Opinion
P-00-CR-315(14)-F
February 7, 2001
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SEVERANCE
Before this Court is Defendant's Motion for Severance. After careful consideration of the facts and the law, the Court is of the opinion that the Defendant's Motion should be DENIED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
By superceding indictment filed on December 12, 2000, the Defendant Jose Sergio Ayala-Meraz, along with some sixteen other defendants, is charged with conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute marihuana in an amount greater than 1,000 kilograms, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846. Count One identifies the several overt acts committed by several defendants to effect the objects and purposes of the conspiracy. In the part relevant to the Defendant, the conspiracy involved the smuggling of manhuana from the Republic of Mexico to the United States and the transportation and distribution of the marihuana within the United States. Paragraph `19' alleges that the conspiracy utilized "scout," "lead," or "decoy" vehicle formations to smuggle and transport the marihuana and to avoid detection by law enforcement. Under Paragraph `16' of Count One, Defendant is described as having served as a guide for the marihuana laden vehicles utilized in the alleged smuggling and transportation conspiracy. Specifically, Paragraph `v' alleges that on or about October 4, 1999, the Defendant Ayala-Meraz and another defendant transported marihuana using a vehicle purchased by co-defendant Robert Sanchez Galindo. Count Two charges several defendants, including Defendant Ayala-Meraz, with knowingly conspiring to import marihuana, in an amount greater than 1,000 kilograms, from Mexico into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a), 960, 963. Several other defendants including Defendant Ayala-Meraz are also charged with knowingly possessing with the intent to distribute, aided and abetted by each other, marihuana in an amounts greater than 100 kilograms but less than 1,000 kilograms, on occasion October 4, 1999, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. This violation is charged in Counts Nine of the Superceding Indictment. The counts relating to Defendant Ayala-Meraz, that is, Counts One, Two, and Nine, stem from a single transaction or event that alleged occurred on October 4, 1999.
Defendant moves for a severance and separate trial from the other named defendants based on the prejudice that the joinder of the other defendants inflicts on Defendant, whose role in the conspiracy is limited to the October 4, 1999 transaction. Specifically, Defendant asserts that he will be prejudiced by the spillover effect from evidence relating to the other co-defendants. This harm is heightened, the Defendant argues, by several factors. First, the Defendant's role in the conspiracy is minor compared to the main defendants. Second, the evidence against the main defendants includes evidence of firearms possession and possession of child pornography. This evidence is both inflammatory and highly prejudicial. The harm to Defendant Ayala-Meraz warrants severance, as the Defendant argues, because this evidence, though admissible against the main co-defendants, is unrelated to the conspiracy for which the Defendant is charged. The Court finds these arguments unpersuasive.
DISCUSSION
FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 affords the district court the authority to sever properly joined defendants. It has been long recognized that persons properly indicted together should be tried together and that severance should be granted only in limited circumstances. United States v. Rocha, 916 F.2d 219, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1990). These rules especially apply to cases involving conspiracy. United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 862 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. De la Torre, 639 F.2d 245, 249 (5th Cir. 1981).
In determining whether severance under Rule 14 is warranted, the Court balances the public's interest in the efficient and economic administration of justice against the prejudice likely to be suffered by the defendant in a joint trial. United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1016 (5th Cir. 1981). A motion for severance should be granted "only if the [movant] an demonstrate compelling prejudice which could not be alleviated by the trial court and that he was unable to obtain a fair trial." United States v. DeSimone, 660 F.2d 532, 539 (5th Cir. 1981); see also 1 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 223 (1982) (arguing that the defendant has the burden of making a "strong showing of prejudice" that would result from joinder in order to obtain the relief of severance provided by Rule 14).
Naturally, any joint trial of alleged co-conspirators runs the risk that the unsavory character of some defendants will "spillover" to other co-defendants. However, the potential that "guilt by association" or that "spillover" from evidence against more culpable defend ants will prejudice less culpable defendants does not automatically warrant severance. As the Fifth Circuit noted:
The Constitution does not guarantee a trial free from the burdens that inevitably accompany a [joint] trial; rather, it requires that the potential for transferability of guilt be minimized to the extent possible in order to "individualize each defendant in his relation to the mass.DeSimone, 660 F.2d at 542 (citation omitted). If necessary to accomplish this task, the court will give the appropriate limiting instructions to prevent any potential prejudice to the defendant that may be caused by a joint trial. It is only when the prejudice caused by a joint trial cannot be mitigated by the curative powers of cautionary or limiting instructions that severance is warranted. Phillips, 664 F.2d at 1017.
The Defendant argues that he will be prejudiced by the evidence of firearms possession and child pornography. This evidence relates to the co-defendants but not specifically to the conspiracy or to the Defendant himself. This prejudice, the Defendant argues, warrants severance of the Defendant Ayala-Meraz from the principal co-defendants. The Court disagrees. First, severance is not proper merely because a joint trial will involve evidence admissible against some defendants but not against others. United States v. Moser, 123 F.3d 813, 829 (5th Cir. 1997). Nor will the Court order severance merely because the Defendant's role in the conspiracy is minor compared to the principal defendants. United States v. Ramirez, 145 F.3d 345, 354 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he mere fact that a "minnow" stands trial with a "kingfish' at whom most of the government's ammunition is aimed does not necessitate separate trials."); Rocha, 916 F.2d at 227-28 (finding that the defendant was properly joined in trial for conspiracy even though count alleged only one overt act by the defendant). In addition, any unfair prejudice that might be suffered by the Defendant as a result of the admittance of evidence concerning firearms and child pornography possession is no greater than the prejudice that would affect the principal co-defendants themselves. Finally, the Court finds that any potential harm from a spillover effect can be adequately alleviated with limiting instructions. See Phillips, 664 F.2d at 1017 (emphasizing that severance is warranted only if the jury would be unable to "avoid culminating the evidence against all the defendants and make individualized guilt determinations" even with the appropriate limiting instructions).
The Defendant fails to make a compelling showing that prejudice would result from a joint trial or that limiting instructions would be ineffective in curing any such prejudice. Therefore, the Court finds that severance is not warranted.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore ordered that the Defendant's Motion for Severance is DENIED.