John Does.See Wiltsie v. California Dept. of Correction, 406 F.2d 515, 518 (9th Cir. 1968). Thus, the Court does not deem the fictitious John Doe defendants as parties in this lawsuit.
Relator's claims arise out of the defendants' alleged scheme to defraud the Medicare and Medicaid programs established by federal law and financed by the United States. The United States, however, the declined to intervene in this action to. The Northern District of Georgia gave Relator leave to file an amended complaint (Docket Entry No. 32). The amended complaint added as new defendants Sparta Hospital Corporation ("SHC"), doing business as White County Community Hospital, and Cornerstone Health Management Company, Inc. ("CHMCI"), that managed the psychiatric unit at White County Hospital for a period of time (Docket Entry No. 32). Relator dismissed the individual defendants, CRMC, and FLC (Docket Entry No. 34), and later nonsuited his claims against CHMCI (Docket Entry No. 41).
CHSI moved to transfer the action to this Court and to stay the proceedings (Docket Entry Nos. 37 and 39). The Northern District of Georgia granted the motion to transfer (Docket Entry No. 44). The Magistrate Judge of this Court stayed most discovery pending disposition of the motion to dismiss (Docket Entry No. 70) with a principal exception for discovery related to Relator's motion to recognize the settlement agreement.
Before the Court is the Defendants CHSI's and SHC's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docket Entry No. 66) upon the grounds: (1) that Relator's amended complaint relies on prior publicly disclosed litigation brought by another party, and is barred under the public disclosure provisions of the FCA, 31 U.S.C. § 3130(e)(4)(A) and (e)(2); (2) that the Relator's allegations of Medicare fraud are conclusory, and fail to satisfy the requirement of pleading fraud with particularity under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 9(b); (3) that there are not any factual allegations against CHSI to state a claim; and (4) that CHSI cannot be held liable for any acts of its subsidiary.
The Relator responds, in essence, that sufficient facts are alleged to state a FCA claim and to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). Relator asserts that CHSI can be held liable and that the Relator should be allowed to conduct discovery on his claims. Finally, Relator contends that the cited state court action did not disclose the fraud in this action and the alleged fraudulent acts were known to Relator prior to the filing of the state court action (Docket Entry No. 71). Both CHSI and the United States oppose this motion, citing the lack of a cognizable FCA claim and the settlement agreement's express exclusion of the Relator's claims from its terms.
Also before the Court is Relator's motion to recognize the settlement agreement between the United States and Defendant CHSI so as to entitle him to participate in that recovery (Docket Entry No. 79).
Of the pending motions, the Court addresses first the motion for judgment on the pleadings that impacts the Court's consideration of Relator's motion.
A. ANALYSIS OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
In his original complaint, Relator asserted claims the Defendants, including CHSI, relating to alleged False Claims Act violations at the Cookville Regional Medical Center in Cookville, Tennessee. There were not any specific allegations against FLC, or CHSI. Relator also alleged fraud against a number of individual officers at CHSI and FLC. Yet, there was not any specific allegation that any of these individuals had participated in the alleged unlawful charging of individual patients or for tests at the Cookeville Medical Center. There, likewise, were not any allegations about the White County Hospital, nor its psychiatric unit. The fraud allegations in the original complaint concerned the Cookeville Medical Center and were as follows:
An amended complaint supersedes all prior complaints.Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736, 740-41 (5th Cir. 1986). Relator's First Amended Complaint by its own terms "substitute[d] said amended complaint in its entirety for the complaint originally filed herein." The filing of an amended or superseding complaint renders moot all pending motions to dismiss an earlier pleading. Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 410, 411 (6th Cir. 1998). In this ruling, the Court will evaluate the amended complaint, and any references to the original complaint are only to provide the appropriate context.
