Opinion
1:15-CR-00142 EAW
12-17-2020
UNITED STATES of America, v. Glenn STACHARCZYK, Defendant.
Brendan T. Cullinane, Joseph M. Tripi, Richard D. Kaufman, U.S. Attorney's Office, Buffalo, NY, Marianne Shelvey, U.S. Department of Justice/Organized Crime Section, Washington, DC, for United States of America.
Brendan T. Cullinane, Joseph M. Tripi, Richard D. Kaufman, U.S. Attorney's Office, Buffalo, NY, Marianne Shelvey, U.S. Department of Justice/Organized Crime Section, Washington, DC, for United States of America.
DECISION AND ORDER
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court is a motion filed by defendant Glenn Stacharczyk (hereinafter "Defendant") for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Dkt. 1919). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's request is denied.
II. BACKGROUND
Defendant, who was convicted pursuant to a plea agreement of a RICO conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) related to the Kingsmen Motorcycle Club, was sentenced by this Court on December 12, 2018, to 57 months in prison to be followed by three years supervised release, representing a sentence at the lowest end of the Guidelines range. (Dkt. 1496). Defendant contends that compassionate release is warranted because of the COVID-19 pandemic, his pre-existing medical conditions ("obesity, type II diabetes, hypertension, a history of smoking and dyslipidemia"), and based on a consideration of the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). (Dkt. 1919). Defendant states in his motion that he is currently housed at Federal Correctional Institution Allenwood (Low) ("FCI Allenwood (Low)") with a projected release date in July 2022 (id. at 1), although the government identifies Defendant's projected release date as December 19, 2022 (Dkt. 1926 at 3). According to statistics published on a Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") website, FCI Allenwood (Low) currently has 43 inmates and 9 staff members who have tested positive for the virus causing COVID-19, with 21 inmates and 2 staff who have recovered. See COVID-19: Coronavirus , Fed. Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2020).
The government has opposed Defendant's motion, arguing that he has failed to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling circumstances, and the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) do not justify a sentence reduction. (Dkt. 1926). In addition, the United States Probation Department ("USPO") submitted a memorandum dated December 3, 2020, wherein it indicates its opposition to Defendant's motion. (Dkt. 1927).
III. LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS
"A court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except pursuant to statute." United States v. Gotti , 433 F. Supp. 3d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). The compassionate release statute, as amended by the First Step Act, is such a statutory exception, and provides as follows:
The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that ... the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that ... extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction ... and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Relief is appropriate pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A) when the following conditions are met: (1) the exhaustion requirement of the statute is satisfied; (2) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a reduction of the prison sentence; and (3) the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) support modification of the prison term.
The Second Circuit has held that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 Application Note 1(D) does not apply to compassionate release motions brought directly to the court, and therefore a court is not constrained by the Sentencing Guideline's policy statements as to what constitutes "extraordinary and compelling." United States v. Brooker , 976 F.3d 228, 236 (2d Cir. 2020).
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The government does not oppose Defendant's application on exhaustion grounds, as he filed a request with the Warden at FCI Allenwood (Low) for release and that request was denied on July 22, 2020. (Dkt. 1926 at 3). See United States v. Wen , 454 F. Supp. 3d 187, 194 (W.D.N.Y. 2020) (as a claim-processing rule, § 3582(c)(1)(A) ’s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional and thus subject to the doctrines of waiver and equitable estoppel). As a result, the exhaustion requirements of the statute do not operate to bar the Court's consideration of the motion.
However, the Court concludes that Defendant has failed to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction, and the § 3553(a) factors do not support a sentence reduction. Although Defendant has certain medical conditions that appear to place him at increased risk of serious illness in the event that he contracts the virus causing COVID-19, he has not established that he is receiving inadequate medical care at FCI Allenwood (Low) or that the facility would not be equipped to treat him if he became ill. The Court acknowledges that prison settings present challenges for preventing the spread of this virus, and the Court doubts the accuracy of the government's contention that "FCI Allenwood Low is likely the safest place for this defendant right now." (Dkt. 1926 at 13). But simply being in a prison setting with medical conditions that place an individual at increased risk for serious illness from COVID-19 do not, in the Court's view, constitute the type of "extraordinary and compelling reasons" justifying a reduction in a prison sentence. More is needed to meet that standard, and Defendant has not met it here.
In addition, the § 3553(a) factors counsel against granting Defendant's motion. As detailed in the government's opposition papers (Dkt. 1926 at 14-15), Defendant played an integral role in a violent motorcycle club that trafficked in drugs and firearms. Defendant was one of over twenty defendants who were sentenced by the undersigned as a result of their crimes associated with this RICO conspiracy, and the Court concluded at the time of sentencing—and continues to believe—that a 57-month prison sentence was warranted in Defendant's case, based on a consideration of all the § 3553(a) factors and mindful of imposing a sentence that was sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with those goals. Specifically considering the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of Defendant, the need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, the need to protect the public from further crimes of Defendant, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct, the Court concludes that releasing Defendant at this point, notwithstanding his pre-existing medical conditions and the COVID-19 pandemic, would seriously undermine the goals of sentencing as reflected by the Court's original sentence. See United States v. Roney , 833 F. App'x 850, 854, No. 20-1834 (2d Cir. Nov. 2, 2020) ("[C]ourts regularly consider whether compassionate release would be consistent with § 3553(a) by considering how early release would impact the aims of the original sentence.").
In sum, the Court concludes that a reduction of Defendant's prison sentence is not justified.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (Dkt. 1919) is denied.
SO ORDERED.