Opinion
23-1169
05-23-2023
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. DWAYNE MANUEL VILLAFUERTE, Defendant-Appellant.
(D.C. No. 1:22-CR-00222-DDD-1) (D. Colo.)
Before TYMKOVICH, BRISCOE, and EID, Circuit Judges.
ORDER
In the criminal prosecution underlying this appeal, pro se defendant-appellant Dwayne Manuel Villafuerte filed a pro se Motion to Object to This Court's Order, Denying Defendant's Pending Motions. [See ECF No. 141]. Upon consideration of that document (which the district court construed as a notice of interlocutory appeal), the district court docket, and the applicable law, the court dismisses this appeal for the reasons set forth below.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 requires that any notice of appeal must "designate the judgment-or the appealable order-from which the appeal is taken." Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). The purpose of Rule 3 is to provide "sufficient notice to other parties and the courts." See Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992). Although we "liberally construe" Rule 3's requirements, see id., Mr. Villafuerte's Motion to Object does not designate a particular order or orders he intends to appeal. [ECF No. 141 (noting Mr. Villafuerte's general dissatisfaction with the district court proceedings)]. His appeal is subject to dismissal on that basis alone.
There is, however, a more significant jurisdictional issue with Mr. Villafuerte's appeal: the district court's orders to date are not final or otherwise appealable while the district court case remains pending.
This court's appellate jurisdiction is generally limited to review of final decisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In criminal cases, this "final judgment rule" "generally requires that a defendant await conviction and sentencing before raising an appeal," United States v. Perea, 977 F.3d 1297, 1299 (10th Cir. 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and allows for interlocutory appeal "only when the asserted right cannot be vindicated after trial." See United States v. Tucker, 745 F.3d 1054, 1064-65 (10th Cir. 2014) (discussing cases permitting interlocutory review); see also DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126 (1962) ("the delays and disruptions attendant upon intermediate appeal are especially inimical to the effective and fair administration of the criminal law").
Mr. Villafuerte-as the proponent of this court's jurisdiction-has the burden to establish the court's jurisdiction over this appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Ceballos-Martinez, 387 F.3d 1140, 1143 (10th Cir. 2004). Here, however, Mr. Villafuerte does not seek review of a final judgment and any issues with the district court's orders to date can be "vindicated after trial." See Tucker, 745 F.3d at 1064-65. Thus, § 1291 does not provide this court with jurisdiction over the appeal.
Nor does the collateral order doctrine reach any order that would potentially be at issue here. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949) (recognizing the appealability of certain non-final orders). To establish jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine, Mr. Villafuerte would need to demonstrate that the order on appeal satisfies each of three conditions: it must "[1] . . . conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." United States v. Quaintance, 523 F.3d 1144, 1146 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Coopers &Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)); see also Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 265 (1984) ("Because of the compelling interest in prompt trials, the [Supreme] Court has interpreted the requirements of the collateral-order exception to the final judgment rule with the utmost strictness in criminal cases."). The orders the district court has entered to date do not meet these criteria.
For the foregoing reasons, any order Mr. Villafuerte seeks to appeal at this time is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, this court is without jurisdiction to hear his appeal. See Tucker, 745 F.3d at 1064-65.
APPEAL DISMISSED.