Opinion
04 Civ. 964 (JGK).
September 28, 2006
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The defendant moves for reconsideration of this Court's July 10, 2006 Memorandum Opinion and Order ("Opinion") to the extent that it failed to find that alleged discriminatory acts that occurred prior to March 20, 2002 with respect to the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), and prior to February 5, 2002 with respect to the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("LAD"), N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1 et seq. could not be used to support the plaintiff's claim that the defendant failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for his disability.
The underlying details of this dispute are explained more fully in the Court's prior Opinion. See Urmey v. ATT Corp., 438 F. Supp. 2d 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
I.
The standards for granting a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Local Civil Rule 6.3 are well established and are the same as those governing former Local Civil Rule 3(j). See United States v. Letscher, 83 F. Supp. 2d 367, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (collecting cases). The moving party is required to demonstrate that the Court overlooked the controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before the Court in the underlying motion.Nakano v. Jamie Sadock, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 0515, 2000 WL 1010825, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2000); Walsh v. McGee, 918 F. Supp. 107, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Houbigant, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The rule is "narrowly construed and strictly applied so as to avoid repetitive arguments on issues that have been considered fully by the court." Walsh, 918 F.Supp. at 110; see also Nakano, 2000 WL 1010825, at *1;United States v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council of Greater N.Y., 909 F.Supp. 882, 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).II.
In this case, the defendant has failed to show that the Court overlooked controlling law or facts that were brought to the Court's attention. In its prior motion, the defendant argued that many of the allegations in the plaintiff's amended complaint were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The Court rejected that argument because even acts outside the relevant statutory period could be considered with respect to the plaintiff's hostile work environment claim. See Urmey, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 375.
In its prior motion, the defendant did not differentiate among the plaintiff's claims. The defendant did not argue that evidence of acts that occurred before the statutory cut-off date should be excluded for the denial of a reasonable accommodation claim and admissible only as to the hostile work environment claim. In its prior motion papers, the defendant failed to cite any of the relevant cases now cited in its motion for reconsideration. Thus, in the prior motion, the Court was not asked to rule that the plaintiff could not base its claim for denial of a reasonable accommodation on discrete acts that occurred outside the relevant statutory period, even though the plaintiff could base a claim for hostile work environment on those acts. The Court did not find that discrete acts of failure to accommodate that occurred before the relevant statutory period could be a basis for a claim of failure to accommodate. Therefore, there is no basis for reconsideration of the Court's prior Opinion.
The papers on the current motion also make it clear that the defendant is not arguing that the evidence at issue is not admissible at trial, because evidence of discrete acts that occurred before the statutory cut-off date would be admissible at least as to the hostile work environment claim. Nor is the defendant arguing on this motion that that the Court improperly denied a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for failure to accommodate because the claim is untimely. No such argument was made in the prior motion, nor is such an argument contained in the motion for reconsideration. Rather, the current motion appears to be an effort by the defendant to assure that the Court has not precluded any argument that the plaintiff cannot rely on discrete acts of failure to accommodate that occurred before the relevant statutory period to establish the plaintiff's claim for denial of a reasonable accommodation. Such an argument is not precluded by the Court's prior Opinion. However, in view of the admissibility of such evidence on the hostile work environment claim, there is a question as to whether such issues are more appropriately raised as issues with respect to jury instructions and motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50.
Indeed, in the defendant's reply memorandum on its motion for reconsideration, the defendant notes: "This motion is made to avoid any contention at the motion in limine stage that a request for such relief at that time is an improper attempt to seek substantive rather than evidentiary relief, which should have been sought on summary judgment." (Reply Mem. on Mot. for Recons., August 17, 2006, at 1 n. 1.)
CONCLUSION
The defendant's motion-for reconsideration is denied.
SO ORDERED.