Summary
In Upton v. State, 192 Miss. 339, 6 So.2d 129, we further upheld the rule that a conviction for rape may rest on the uncorroborated testimony of the person charging the rape, but such testimony should be construed with caution, and where there is much in the facts and circumstances to discredit her testimony, another jury should be permitted to pass thereon.
Summary of this case from Moss v. StateOpinion
No. 34513.
February 9, 1942.
1. RAPE.
A conviction for rape may rest on the uncorroborated testimony of the person raped but it should be scrutinized with caution and where there is much in the facts and circumstances in evidence to discredit her testimony, another jury should be permitted to pass thereon.
2. RAPE.
In rape prosecution, testimony of prosecutrix was such that conviction was reversed so that another jury could pass upon the evidence.
APPEAL from the circuit court of Warren county, HON. R.B. ANDERSON, Judge.
Ben Guider, Vance W. Good, and John H. Culkin, all of Vicksburg, for appellant.
It is our contention that the verdict of the jury was contrary to the law and the manifest weight of the evidence.
We respectfully submit that the testimony of the prosecutrix in this case is strange, unnatural, and contrary to human experience. That a girl should have been ravished twice, during the early part of the night, and remain with relatives, and share her bed on the same night with her cousin, not to have told of her horrible and frightful experience, until the next day, is unbelievable, in the absence of any explanation. We, therefore, contend that the appellant's guilt is not shown by this record, as the law requires, and we are convinced, beyond every reasonable doubt, that this court should interpose the protective shield of the law, to which the humblest, as well as the meanest of humankind, is entitled.
Holifield v. State, 132 Miss. 446, 96 So. 306; Monroe v. State, 71 Miss. 196, 13 So. 884; Frost v. State, 100 Miss. 796, 57 So. 221.
Greek L. Rice, Attorney-General, by Geo. H. Ethridge, Assistant Attorney-General, for appellee.
It is the settled rule in Mississippi that the testimony of a woman ravished is sufficient to sustain a conviction without corroboration. In other words, the doctrine of corroborating the testimony of a female assaulted does not exist in this state.
Sanders v. State, 150 Miss. 296, 116 So. 433; Fairley v. State, 152 Miss. 656, 120 So. 747; Reeves v. State, 159 Miss. 478, 132 So. 331; Barnes v. State, 164 Miss. 126, 143 So. 475; Lewis v. State, 183 Miss. 192, 184 So. 53.
I respectfully submit that the guilt of the appellant has been demonstrated by the evidence as far as it is possible for human evidence to demonstrate facts and the case should be affirmed.
This is an appeal from a conviction for rape in which the death penalty was imposed. The appellant's defense was an alibi and physical incapacity and his conviction rests on the uncorroborated testimony of the woman he is alleged to have raped. It is true that a conviction for rape may rest "on the uncorroborated testimony of the person raped, but it should always be scrutinized with caution; and, where there is much in the facts and circumstances in evidence to discredit her testimony" another jury should be permitted to pass thereon. Monroe v. State, 71 Miss. 196, 13 So. 884; Rawls v. State, 105 Miss. 406, 62 So. 420. Such is the case here.
Without setting forth the testimony of the prosecutrix, to do which would serve no necessary purpose, it will be sufficient to say that it does not appear therefrom that the alleged rape left any marks of violence on her person and her version of how the rape was committed sets forth at least two highly improbable accompaniments of such a crime; in addition her own admitted conduct immediately after the alleged rape suggests that she was not then conscious of such a wrong having been done her and the then conduct attributed by her to the man whom she says had just raped her suggests that he was not then conscious of having so done. Whether a "reasonable man engaged in a search for truth, uninfluenced by improper motives or consideration (e.g. passion, prejudice, or corruption)" Truckers Exchange Bank et al. v. Conroy, 190 Miss. 242, 199 So. 301, 303; Jakup v. Lewis Grocer Co. et al., 190 Miss. 444, 200 So. 597, could safely accept or act on her evidence is so doubtful that another jury should pass thereon.
Reversed and remanded.