1. Cookville Regional Medical Center was "unbundling services and billing Medicare and Medicaid";
2. "CHSI and related defendants [had] engaged in a scheme of defrauding the United States Government by miscoding and upcoding items billed to Medicare and Medicaid"; and
3. "defendants [had] engaged in other improper and illegal acts causing false claims to be filed with Medicare and Medicaid."
(Docket Entry No. 1, Complaint at ¶¶ 22-24).
The amended complaint contains allegations naming a single hospital owned or affiliated with CHSI, namely, White County Hospital. In sum, the alleged FCA violations involve the psychiatric unit at White County Hospital and include a "scheme to defraud whereby patients who did not meet Medicare or Medicaid eligibility were admitted to the psychiatric unit and fraudulently billed to Medicare or Medicaid" (Docket Entry No. 32, Amended Complaint at ¶ 20). Relator also alleged that "Defendants . . . encourag[ed] physicians to maximize the average length of stay [in the psychiatric unit], whether medically necessary or not, in order to maximize reimbursement." Id. at ¶ 21. Relator contends that "Defendants terminated Dr. Robert Adams as director of the psychiatric unit because he declined to increase the average length of stay of patients unnecessarily."Id. at ¶ 23.
Relator's particular allegations that the White County Hospital improperly increased its Medicare billings from its psychiatric unit read as follows:
17. Defendant White County Community Hospital, as well as other subsidiaries of CHSI, operate its psychiatric unit within the White County Community Hospital. Under the Medicare regulations, certain psychiatric services continue to be billed to and paid by the Medicare based on the ordinary and necessary, reasonable expenses incurred by the hospital provider.
18. Although the psychiatric unit of the White County Community Hospital is paid for services of a cost basis, or other portions of the hospital cannot and are typically paid through program known as diagnostically related groups.
19. As a result, there is an incentive for Medicare provider to charge hospital expenses to psychiatric unit in order to obtain additional reimbursement. White County Community Hospital, acting in concert with other defendants and co-conspirators, routinely and deliberately classified certain employees as employees of the psychiatric unit in order to obtain reimbursement for their salaries and benefits, when they knew such employees were principally or exclusively assigned to other parts of hospital which were not a cost based reimbursement.
20. Further, White County Community Hospital, acting in concert with other defendants and employees, engaged in a scheme to defraud whereby patients who did not meet Medicare or Medicaid qualifications were admitted to the psychiatric unit and fraudulently billed to Medicare or Medicaid. Physicians were encouraged to make such patients in a manner to make them appeared eligible for Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement, and thereafter were encouraged not to discharge patients until such eligibility had expired or was close to expiring.
21. Defendants closely monitored the average length of stay of such patients, encouraging physicians to maximize the average length of stay, whether medically necessary or not, in order to maximize reimbursement for defendants. In and some cases physicians were told that they weren't keeping patients long enough into the geropsychiatric unit, and in at least one case and decision was right palliative against for refusing to keep such patients.
22. In other instances, patients who did not qualify for Medicare reimbursement is part of the geropsychiatric unit, were admitted with a description such as "onset of behavioral change," which enabled them to be admitted temporarily to the psychiatric unit. Some of these patients were recycled repeatedly through the psychiatric unit in violation of Medicare and Medicaid regulations.
23. Defendants terminated Dr. Robert Adams as director of the psychiatric unit because he declined to increase the average length of stay of patients unnecessarily, even after defendants pressure Dr. Adams to increase the average length of stay of his patients.
24. Dr. Adams was replaced as director of the psychiatric unit by nonresident physicians on a visa, over whom the hospital have leverage because other non-resident status, in order to facilitate the scheme alleged herein.Id. at ¶¶ 17-24.
In a separate claim entitled for FRAUDULENT USES OF PROVIDERS NUMBERS, the Relator's amended complaint alleges:
25. Sometimes after 1997, defendants changed emergency room management companies. Initially, the new management company had no provider number, which is necessary for purposes of billing Medicare and Medicaid. As a result, every professional fee charged by it was billed under the number of another physician who had a provider number, even though such physician had not in fact provided the professional services.
