Summary
In Upper Lakes the alleged misconduct was for the violation of an injunction directed at a group, the individuals of which were unidentified in the order.
Summary of this case from Kaminsky v. Milwaukee Acceptance Corp.Opinion
October 31, 1963 —
December 20, 1963.
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee county: ROBERT M. CURLEY, Circuit Judge. Reversed.
For the appellant there was a brief by Jeknavorian, Ludwig Shlimovitz, and oral argument by Herbert S. Bratt and Jack U. Shlimovitz, all of Milwaukee.
For the respondent there was a brief by Foley, Sammond Lardner, attorneys, and Herbert P. Wiedemann and Eugene C. Daly of counsel, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument Mr. Wiedemann.
This is a civil contempt proceeding. Some background facts are necessary to give the setting in which this proceeding occurred.
In May of 1962, one of the ships of Upper Lakes Shipping Ltd. (hereinafter "Upper Lakes"), the "Victorious," was picketed by persons other than the employees of Upper Lakes, while the ship was in the Milwaukee harbor for the purpose of loading grain. As a result of this recognition picketing, a temporary injunction was issued by the circuit court, ROBERT M. CURLEY, circuit judge, presiding. The temporary injunction, which is the subject of these proceedings, dated June 29, 1962, enjoined picketing and other specified types of interference with Upper Lakes ships by the Seafarers' International Union of Canada, Seafarers' International Union of North America, Seafarers' International Union of North America, Atlantic, Gulf, Lakes and Inland Waters District, certain individual defendants, and:
". . . each of them and their agents, servants, employees and attorneys, and all persons in active concert and participation with them who shall by personal service or otherwise receive actual notice hereof are hereby restrained and enjoined, pending the trial of this action, . . ."
The order granting this injunction was appealed to this court and in Upper Lakes Shipping, Ltd., v. Seafarers' International Union we sustained the trial court, holding that because Upper Lakes was a foreign corporation whose ships were manned by alien crew members, the controversy was not within the jurisdiction of the national labor relations board, and a state court could properly resolve the dispute. Moreover, we held that there was no "labor dispute" under the provisions of the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act, and concluded that under the common law of this jurisdiction, recognition picketing, such as was engaged in by the defendants, was for unlawful purposes and, therefore, could be properly enjoined.
(1963), 18 Wis.2d 646, 119 N.W.2d 426.
Following this decision and on April 23, 1963, members of the Milwaukee county sheriff's department encountered Jack Pearl, a member of the Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association, on a road in the vicinity of the Milwaukee dock area. According to the record, he was carrying a sign, the content of which is not known on this record. A deputy sheriff read him the injunction of June, 1962, and asked him to leave the dock area. Pearl refused; he was then served with an attachment dated November 10, 1962, commanding the sheriff to this effect:
"We command you, that, if any person shall violate said temporary injunction after having received a copy of same, you take and safely keep him, so that you may have his body before the circuit court of the county of Milwaukee aforesaid, at the court room, in Milwaukee, forthwith, then and there to answer charges against him for contempt, and of this writ make the return."
Under this attachment, Pearl was brought before the circuit court for Milwaukee county, ROBERT M. CURLEY, circuit judge, presiding, to be tried for civil contempt.
At the outset of the hearing held on the same day, Pearl's counsel objected to the jurisdiction of the court on the grounds that under the terms of ch. 295, Stats., relating to the procedure for civil contempt, and specifically secs. 295.04 and 295.05, a civil contempt proceeding must be initiated by an affidavit of the party whose interests are threatened by the alleged contemnor. Because an affidavit did not precede the attachment, Pearl's counsel argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to the merits of the dispute. Counsel also asked for a recess of this hearing in order to have time to develop the necessary evidence and legal arguments to support his contention that the injunction did not apply to Pearl as he was not a member of any of the named organizations in the original injunction.
"295.04 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE; ATTACHMENT. In a case specified in either section 295.02 or 295.03 the court may, in its discretion, and in all other cases the court shall, upon being satisfied by affidavit of the commission of the misconduct, either make an order requiring the accused party to show cause at some reasonable time to be therein specified why he should not be punished for the alleged misconduct or shall issue an attachment to arrest such party and to bring him before such court to answer for such misconduct. Such order to show cause may be made or attachment may be issued by any judge in vacation, but must be made returnable to the court."
