Opinion
05 Cr. 231 (RCC).
June 23, 2005
MEMORANDUM ORDER
A jury found Defendant John Cilia guilty of a one-count charge of extortion on June 2, 2005. Defendant now moves for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c). For the reasons explained below, Defendant's motion is denied.
I. Standard
In reviewing Defendant's motion, the Court considers "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). "In this regard, the defendant who is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 'bears a heavy burden.'" United States v. Espaillet, 380 F.2d 713, 718 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Si Lu Tian, 339 F.3d 143, 150 (2d Cir. 2003)). The Court will "enter a judgment of acquittal only if the evidence that the defendant committed the crime alleged is nonexistent or so meager that no reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."United States v. Guadagna, 183 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the Court will "review all of the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the government, crediting every inference that the jury might have drawn in favor of the government."United States v. Walker, 191 F.3d 326, 333 (2d Cir. 1999).
II. Discussion
Defendant raises six grounds for acquittal. The Court considers each in turn:
First, Defendant asserts that the tape recordings of the victim were used by the Government for their truth, thus violating the Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser. This argument is unavailing. As the Court found at the end of closing arguments, the victim's statements were not used by the Government for their truth. Rather, they were used to provide context. See Tr. at 752. Further, the Court instructed the jury when the tapes were placed into evidence and during its charge, that the victim's statements were only to be considered for the purpose of providing context for the Defendant's statements.See Tr. at 761.
Second, Defendant claims that the victim was a government agent who entrapped the Defendant and that the jury should have been given an entrapment defense instruction. The Court disagrees. As the Court explained several times during the course of the trial, the evidence did not support a charge on entrapment. See, e.g., Tr. at 598; see also United States v. Mayo, 705 F.2d 62, 68 (2d Cir. 1983). Here, the Government rebutted any suggestion of entrapment with uncontested evidence that Defendant was predisposed to violence and threats of violence. United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 585 (2d. Cir. 1995) ("If the government . . . presents uncontradicted proof of predisposition, the entrapment defense is precluded as a matter of law."). Additionally, Defendant's threats of violence in this case pre-dated the Government's investigation of his conduct, thus foreclosing the entrapment defense. See Tr. at 598; see also United States v. Williams, 23 F.3d 629, 635 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding entrapment defense "foreclosed" where defendant's criminal conduct began prior to the government's involvement).
Third, Defendant argues that the evidence established only one threat, i.e., Defendant's lawful threat to report the victim's conduct to his probation officer. The jury heard evidence of Defendant threatening to put a price on the victim's head and have him placed in a pine box. This is sufficient evidence from which a rational juror could have found that Defendant's threats included threats of violence.
Fourth, Defendant contends that he did not pressure the victim to commit crimes to repay the debt and the Court should not have included an instruction regarding such pressure. The Court overruled this objection when Defendant raised it at the charge conference. See Tr. at 610-11. Defendant has not offered any new support for his argument now. There was sufficient evidence of the Defendant urging the victim to undertake fraudulent credit card schemes and drug deals from which a rational juror could find Defendant pressured the victim.
Fifth, Defendant argues the Court erred in not providing the jury with a special verdict to distinguish between Defendant's threats of violence and his pressure on the victim to commit crimes to repay the loan. Again, the Court overruled this objection when the Defendant raised it during the charge conference and Defendant has not offered any new support here.See Tr. at 608-09. The Court's decision to not use a special verdict form does not support Defendant's motion for acquittal.
Finally, Defendant argues the Court erred in not giving an instruction on attempted extortion. Defendant was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 894, which prohibits the use of extortionate means to collect or attempt to collect credit. Accordingly, the Court instructed the jury on the law of attempt and made clear that Defendant did not have to actually collect money to be found guilty. See Tr. at 768-69. Because the Court did give the jury an instruction on attempt, Defendant's final argument does not justify an acquittal.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons outlined above, Defendant has not met his burden to succeed in his Rule 29(c) application. The motion is denied.