26. Employees of White County Hospital to brought this practice to the attention of White County Hospital, which declined to change or correct it.
27. Certain of White County Hospital's rooms were equipped for centralized touring of up a patients vital signs by telemetry. Monitoring by telemetry is to be done by a qualified technician on a constant basis at a central station.
28. In fact, although White County Hospital billed Medicare and Medicaid for continuous monitoring, there was not anyone actually monitoring the equipment unless someone happened to be in the intensive care unit, and monitoring was then performed by an ICU nurse. Otherwise, monitoring was left to occasional review by nurses at a nursing station, or in the ICU, when they were available. Such monitoring fails to meet applicable criteria or to qualify as continuous monitoring. Nevertheless, White County hospital falsely represented to Medicare and Medicaid that continuous monitoring was being performed and claimed payment for such monitoring.Id. at ¶¶ 25-28.
In the final group of alleged fraudulent practices, Relator makes the following allegations:
29. In addition to the foregoing, defendants engaged in other acts or practices to defraud the United States, including but not limited to paying providers bonuses based on admissions, misrepresenting whether certain physicians recruited for an underserved area were full-time employees of the hospital in order to obtain federal funds, when such physicians had in fact been leased out by the hospital to other healthcare providers, unbundling of services, such as charging both the set up fee and daily rate when the two overlapped, or charging for individual components of a kit at the same time as an entire kit was billed for, and similar practices in knowing and willful violation of Medicare and Medicaid rules and regulations.
30. Sometime in August of 1997, a consulting firm reviewed in audited the hospital's billing practices. The audit revealed numbers billing irregularities, only some of which were changed by the hospital.
31. The foregoing acts and practices were part of a willful scheme to defraud the United States by presenting false and fraudulent claims for payment under the Medicare and Medicaid programs.Id. at ¶¶ 29-31.
B. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Upon the filing of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the District Court is required to consider whether the well-plead facts in the pleadings demonstrate that the moving party is entitled to the relief sought. Republic Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Engineering Corp., 785 F.2d 174, 177 n. 2 (6th Cir. 1986). "For the purpose of [a party's] 12(c) motion, the District Court [is] required to accept as true all facts alleged in [the plaintiff's complaint]. . . . The District Court [is required] to draw all reasonable inferences from the pleadings in the nonmoving party's favor, though the Court [is] not bound by the legal characterizations [that the nonmoving party] had given to those facts." Id.
Motions for judgment on the pleadings can be granted where the facts and law so warrant. See, e.g., Republic Steel Corp., 785 F.2d at 178 n. 2; 2 Moore's Federal Practice § 12.38 (2000). As to the consideration of materials outside the pleadings is given aside from the complaint and several exhibits that were attached to it, the motion for judgment on the pleadings can be converted to a motion for summary judgment. Falls Riverway Realty v. City of Niagara Falls, 754 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1985). However, where documents are attached to pleadings, such documents become part of the pleading. Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c).
Claims under the FCA must satisfy the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). United States ex rel. Branhan v. Mercy Health Sys., 188 F.3d 510, at **2 (6th Cir. 1999); United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 1997); Gold v. Morrison-Knudson Co., 68 F.3d 1475, 1476 (2d Cir. 1995); United States ex rel. Cooper v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 19 F.3d 562, 568 (117th Cir. 1994); United States ex rel. Roby v. Boeing Co., 184 F.R.D. 107, 109 (S.D. Ohio 1998).
