Opinion
No. TTD CV 08 5002551 S
June 12, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This opinion addresses whether a state court has the power to nullify an act of Congress, based on unconstitutionality, and, if so, whether Congress exceeded the power conferred upon it by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United States in enacting 49 U.S.C. § 30106, known as the Graves Amendment.
The plaintiff, Unitrin Preferred Insurance Co., has filed a two-count, revised complaint asserting subrogation claims arising from a motor vehicle accident on Route 195 in Tolland on April 24, 2006. The first count alleges negligence on the part of Daniel Chapman in the operation of a vehicle which he leased from Ed Bolles Ent., Inc. The second count imputes liability for Chapman's negligence to the lessor under General Statutes § 14-154(a).
The lessor moves to strike the vicarious liability count based on 49 U.S.C. § 30106 which states that owners of motor vehicles engaged in the vehicle rental business shall bear no vicarious responsibility for injury or damages arising from the use of rental vehicles by their lessees. The enactment of the Graves Amendment on August 10, 2005, predates the filing of the present action. The plaintiff concedes that, if the Graves Amendment is valid, it preempts § 14-154(a) and the second count ought to be stricken. The plaintiff contends, however, that Congress lacked constitutional power to enact this legislation under the Commerce Clause.
I
The parties concur in their belief that a state court possesses the power to declare an act of Congress invalid under the federal constitution. The parties' consent, however, is insufficient to supply that power if it is lacking. Consequently, the court must confront the propriety of state court judicial review of the constitutionality of federal law despite the absence of opposition by any party.
The proposition that federal courts have the right to review and void federal statutes as unconstitutional requires no citation; likewise for state court power to invalidate state legislation. The circumstance of the judicial tribunal of an inferior sovereign negating the legislative action of its superior sovereign is another matter and warrants some examination, however.
Judges in Connecticut swear to "support the Constitution of the United States." General Statutes § 1-25. A state statutory oath, alone, cannot confer upon the court the power to invalidate federal legislation.
Neither can mere convenience or necessity authorize a state court to wield such power. The plaintiff notes that it has no choice but to bring this action under § 14-154(a) in a state court. While that may be true, once the lessor raised the abolition of imputed liability under state law as provided by the Graves Amendment, a federal question arose. Either party could have sought removal to federal court under federal statutory and common law. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 266-67 (1879). A case "may be truly said to arise under the Constitution or a law of the United States whenever its correct decision depends upon the right construction of either." Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. 247, 252-53 (1867).
The court must look to other sources to justify scrutiny of the legality of a federal statute by a state court.
In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816), the United States Supreme Court had previously rendered a judgment based on a treaty in a land dispute case. Despite that ruling, the Virginia Court of Appeals, in the same litigation, refused "to obey the mandate of this court, requiring the judgment . . . to be carried into due execution." Id., 323. That state's highest court had held that the United States Supreme Court exercised no appellate authority over it under the federal constitution, and, therefore, the Supremacy Clause was inapplicable. Id., 323-24. The United States Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the state court decision once again. Id., 355.
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court observed that "state courts would incidentally take cognizance of cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States." Id., 342. Further, the Supreme Court noted that, with respect to state courts, "they are expressly bound to obedience by the letter of the constitution; and if they should unintentionally transcend their authority, or misconstrue the constitution," their decisions are subject to appellate review by the Supreme Court of the United States. Id., 344 (emphasis added).
The observations in that case are important for what they do not say. The Supreme Court avoided divesting state courts of any power to construe the federal constitution, laws, and treaties. That Court recognized that state courts would occasionally need to apply federal law and the strictures of the federal constitution. When state courts do so, however, the United States Supreme Court is vested by the Constitution with appellate jurisdiction. Id., 323-24.
Mayor v. Cooper, supra, also sheds some light on this issue:
The sixth article declares that `the Constitution and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof' . . . `shall be the supreme law of the land.' The grant of the judicial power contains no such qualification. It is declared to extend `to all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States without distinction or discrimination as to the latter; nor is there any restriction as to the tribunals — State or Federal — in which they may arise. Id., 252 (emphasis in original).