"295.05 ORDER, WHEN MADE; ATTACHMENT. Such an order to show cause can only be made in an action or special proceeding in the same court, but it may be made either before or after the judgment in the action or the final order in the special proceeding, and is equivalent to a notice of motion; and the subsequent proceedings thereon shall be taken in the action or special proceedings as upon a motion made therein. When an attachment shall be issued it shall be deemed an original special proceeding against the accused in behalf of the state upon the relation of the complainant."
The trial court noted that Pearl had been brought before the court the previous day, April 22, 1963, for alleged picketing activities directed against an Upper Lakes ship, and that a hearing on this conduct had been set for May 2, 1963. The trial court then decided to proceed to a determination on the merits of the contempt claim based upon the conduct on April 23d, even in the absence of an affidavit by Upper Lakes setting forth the basis of the claim that Pearl's conduct on the 23d was defeating certain interests of Upper Lakes protected by the injunction of June, 1962, and in the absence of interrogatories duly filed in accordance with the provisions of sec. 295.12, Stats.
"295.12 INTERROGATORIES, FILING OF, AND PROCEEDINGS. When any defendant shall have been brought into court by virtue of an attachment, or on such writ of habeas corpus, or shall have appeared upon the return of an attachment the court shall, unless he admits the offense charged, cause interrogatories to be filed specifying the facts and circumstances alleged against the defendant and requiring his answers thereto; to which the defendant shall make written answers on oath within such reasonable time as the court shall allow; and the court may receive any affidavits or other proofs, contradictory of the answers of the defendant or in confirmation thereof, and upon the original affidavits, such answers and such subsequent proof shall determine whether the defendant has been guilty of the misconduct alleged."
At the hearing the court concluded that Pearl had violated the injunction, was guilty of civil contempt, and forthwith sentenced him to six months in confinement in the Milwaukee county jail. The court made no formal findings of fact and conclusions of law. Execution of the sentence was stayed, pending the outcome of this appeal, as taken by Pearl.
Further facts will be set forth in the opinion.
A preliminary issue presented on this appeal is raised by appellant's contention that under the doctrine of federal pre-emption, the National Labor Relations Act renders invalid a temporary injunction issued by a Wisconsin court against picketing of foreign ships operated by foreign seamen.
In Upper Lakes Shipping, Ltd., v. Seafarers' International Union, supra, we held that the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act were not applicable to a dispute in which one party was a foreign shipping corporation, flying a foreign flag on its vessels, and employing crews composed entirely of foreign seamen. We relied on Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo. In that case, the United States supreme court held that the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act did not apply to a dispute involving picketing by striking foreign seamen of a foreign-owned ship, flying a foreign flag.
(1957), 353 U.S. 138, 77 Sup. Ct. 699, 1 L.Ed.2d 709.
Two later United States supreme court cases buttress our previous ruling.
In McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional the supreme court rejected the "balancing of foreign and American contacts" rule of jurisdiction applied by the national labor relations board, and adopted the flat rule "that the jurisdictional provisions of the act [National Labor Management Relations Act] do not extend to maritime operations of foreign-flag ships employing alien seamen."
(1963), 372 U.S. 10, 83 Sup. Ct. 671, 9 L.Ed.2d 547.
Ibid, p. 13.
In Incres Steamship Co. v. Maritime Workers decided the same day, the court considered whether the National Labor Management Relations Act applied to a dispute involving recognition picketing of a foreign-flag ship employing alien seamen, by members of nonbargaining-unit unions — precisely the fact situation present in the instant case. The United States supreme court held, at page 26:
(1963), 372 U.S. 24, 83 Sup. Ct. 611, 9 L.Ed.2d 557.
"We held today in Sociedad Nacional that the Act does not apply to foreign-registered ships employing alien seamen. The holding and reasoning in that case are equally applicable to the maritime operations here, leading to the conclusion that the Act does not apply."