Where fraud is alleged, Rule 9(b) requires that "in all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity." Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). The Sixth Circuit has ruled that the provisions of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 and the requirement of Rule 9(b) are to be read in conjunction with each other. Michaels Bldg. Co. v. Ameritrust Co., N.A., 848 F.2d 674, 679 (6th Cir. 1988). In Blount Fin. Serv. v. Walter E. Heller Co., 819 F.2d 151, 153 (6th Cir. 1987), the court explained that "Rule 9(b) requiring 'averments of fraud . . . with particularity' is designed to allow the District Court to distinguish valid from invalid claims in just such cases as this one and to terminate needless litigation early in the proceedings." Rule 9(b) is also intended "to provide a defendant fair notice of the substance of a plaintiff's claim in order that the defendant may prepare a responsive pleading." American Town Ctr. v. Hall 83 Assoc., 912 F.2d at 104, 109 (6th Cir. 1990).
Under Ameritrust, the Relator can satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b) by pleading the circumstances of the fraud, not the evidence. 848 F.2d at 690 n. 9. Since Ameritrust, however, the Court of Appeals reiterated that the rule of this Circuit is that Rule "9(b) requires that fraud be pleaded with particularity. To satisfy [Rule] 9(b), a plaintiff must at a minimum allege the time, place and contents of the misrepresentations upon which [the plaintiff] relied." American Town Ctr., 912 F.2d at 109 (quoting Bender v. Southland Corp., 749 F.2d 1205, 1216 (6th Cir. 1948)) (emphasis added). Accord Coffey v. Foamex L.P., 2 F.3d 157, 161-62 (6th Cir. 1993) (A plaintiff relator must "at a minimum . . . allege time, place and content of the alleged misrepresentation . . . the fraudulent scheme; the fraudulent intent of the Defendants; and the injury resulting from the fraud."). "[G]eneralized and conclusory allegations that the Defendants' conduct was fraudulent do not satisfy Rule 9(b)."Craighead v. E.F. Hutton Co., Inc., 899 F.2d 485, 489 (6th Cir. 1990).
In addition, where the fraud claims involve multiple defendants, the alleged fraudulent conduct of each defendant must be set forth separately or otherwise the complaint is legally deficient under Rule 9(b).
The defendants now before the Court comprise a varied group of accounting firms and their employees; law firms and their employees; and bank employees. Yet the complaint makes no attempt to distinguish among them. This is inadequate; each individual defendant must be appraised separately of the specific acts of which he is accused, especially in a case involving multiple defendants. Brew v. Philips, Apel Walden, Inc., CCH Fed.Sec.L.Rep. # 97,697 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Golberg v. Meridor, 81 F.R.D. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 'The complaint, therefore, may not rely upon blanket references to acts or omissions by all of the 'defendants,' for each defendant named in the complaint is entitled to be apprised of the circumstances surrounding the fraudulent conduct with which he individually stands charged.' McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631, 639 (N.D. Cal. 1980), quoting Jacobson v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell Co., 445 F. Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).Benoav v. Decker, 517 F. Supp. 490, 493 (E.D. Mich. 1981),aff'd 735 F.2d 1363 (6th Cir. 1984).
In Relator's amended complaint, there is only one specific allegation about CHSI's subsidiary co-defendant Cornerstone that managed the White County Hospital (Docket Entry No. 32 at ¶ 3). Thereafter, there are only combined references to the defendants. The Court concludes that this type of generic pleading does not comply with Rule 9(b), and for that reason, claims against all defendants are dismissed.
Although the Relator asserts his first hand knowledge of these alleged illegal acts, his amended complaint cannot name any of the physicians who performed services at issue, or any of the physicians whose provider numbers were allegedly misused.See Branhan, 188 F.3d 510, at **2 (requiring that a person alleging fraud must identify the individuals who participated in the fraudulent scheme); Thompson, 125 F.3d at 903 (relator "failed to meet the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) because he did not identify any specific physicians who referred patients for medically unnecessary services or any specific claims for medically unnecessary services.").
The wholesale abandonment of claims and parties named in the original complaint, in the Court's view, casts doubt upon these assertions.
