Opinion
Civ. No. JFM-00-2838.
March 21, 2001.
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff United Steel Workers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC ("the Union") brought this suit to enforce an arbitration award under Section 301 of the National Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). Defendant Conopco, Inc. ("Conopco") filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). That motion will be denied.
Conopco was incorrectly sued as Good Humor-Breyers, Inc., which is a division of Conopco.
I.
A collective bargaining agreement existed between the Good Humor division of Conopco and its employees, who are members of the United Steel Workers Union. This collective bargaining agreement expired on August 12, 1998. During the period of time between the expiration of this agreement and the creation of a new agreement, Conopco stated that it would not arbitrate any employee grievances. The Union challenged this position with respect to twenty-five grievances that were filed in between collective bargaining agreements. The Union and Conopco agreed to arbitrate whether these twenty-five grievances were arbitrable.
On February 28, 2000, the Arbitrator, Harold Fishgold, held that twenty-four of the twenty-five grievances were not arbitrable. He also held that the grievance brought by Henry Springirth was arbitrable. Springirth was injured on the job in 1997. Conopco eventually decided that it could not accommodate Springirth's permanent impairment, and, on April 16, 1999, it terminated him. The Union's grievance on behalf of Springirth challenges his termination. Conopco has refused to follow the Arbitrator's award and arbitrate Springirth's grievance.
On September 21, 2000, more than six months after the Arbitrator's award, the Union filed the present suit to enforce the Arbitrator's award.
II.
Section 301 of the LMRA does not provide a statute of limitations. 29 U.S.C. § 185; see, e.g., Int'l Longshoremen's Assoc. v. Cataneo Inc., 990 F.2d 794, 799 (4th Cir. 1993). In order to supply a statute of limitations, courts usually look to the most analogous state statute of limitations. See, e.g., DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 (1983). In some cases, courts borrow a more appropriate federal statute of limitations. See id. (for "hybrid" section 301 and unfair representation actions, the six-month statute of limitations in 29 U.S.C. § 160 (b) applies).
The parties dispute which statute of limitations should be borrowed for this "pure" section 301 action. See Serv. Employee Int'l Union v. City Cleaning Co., 982 F.2d 89, 92 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1992) (pure section 301 suits only involve a union suing an employer for breach of a collective bargaining agreement). Conopco argues that an order enforcing an arbitrator's ruling that a grievance is arbitrable is essentially an order compelling arbitration. Therefore, Conopco argues that this court should follow other courts that have held that the federal six-month statute of limitations found at 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) applies to motions to compel arbitration. See, e.g., Teamsters Union Local 315 v. Great Western Chem. Co., 781 F.2d 764, 769 (9th Cir. 1986). The Union argues that this is simply an action to enforce an arbitration decision. Therefore, this court should follow other courts that have held that the most appropriate state statute of limitations applies to motions to enforce an arbitrator's award. See, e.g., City Cleaning, 982 F.2d at 95-96 (applying Pennsylvania's six-year statute of limitations to an action to enforce an arbitration award). The Union argues that Maryland's three-year civil-action catch-all statute of limitations is the most appropriate. Md. Code Ann. § 5-101.
I need not decide whether the present case is more like an action to compel arbitration or an action to enforce an arbitrator's award. Even if Conopco's suggested, shorter six-month statute of limitations applies, the Union is not barred from bringing this suit.
Assuming that the present action is treated like a suit to compel arbitration, the statute of limitations has not run. "[A] cause of action to compel arbitration accrues, and the limitations period begins, with the refusal to arbitrate." Int'l Longshoremen's Assoc. v. S.C. Stevedores Assoc., 170 F.3d 407, 409 (4th Cir. 1999). On February 28, 2000, the Arbitrator held that the underlying grievance in this case was arbitrable. According to the Union, whose version of the facts this court is required to credit for the present motion to dismiss, Conopco was cooperating with the Union in selecting an arbitrator to hear the grievance as late as May 2000. In other words, as of May 2000, Conopco had not refused to arbitrate, and the statute of limitations had not begun to accrue. The present action was filed on September 20, 2000, within six months of May 2000. Therefore, even under the shorter six-month statute of limitations, the Union is not barred from bringing this action.
This rule applies differently if the Union does not make a clear request for arbitration. Id. That is not the case here because obtaining an arbitrator's decision that a case is arbitrable constitutes a clear request for arbitration.
In addition, Conopco argues that the statute of limitations should accrue from the date of the Arbitrator's award because the present suit is an action to enforce an arbitration award. However, if the present case is viewed simply as an action to enforce an arbitrator's award, and not as an action to compel arbitration, then Maryland's three-year statute of limitations would apply.
III.
Conopco contests the Arbitrator's award on two grounds. First, Conopco argues that the Arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority. Conopco argues that the Arbitrator was only authorized to consider whether the new collective bargaining agreement operated retroactively to the make the disputed grievances arbitrable. Therefore, the Arbitrator violated the scope of his authority by ruling that Springirth's grievance was arbitrable under the expired collective bargaining agreement. See United States Postal Serv. v. American Postal Workers Union, 204 F.3d 523, 527-28 (4th Cir. 2000) (parties decide on the scope of an arbitrator's authority). Second, Conopco argues that the award violates federal labor law because the award obligates it to arbitrate a grievance based on events that occurred after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. See Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 501 U.S. 190, 205-206 (1991) (holding that, with certain limited exceptions, an employer is not obligated to arbitrate grievances based on events occurring after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement).
Conopco's arguments may be meritorious, however, it has waived these by failing to bring this action within thirty days of the arbitration award. Section 3-224 of the Maryland Code provides a thirty-day statute of limitations for vacating arbitration awards. See Cataneo, 990 F.2d at 799 n. 10. Because this thirty-day statute of limitations is the most analogous state statute of limitations, it applies to federal suits to vacate arbitration awards. See Cataneo, 990 F.2d at 799-800 (Maryland's thirty-day statute of limitations applies to section 301 motion to vacate grievance committee's decision). Conopco cannot assert defenses it could have raised in a timely suit to vacate the award. Id. at 800 (A party may not "sit back with impunity until faced with a motion in federal court and assert a defense it could have raised . . . in a [timely] motion to vacate."). Because approximately seven months have passed since the Arbitrator's award, Maryland's thirty-day statute of limitations bars Conopco from asserting these defenses to the Union's suit.
A separate order effecting the rulings made in this memorandum is attached.