Opinion
Civ. No. 98-2031 (DRD)
September 26, 2000
Richard P. Hedeman, Esq., Law Offices of Richard P. Hedeman, Morristown, New Jersey, Harvey S. Mars, Esq., Leibowitz Mars, LLP, New York, NY, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
Peter S. Pearlman, Esq., Cohn, Lifland, Pearlman, Herrmann Knopf LLP Saddle Brook, New Jersey, Attorneys for Defendant Alan Traster.
OPINION
Defendant Alan Traster moves for reargument with respect to Part B of the August 17, 2000 decision denying Traster's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim of wrongful discharge under the whistleblower provision of the False Claims Act ("FCA"), 31 U.S.C. § 3720(h).
Background and Analysis
The underlying facts in this case have been set forth in the August 17, 2000 opinion and will not be repeated here.
Motions for reargument are governed by Local Civil Rule 7.1(g). On such a motion, the primary determination is whether "dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions of law" were overlooked by the court.Pelham v. United States, 661 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (D.N.J. 1987). "In ordinary circumstances, the court grants motions to reconsider its judgments very sparingly." Maldonado v. Lucca, 636 F. Supp. 621, 630 (D.N.J. 1986). In those instances where facts or cases properly presented at the time of the motion were not overlooked, the courts of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals consistently have denied relief. See Egloff v. New Jersey Air Nat'l Guard, 684 F. Supp. 1275 (D.N.J. 1988). "A party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the Court's decision." G-69 v. Degnan, 748 F. Supp. 274, 275 (D.N.J. 1990). Simple disagreement with the Court's initial decision "should be dealt with in the normal appellate process, not on a motion for reargument."Florham Park Chevron, Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 680 F. Supp. 159, 163 (D.N.J. 1988).
In the August 17, 2000 opinion, I denied Traster's motion to dismiss the claim of wrongful discharge under the FCA whistleblower provision, finding that, contrary to Traster's argument,
[t]he amended complaint provides more specific allegations which if proven at trial would permit a fact finder to conclude that Traster was Quinn's de facto employer:
i) Traster directed Quinn to issue monthly checks to Medicaid based on allegedly false reports, ¶ 33; ii) Traster is alleged to have directed Quinn to falsify weekly reports,
¶¶ 34-35; iii) Traster is claimed to have advised Quinn to cover up the budget shortfall, ¶ 44; and, iv) Traster allegedly ordered Quinn to "never go around Omnicare headquarters" and insure that "everything that happens here stays within the family." ¶ 45. If these allegations were proved, a fact finder could conclude that Traster, as a de facto employer, was liable for Quinn's termination of employment in retaliation for Quinn's fraud complaint.
August 17, 2000 opinion at 11-13.
In moving to reargue, Traster argues that the Court overlooked "a controlling legal prerequisite for application of the de facto employer doctrine — domination and control of the corporate defendant." Traster's brief at 3. In response, Quinn argues that "Traster's motion to reargue solely concerns his disagreement with this Court's holding that several factual allegations contained in the Amended Complaint support plaintiff's contention that Traster acted as his de facto employer." Quinn's brief at 4.
The whistleblower provision of FCA, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), provides as follows:
An employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment by his or her employer because of lawful acts done by the employee on behalf of the employee or others in furtherance of an action filed or to be filed under this section, including investigation for, initiation of, testimony for, or assistance in an action filed or to be filed under this section, shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee whole.
As discussed extensively in Mruz v. Caring, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 701, 709-10 (D.N.J. 1998), the plain language of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) indicates a legislative intent that the statute extend to actions taken by employers only. In order to determine whether the plaintiffs' allegations could survive a motion to dismiss, the Mruz court looked to the complaint to determine whether the plaintiffs pled facts from which to draw an inference of an employment relationship between the plaintiffs and individual — as opposed to corporate — defendants. Id.
The court concluded that with respect to one of the individual defendants, the complaint alleged that she "dominated and dictated the actions of [the defendant corporations] and their boards, and conduct[ed] the affairs of [the defendant corporations] in a way which benefitted her, inter alia, personally." Id. In light of those allegations, the court concluded that the plaintiffs may have been able to prove that the individual defendant was a de facto employer. Id. However, because the other individual defendants were alleged to have merely defined and supervised the plaintiffs' job assignments, they could not be considered de facto employers and the complaint was therefore dismissed as to them.Id.; see also Palladino v. VNA of Southern New Jersey, Inc., 68 F. Supp.2d 455, 464-65 (D.N.J. 1999) (dismissing complaint against individual defendants in absence of allegation that those defendants dominated and controlled corporate defendants).
In this case, Quinn amended his complaint to allege that "Traster dominated and controlled the operation of PNHS for his own personal benefit and was the plaintiff/realtor's de facto employer." Although some of the factual allegations in the complaint do relate to Traster's definition and supervision of Quinn's work assignments, others illustrate Traster's alleged domination and control over the defendant corporation. As in Mrutz, 991 F. Supp. at 710, there is a factual question whether Traster was Quinn's de facto employer because Traster is alleged to have dominated and controlled the defendant corporation. Therefore, it cannot be said that Quinn cannot prove that Traster was a de facto employer. That issue was considered and discussed in the August 17, 2000 opinion.
In sum, Traster has not set forth any controlling issues of fact or law that could alter the Court's decision. Traster essentially argues that the Court's evaluation of the complaint does not comport with his own. "A party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the Court's decision," G-69 v. Degnan, 748 F. Supp. at 275, and Traster has failed to do so.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Traster's motion for reargument will be denied.