It is clear that under the Incres Steamship Co., Sociedad Nacional, and Benz Cases, supra, because Upper Lakes Shipping, Ltd., flies a foreign flag on its vessels, and employs alien seamen exclusively, the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act do not apply to the instant case, and the state court had jurisdiction to issue the injunction and enforce its provisions.
The crucial question on this appeal is whether the absence of an affidavit as to the commission of misconduct on the part of Pearl as specified under sec. 295.04, Stats., produced to the court prior to the service of the attachment on Pearl, renders the attachment void and destroys the jurisdiction of the court to go ahead with the civil contempt proceeding.
Civil contempt proceedings are primarily remedial in that their main purpose is to enforce a judgment entered by a court as a result of the determination of private rights. There may be imprisonment. If so, "[t]he dominant character of the imprisonment is remedial and coercive, although a punitive effect may also result." Where imprisonment is ordered in a civil contempt proceeding following a finding that the contemnor has committed an act prohibited by the court's judgment, such imprisonment serves to deter the contemnor from repeating his misconduct when he is released. Civil contempt proceedings are not instituted for the primary purpose of punishment as are criminal contempt proceedings, although as the statutes indicate, the same contempt may be punished under different procedures in civil or criminal proceedings.
State ex rel. Rodd v. Verage (1922), 177 Wis. 295, 314, 187 N.W. 830.
Chs. 256 and 295, Stats.
In the instant case a judgment had been entered for the protection of Upper Lakes by enjoining specified acts of unlawful picketing. It is conceded that no affidavit was executed specifying the commission of any act of misconduct by Pearl either before the service of the attachment on Pearl or at any time prior to or during the hearing on the alleged contempt of April 23d. Neither were any interrogatories filed as called for by sec. 295.12, Stats., supra. Thus at the time of hearing, Pearl was not informed of the precise charges against him; neither had there been any showing prior to the hearing of any adverse effect caused to Upper Lakes by the alleged misconduct of Pearl.
Upper Lakes contends that even though there was no affidavit and there were no interrogatories, the court could proceed to judgment because the defendant admitted his guilt in open court and the requirement of interrogatories was suspended by that admission. We are satisfied that an inference arises from the record that he did admit to picketing an Upper Lakes ship. However, picketing these ships not a violation of the 1962 injunction unless it is shown that the prohibitions applied to Pearl. Acknowledging that Pearl was not a member or agent of any of the named organizations, Upper Lakes argues that Pearl admitted to being a person "in active concert and participation with them." The basis for this proposition is the following colloquy between the court and Pearl:
"The Court: Let me read you this injunction again. `. . . and each of them and their agents, servants, employees and attorneys, and all persons in active concert and participation with them . . .' and so forth. A. Well, sir, I am not an attorney, and I don't presume to be able to qualify legal language, but the way it seems to me, that applies to — to the organizations listed in that —
"The Court: What about the part that says, `. . . all persons in active concert and participation with them. . . .?' A. That also applies to their servants and the individuals, members of those particular organizations."
This is no more than an argument between the court and Pearl as to the legal meaning of the injunction. Pearl did not admit to his contempt.
The record contains no affirmative evidence to prove Pearl's relationship with the specifically enjoined parties nor of any adverse effect of the misconduct on the interests of Upper Lakes.
We conclude that the interrogatory requirements of sec. 295.12, Stats., supra, applied, and in their absence the defendant was not given notice of the charges against him and of necessity could not properly prepare and assert his defense.
There is still the question, however, of whether the defendant was properly before the court in the first instance where there was no affidavit filed before the service of the attachment.
As to this point, Upper Lakes argues that the contempt occurred "in the . . . presence of the court" justifying summary punishment under sec. 295.02, Stats., and excusing the filing of an affidavit (as specified under sec. 295.04, supra) prior to the service of the attachment on Pearl. Upper Lakes relies upon the Ohio case, State ex rel. Bruns Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America:
"295.02 SUMMARY PUNISHMENT. When any such misconduct shall be committed in the immediate view and presence of the court it may be punished summarily by fine or imprisonment, or both, as hereinafter provided. For that purpose an order must be made by the court stating the facts which constituted the offense and bring the case within the provisions of this section, and particularly and specifically prescribe the punishment to be inflicted therefor." (Emphasis added.)