Again, the Supreme Court acknowledged that federal constitutional issues will legitimately surface in state court cases.
A century ago, the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors, in two related cases, declared a federal statute unconstitutional on the basis that Congress had overstepped the bounds of the Commerce Clause. Hoxie v. New York, N.H. and H.R. Co., 82 Conn. 352 (1909); and Mondou v. New York, N.H., and H.R. Co., 82 Conn. 373 (1909), reversed in the Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912). In reversing the Connecticut Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the statute in question was constitutional. Significantly, the United States Supreme Court made no criticism of the state courts for acting ultra vires in invalidating an act of Congress. Rather, the United States Supreme Court disagreed with the state courts' reasoning as to the power afforded Congress by the Commerce Clause. In other words, the United States Supreme Court rejected the result of the Connecticut court's decision but not the process of making such a decision.
The United States is not a foreign sovereignty as regards the several States, but is a concurrent, and, within its jurisdiction, paramount sovereignty . . . The fact that a state court derives its existence and functions from the state laws is no reason why it should not afford relief [under federal statutes]; because it is subject also to the laws of the United States, and is just as much bound to recognize those as operative within the State as it is to recognize state laws. The two form one system of jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of the land for the State; and the courts of the two jurisdictions are not foreign to each other, nor to be treated by each other as such, but as courts of the same country . . . [there] is no reason why the state courts should not be open for the prosecution of rights growing out of the laws of the United States, to which their jurisdiction is competent, and not denied.
Id., 57-58.
If, as to federal law, the state and federal courts "form one system of jurisprudence," then a state court must possess the same authority as a federal court to determine that an act of Congress exceeds the legislative prerogative created by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United States, when that question arises in a case appropriately before the State court. This court concludes that it is both empowered and obligated to review the constitutionality of the Graves Amendment.
II
At least four trial courts in Connecticut have considered this issue and found the Graves Amendment to meet constitutional muster, see Avelino v. Williams, Superior Court, Hartford J.D., d.n. CV07-5010476 (May 8, 2008), Elgo, J.; Halligan v. Wallingford, Superior Court, New Haven J.D., d.n. CV07-5012748 (April 22, 2008), Corradino, J; Ruegg v. Allis, Superior Court, New Britain J.D., d.n. CV06-5001822 (November 28, 2007), Pittman, J. [44 Conn. L. Rptr. 551]; and Iljazi v. Dugre, Superior Court, Waterbury J.D., d.n. CV06-5002684 (April 12, 2007), Gilligan, J. [43 Conn. L. Rptr. 249].
The Constitution of the United States, article one, § 8, provides that Congress "shall have power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes . . ." The term "commerce" as used in the Commerce Clause "embraces commercial intercourse in all its branches, including transportation." Second Employers' Liability Cases, Supra, 46. "To regulate" means "to foster, protect, control and restrain." Id., 47.
This congressional authority over commerce "is complete in itself . . . may be exerted to its utmost extent over every part of such commerce . . ." Id. Under the Commerce Clause, Congress may validly regulate activities which "affect commerce." Perez v. U.S., 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971). It can regulate intrastate activity which has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id., 151-52.
The decision whether to invalidate an act of Congress must be the result of "great delicacy," and utilized "only . . . where the repugnancy is clear, and the conflict [with the Constitution] irreconcilable." Mayor v. Cooper, supra, 251. Every doubt is resolved in favor of constitutionality. Id. If any rational basis exists for the legislation, it must be upheld. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981).
Vicarious liability imposes financial burden on a nonnegligent party. The collective effect of such exposure increases costs for car rental businesses which impacts the cost for business travelers and tourists. Also, car rental is an adjunct to air, train, and ship travel. Affordable and available vehicle rental affects many types of transportation and categories of travelers.
It is entirely rational for Congress to recognize that many lessees will already have their own motor vehicle insurance coverage. It is completely appropriate for Congress to determine that the financial burden of motor vehicle accidents should not be borne by a nonnegligent lessor under such circumstances.
The plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Congress acted beyond its authority in enacting the Graves Amendment. The motion to strike the second count of the revised complaint is, therefore, granted.