Opinion
99 Cr. 807 (RWS)
April 24, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
By motion filed on November 2, 1999, defendant Luis Taveras ("Taveras") moved to suppress various post-arrest statements made during the course of a custodial interrogation by federal agents. A hearing was held on December 13, 1999, during which testimony from special agents Kenneth Hosey ("Hosey"), Jane Rhodes ("Rhodes"), and Joan Buckley ("Buckley") was heard. After the receipt of several post-hearing submissions from both the Government and Taveras, oral argument was heard on the matter on March 15, 2000, at which time the motion was deemed fully submitted.
Discussion
Taveras has challenged the admissibility of various statements made to law enforcement agents in the wake of his arrest on June 23, 1999, contending that the Government has failed to carry its burden of establishing that any relinquishment of his rights was voluntary, and that Taveras had a full awareness of both the rights being waived and the consequences of such waiver. More specifically, Taveras presses that Agent Mosey's failure to read Taveras an explicit "Waiver of Rights" provision and to. obtain Taveras signature thereto calls into question the admissibility of Taveras' post-arrest statements.
To prove a valid waiver, the Government must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the relinquishment of Taveras' rights was voluntary, and (2) that Taveras had a full awareness of the rights being waived and of the consequences of waiver. See United States v. Male Juvenile, 121 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Belizaire, No. 97 Cr. 507 (DAB), 1998 WL 283372, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 1, 1998)
The evidence presented at the December 13th hearing established that, after his arrest and processing at the FBI's offices in New York, Taveras was both informed of the charges against him and read his Miranda rights by Agent Mosey. In doing so, Hosey read Taveras his rights as listed in FBI form 395. At the bottom of that form, Agent Hosey wrote "I have read understand my rights," and placed an "X" beneath that sentence. Taveras signed the handwritten entry, and Agents Rhodes and Hosey signed the form in turn as witnesses.
However, while Taveras' attention was directed to the passage in which he affirmed his understanding of the rights he had been read, Agent Mosey did not read that portion of the form entitled "Waiver of Rights," which stated: "I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. At this time, I am willing to answer questions without a lawyer present."
It is this failure to read Taveras the explicit waiver of rights passage and to obtain his signature thereto that Taveras has seized upon in the present motion, claiming that the failure to read the waiver section of the form was a violation of FBI policy, that the Government cannot meet its burden of proving a valid waiver when it deliberately creates a "gap" in the record evidence of such waiver, and that Agent Mosey's decision not to solicit an explicit waiver raises significant questions about the voluntariness of Taveras' waiver.
However, Taveras has neither challenged that he was read his rights by Agent Mosey nor contended that he did not understand those rights when they were read to him. Me acknowledges in his papers that he was read those rights, and while he now takes issue with Agent Mosey's use of the FBI's waiver of rights form, he explicitly acknowledged his understanding of those rights by signing the handwritten entry added to the form by Mosey.
Given the record developed at the hearing, waiver may be inferred from his provision of information in spite of his awareness of his right to remain silent and seek the assistance of counsel. See Belizaire, 1998 WL 283372, at *3 ("An explicit statement of waiver is not necessary to demonstrate that a defendant is voluntarily and knowingly waiving the right to remain silent."); see also United States v. Spencer, 995 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1993) (upholding finding of knowing and voluntary waiver where defendant admitted that he was presented with form describing his rights, and that he understood those rights, despite his refusal to sign explicit waiver form);United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 972-73 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding district court's determination that defendant waived his rights, despite refusal to sign explicit waiver form); United States v. Scarpa, 897 F.2d 63, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1990) ("While merely answering questions after Miranda warnings have been given does not necessarily constitute a waiver, no express statement of waiver is required."); United States v. Boston, 508 F.2d 1171, 1175 (2d Cir. 1974) ("Boston does not urge that the absence of a written waiver automatically bars the admission of a confession. It is clear, in any event, that a written waiver is not required.")
Under such circumstances, Taveras' challenge to the admissibility of his post-arrest statements fails. While it is true that the signing of an explicit waiver of rights form may be of not insignificant evidentiary value, and while there is a suggestion from the record that Agent Mosey's particular use of the waiver of rights form was craftily designed to encourage cooperation, nothing in the record before the Court calls into question Taveras' essential understanding or waiver of his rights. After all, the signing of an explicit waiver form is not a constitutional prerequisite, and one can be deemed to have waived his rights to remain silent in the face of interrogation without ever having been provided with such a form. The Government has successfully carried its burden of demonstrating voluntary waiver.
As nothing in the present record gives the Court cause to suppress Taveras' post-arrest statements, Taveras' motion is therefore denied.
It is so ordered.
New York, NY Apri1 20, 2000 ROBERT W. SWEET U.S.D.J.