Relator's claim of "Fraudulent Billing For Continuous Monitoring Services" is defective because there is not a time period stated for the alleged unlawful acts. Without knowing these critical pieces of information, the defendants would be unable to respond to these allegations.
None of the allegations under "Other Fraudulent Practices," except for Dr. Adams', identifies any employees, or physicians, or other individuals involved. The amended complaint does not reference any specific time period or for these claims. Relator fails to cite to applicable laws or regulations that were allegedly violated. Even the original complaint alleges only that defendants "engaged in a scheme of defrauding the United States Government by miscoding and upcoding items billed to Medicare and Medicaid." While the amended complaint has a description about the Medicare program, the critical allegations of fraud are at best conclusory.
As to Dr. Adams' allegation, comparing the original complaint with the amended complaint, and the timing of the allegations in the state action filed by Dr. Adams about his termination, the Court concludes that the allegation about Dr. Adams is based upon prior public information that cannot be used to support this FCA claim. See United States ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 941-42 (6th Cir. 1997).
A person is not entitled to proceed under the False Claims Act without a valid "action" under Section 3729(a) of the FCA In a word, the action must meet the criteria of the Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Satisfaction of this pleading standard is a prerequisite to relator's proceeding with a FCA action. Branhan, 188 F.3d at 510, at **2; Hoover v. Langston, 958 F.2d 742, 745 (6th Cir. 1992) (district court properly dismissed qui tam action, even if it was not jurisdictionally barred, for failure to comply with Rule 9(b)); United States ex rel. Detrick v. Daniel F. Young, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 1010, 1019 (E.D. Va. 1995) ("a person can achieve relator status [only if] the fraud allegations in his complaint pass muster under Rules 9 and 11").
In Detrick, the court cited the dangers of lowering Rule 9(b)'s standard: "[Under a low] standard, a complainant might well win relator status merely by communicating to the government, 'I think something fishy is going on with Government Contract A, and Contractor B," and then relying on the evidence of fraud if any, disclosed by a subsequent government investigation." 909 F. Supp. at 1021-22.
For the reasons stated in its Rule 9(b) analysis, the Court concludes that the amended complaint fails to state a valid FCA claim.
The Relator argues that he should be granted the opportunity to pursue discovery. There is no right to discovery upon filing of the complaint. Morgan v. Lexington Fayette Urban County Div. of Police, 28 F.3d 1214, 1994 WL 319066 (6th Cir. 1994) (unpublished) ("Because Morgan failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, discovery was not necessary in the case. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989); Rutman Wine Co. v. E. J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987)."). This basic principle has been extended to relator claims in FCA actions. United States ex rel. Russell v. Epic Healthcare Mgmt. Group, 193 F.3d 304, 309 (5th Cir. 1979) (a conclusory allegation of fraud is not a "ticket to the discovery process that the [FCA] does not contemplate"). Given the Relator's alleged first hand knowledge of these events and the pendency of this action for more than two years, Relator has had ample opportunity to cure the cited factual deficiencies in his pleadings.
Finally, the Relator's allegations against CHSI are insufficient to impose liability upon CHSI for the alleged acts of SHC, its alleged affiliate. Wilton v. Ashland Castings Corp., 188 F.3d 670, 673-74 (6th Cir. 1999).
As to the Relator's motion to recognize the settlement agreement, under the FCA, there are two circumstances in which a relator can obtain a share of a federal recovery. As a prerequisite, a relator must file a valid "action" that properly states a cause of action under § 3729. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b). If the United States intervenes in that action, a relator may be entitled to between 15 and 25 percent "of the proceeds of theaction or settlement of the claim." 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (emphasis added). "If the Government does not proceed with an action," a relator may be entitled to 25 to 30 percent "of theproceeds of the action." 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (d)(1) (emphasis added). In either case, any payment to relator "shall be paid out of such proceeds" from the litigation or settlement of the claim that the relator properly brings in his complaint. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (d)(1) and (2).
