Opinion
Case No. 2:19-cr-568-AB
2020-04-03
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Joel Antonio VILLEGAS et al., Defendants.
Anne Carley Palmer, AUSA—Office of US Attorney Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Section, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff.
Anne Carley Palmer, AUSA—Office of US Attorney Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Section, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' APPLICATIONS TO RECONSIDER DETENTION BECAUSE OF COVID-19 PANDEMIC
STEVE KIM, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE The United States has indicted Defendants Joel Antonio Villegas and William Ariel Moreno as the alleged leaders of a drug trafficking conspiracy that could lead to mandatory minimum sentences for each if convicted. (ECF 1; ECF 180 at 7-8; ECF 181 at 7-9). Trial is set to begin in July 2020. (ECF 140 at 2). Both Defendants were ordered detained pending trial because no conditions could reasonably ensure their appearances in court or the safety of the public if released. (ECF 64, 76). Defendant Villegas then unsuccessfully sought reconsideration of the Court's detention order (ECF 145), after which he unsuccessfully appealed that denial to the District Court (ECF 165). Both this Court and the District Court found that no conditions could reasonably ensure public safety if Defendant Villegas were released. (ECF 152 at 27-28; ECF 186 at 14-15). Defendant Moreno also sought reconsideration of his detention, but the Court denied that request, finding again that no conditions could reasonably ensure his court appearances and the public's safety if he were released. (ECF 102). Both Defendants now ask the Court to reconsider their detention orders again, this time because of the global COVID-19 pandemic. (ECF 171, 173, 174, 184). Their motions are DENIED without prejudice.
Reconsideration of a defendant's detention order may be granted only on new information "that has a material bearing on the issue whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of such person as required and the safety of any other person and the community." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). Yet, although some details of each Defendants' proposed bonds have changed, neither Villegas nor Moreno proffer any qualitatively different information with a "material bearing" on the only issue that matters for the Bail Reform Act—the risk of their non-appearance at court proceedings or of their danger to the community if released. So the same reasons given before for Defendants' detention orders (including the District Court's reasons for detaining Defendant Villegas) remain just as valid and decisive. That is no doubt why Defendants do not seriously, much less convincingly, argue that a material change in circumstances—relevant to the risks of their non-appearance or danger to the public—demands revisiting their detentions under section 3142(f).
Instead, Defendants maintain that the current COVID-19 pandemic is an extraordinary circumstance compelling their pretrial release because of the heightened health risks that detainees face if there is a viral outbreak in the federal prison system. (ECF 174, 184). They invoke section 3142(i), which states that the Court may "permit the temporary release" of a detained defendant if "such release [is] necessary for preparation of the person's defense or for another compelling reason." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i). As the plain language of this provision reveals, however, it applies in rare circumstances only: when release is "necessary" for defense preparations or when there is another "compelling reason." Id. And the need to prepare a defense or other compelling reason under section 3142(i) are not additional factors the Court may consider in evaluating whether to detain a defendant in the first place; those factors are in section 3142(g) only. Section 3142(i), by contrast, is entitled "Contents of detention order," so it presumes that a defendant must otherwise be detained pending trial but permits a "subsequent order" for release into the "custody of a United States marshal or another appropriate person" for the two limited reasons enumerated in that section. The release, moreover, must be "temporary" only, meaning that its length can be no longer than needed to complete the "necessary" defense preparations or to resolve the other "compelling" circumstances.
For his part, Defendant Villegas asserts that the need for trial preparations justifies his release because the current pandemic-related restrictions in prison hamper his ability to work with counsel. (ECF 174 at 10-11). But there is nothing unique about his situation—as opposed to all detained defendants who must assist in their defense within the limits of pretrial custody—that would make temporary release for trial preparations "necessary" here. If federal courts had to order temporary release just because it would aid a defendant's ability to work with counsel, the exception in section 3142(i) would swallow all detention orders. So the qualifier "necessary" here has teeth: section 3142(i) authorizes no temporary release of pretrial detainees just because it would be helpful, preferable, or even ideal for a defendant's trial preparations. At a minimum, detained defendants seeking temporary release under section 3142(i) for "necessary" trial preparations must show why less drastic measures—such as requests to continue the trial date (consistent with the Speedy Trial Act) or alternative means of communication (including in writing or by available remote conferences)—would be inadequate for their specific defense needs. Defendant Villegas has not met that burden.