(1952), 63 Ohio L. Abs. 531, 540, 110 N.E.2d 162, 169.
"It is the further view of the court, pertinent to the issues hereof and the orders heretofore and herein made, that the enforcement arm of an Ohio county is not rendered impotent in the fact of a witnessed violation of an existing order of a Common Pleas Court, but on the contrary, that the County Sheriff, to whom is entrusted the preservation of the peace, is empowered not only to repel and repress any attempted violation of such order but to arrest, detain and incarcerate such person or persons as persist in seeking to do so, informing the person or persons arrested of his authority and cause of the arrest. G. C. Section 13432-5.
". . .
"This court, in the exercise of its equity powers and the authority inherent in its right to maintain order with respect to exacting compliance with an injunction order, would be derelict in its public duty if it did less than to insist upon the constitutional and legal right and obligation of its enforcement arm to effectuate its orders effectively.
"The sheriff and his deputies in acting under the direct and explicit order of the Court to exact compliance with its injunction decree thereby and in that respect represents the presence of the Court and any commission of violation in their presence is constructively in the Court's presence and may and will be hereafter dealt with and punished summarily."
The Ohio procedure was exercised pursuant to the court's general equity powers. There was no precise statutory procedure as is set forth in ch. 295, Stats., governing the entire civil contempt procedures.
Although the power of a court to enforce its orders is inherent, this does not mean the power is absolute and we have held that this power is inherent "subject to reasonable regulations by legislative power."
State ex rel. Attorney General v. Circuit Court for Eau Claire County (1897), 97 Wis. 1, 72 N.W. 193.
Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Washburn Brewing Asso. (1904), 122 Wis. 515, 518, 100 N.W. 832.
Under sec. 295.02, Stats., summary punishment for civil contempt is permissible only if the conduct occurs in the presence of the court, and in the immediate view of the court. This provision requires the court, as a person, to directly observe the conduct at issue. Alleged misconduct committed in the presence of the deputy sheriff was not committed "in the immediate view and presence of the court." The rationale underlying summary punishment for contempt requires this construction of sec. 295.02. If the conduct occurs before the court, there is no need for further fact-finding. From his own direct observations the court possesses the necessary information to proceed to judgment. However, the events occur outside his direct observation, fact-finding should follow the requirements of the adversary system. The party seeking the aid of the judicial process to reinforce his legal and economic position must present the information necessary for judgment to the court. The opposing party must be given an opportunity to test the moving party's propositions by cross-examination, and to offer proof supporting his contrary propositions. While the legislature could constitutionally combine the functions of prosecutor, judge, and jury in the court, even though some of the material propositions relating to the contempt occurred outside of the view of the court, the legislature has chosen to give full effect to the logic of the adversary system except in those situations in which the contumacious conduct occurs within the trial judge's direct observation.
Nilva v. United States (1957), 352 U.S. 385, 77 Sup. Ct. 431, 1 L.Ed.2d 415; Green v. United States (1958), 356 U.S. 165, 78 Sup. Ct. 632, 2 L.Ed.2d 672.
Despite the fact that the alleged misconduct of the defendant did not occur in the presence of the court, the court's inherent power to protect its own decrees and the private rights attendant on those decrees is so great that the failure to receive the affidavit specified by sec. 295.04, Stats., prior to the service of the attachment, does not destroy the jurisdiction of the court and we hold that Pearl was properly before the court, but the faulty procedure of the court wherein (1) the affidavit was not filed prior to the commencement of the hearing on the charges against Pearl and (2) no interrogatories were filed against Pearl to which he could respond and the issues could be formulated as contemplated by sec. 295.12 was a denial of a proper hearing to Pearl and the order should be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in order that Pearl can be given a chance to know the precise charges against him and the issues can be fully framed prior to the actual hearing which may or may not result in an adjudication of civil contempt as against Pearl.
By the Court. — Order reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.