Subsection 3730(c)(5) of the FCA provides that if the Government elects to pursue "any alternate remedy" for the relator's fraud claim, the relator "shall have the same rights in such proceeding as [the relator] would have had if the action had continued under this section." 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5). Under this provision, the Government may elect to pursue the claim asserted by the relator on its behalf either through continuation of the judicial action or through an administrative proceeding. See S. Report No. 99-345 at 27 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5292 (the provision that became subsection (c)(5) "clarifies that the Government,once it intervenes and takes over a false claim suit brought by a private individual, may elect to pursue any alternate remedy for recovery of the false claim which might be available under the administrative process") (emphasis supplied). The Senate Report further states: "The Committee intends that if civil monetary penalty proceedings are available, the Government may elect to pursue the claim either judicially or through an administrative civil penalty proceeding." Id. "In the event that the Government chooses to proceed administratively, the qui tam relator retains all the same rights" he would have had in the judicial action. Id.
Moreover, Paragraph 10 of the settlement agreement and the release of the United States contain an express exclusion of any claims in this action:
10. Notwithstanding any term of this Agreement, specifically reserved and excluded from the terms of this Agreement as to any entity or person (including the Released Parties) are any and all of the following:
* * * *
i) Claims asserted in. . . . United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Community Health Systems, Inc. Civil Action No. I:98-cv-0435-MRS (N.D. Ga.) . . .
(Docket Entry No. 79, Settlement Agreement at p. 12).
Thus, the Court concludes that, because the Government has neither intervened nor released the Relator's claims through an administrative settlement in any administrative venue, the Relator is not entitled to a share in a separate settlement by the United States. See United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Delaware, 123 F.3d 734 (3rd Cir. 1997).
In Dunleavy, the Government declined to intervene in the relator's qui tam suit, but subsequently pursued its own audit of the grant in question and eventually reached a settlement with the county. The District Court dismissed the relator's suit for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4). On appeal, the Third Circuit considered whether the Government's audit and settlement with the county mooted the relator's FCA suit. The Third Circuit declined to decide whether the Government audit "even amounted to the type of alternate proceeding contemplated in § 3730(c)(5)." Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 739 n. 8. Instead, the Third Circuit held that the Government's decisionnot to intervene in the relator's suit meant only that the Government's settlement did not extinguish the relator's FCA claim. Id. at 739.
In sum, the Court concludes that the Relator has neither satisfied the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b), nor the requirements of the FCA to state a valid "action" under 31 U.S.C. § 3729. The release of the United States in the Settlement Agreement would not prevent Relator from prosecuting his suit and recovering against defendants, provided Relator states a cognizable and valid FCA claim.
Accordingly, defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings should be GRANTED.
An appropriate order is filed herewith.
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
COMES NOW, Plaintiff-Relator, Sean Bledsoe and, pursuant to Local Rule 8(b)(1), MDTn and at the suggestion of the Court in the status conference dated November 6, 2000, hereby respectfully requests that the Court schedule Plaintiff-Relator's Motion to Recognize Settlement and Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for oral argument before the Court. The issues presented in this case and these motions contain substantial matters of law, are to be reviewed de novo, and oral argument would aid in the understanding and adjudication of the issues presented. Therefore, oral argument is appropriate.MOTION TO STAY
COMES NOW, Plaintiff-Relator Sean Bledsoe and, pursuant to the inherent authority of the Court, respectfully moves the Court to stay the decision in this case on Defendants' Motions pending this Court's decision on the Motion to Recognize Settlement.In support thereof, Relator shows the Court the following:
1.
The Court has inherent power to grant Motions to Stay and otherwise mange its docket.
2.
The Court and all the parties hereto appear to agree that if the matter has been settled, the Court need not waste its time and resources determining collateral matters such as those contained in Defendants' Motions. In fact, Defendants have stated in judicio that the Motion to Recognize Settlement should take priority over their Motions.