That leaves, then, the "compelling reason" exception in section 3142(i) as the only other possible statutory basis for Defendants' pretrial release because of COVID-19 concerns. It is naturally Defendants' strongest argument, for there is no questioning the havoc that the global pandemic is unleashing in everyone's lives. And the Court is not blind to the risks of serious illness or death if the COVID-19 virus were to spread uncontrollably in prisons across the nation. But nothing in the Bail Reform Act, including section 3142(i), authorizes pretrial release under these generic pandemic conditions that—while undeniably grave—apply across the board to every pretrial detainee in federal custody. See , e.g. , United States v. Penaloza , 2020 WL 1555064, at *2, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56569, at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2020) ("[T]he mere presence of the [Covid-19] virus, even in the detention setting, does not automatically translate to the release of a person accused."); United States v. Lee , 2020 WL 1540207, at *3, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55232, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2020) ("[T]he COVID-19 pandemic cannot be the sole basis for releasing a defendant from custody pending trial; the Court must still consider the Section 3142(g) factors.").
In fact, the dangers that Defendants cite are not unique to prisons, much less to them individually, but affect the entire human population. (ECF 180 at 14, 22; ECF 181 at 6, 17). No doubt that certain conditions are naturally more conducive to the transmission of viruses, but in that sense prisons are no different than other physically confined spaces like nursing homes, public schools, or homeless shelters. See United States v. Loveings , 2020 WL 1501859, at *3, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54607, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2020) (possibility of exposure to COVID-19 "exists anywhere in the community"). So the "mere possibility of [a COVID-19] outbreak at [Defendants'] facility does not equate to a compelling enough reason to justify [their] release" under section 3142(i). United States v. Smoot , 2020 WL 1501810, at *3, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55382, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2020). No matter the heightened risks intrinsic to prison populations as a matter of public health, the Court has no authority as a matter of law to permit pretrial release under the Bail Reform Act just because of the current pandemic's generic risks. Accord United States v. Clark , 448 F.Supp.3d 1152, 1156–57, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51390, at *4 (D. Kan. Mar. 25, 2020) (requiring individualized determination whether COVID-19 presents compelling reason for release based on original grounds for detention, specificity of professed concerns, and particularized finding whether release could exacerbate risks to defendant or public). Yet generalized fears and speculative concerns are essentially all that Defendants point to here, which do not add up to "compelling reasons" justifying their temporary release under section 3142(i).
Finally, Defendant Villegas argues that his pretrial detention in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic violates the Constitution. (ECF 174 at 11-12). Under the Due Process Clause, pretrial detainees indeed have a right against prison conditions that amount to "punishment" since they have not been convicted. Bell v. Wolfish , 441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). But pretrial detention for purposes of securing a defendant's appearance or protecting the public is not punitive under the Due Process Clause. See United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 748, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). And even if pretrial detention during a worldwide pandemic seems punitive in the lay sense, that restriction cannot violate due process unless there is also an express intent to punish with no rational relationship to legitimate government interests. See Bell , 441 U.S. at 538-39, 99 S.Ct. 1861. But there is no evidence of such arbitrary purpose and punitive intent here. To the contrary, the Bureau of Prisons is by all objective accounts responding to the COVID-19 pandemic as any reasonable observer could expect under the circumstances to prevent infectious outbreak, protect inmate health, and preserve internal order—all legitimate government aims. (ECF 180 at 9-13; ECF 180-1 at 2-6; ECF 181 at 11-15; ECF 181-1, 181-2, 181-3). Whether that response will be enough as a matter of public health policy is surely debatable, but it is not the measure of a constitutional due process violation. See , e.g. , United States v. Cox , 449 F.Supp.3d 958, 966 (D. Nev. Mar. 27, 2020) (finding no Fifth Amendment due process violation in detaining defendants pretrial under the Bail Reform Act despite COVID-19 health risks).
Nor is it something that the Court can prejudge amid the current national health crisis. Judges cannot responsibly—much less legally—make what would essentially be momentous public health decisions for prisons under the pretense of individual pretrial release determinations. Defendants' unbounded argument for pretrial release because of the COVID-19 pandemic, if accepted and extended to its logical conclusion, would mean the release—en masse—of all federal pretrial detainees. So it is up to Congress, not the courts, to legislate in the current crisis a comprehensive solution for the federal prison system at large. Luckily, there are signs of action. See CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 12003(b)(2) (2020) (lengthening the most time a prisoner may be placed in prerelease home confinement under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2) ). But, meanwhile, because Defendants Villegas and Moreno proffer no facts suggesting that the health risks they face in pretrial detention are any worse or different than those faced categorically by all pretrial detainees, their individual applications for reconsideration of the Court's detention orders must be DENIED.