Opinion
4:23-CR-40087-KES
11-14-2023
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. OWEN ZACHARY SIMONSON, Defendant.
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS
KAREN E. SCHREIER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Defendant, Owen Zachary Simonson, moves to dismiss the indictment in the above-entitled case that charges him with possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8). Dockets 1, 19. Simonson contends that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in its recent decision New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S.Ct. 2111 (2022). Docket 20 at 1. The government objects, arguing that the Eighth Circuit has already upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) under Bruen in United States v. Jackson, 69 F.4th 495, 501-506 (8th Cir. 2023).
LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Second Amendment of the United States Constitution was construed during the twentieth-century as a right held by individuals in the militia and not an everday individual. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178-79 (1939). In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), however, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution “conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (emphasis added). McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill. then incorporated that holding to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. See 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).
Following the Supreme Court's decisions in Heller and McDonald, the Courts of Appeals developed a two-step test to evaluate Second Amendment claims. Bruen, 142 S.Ct. at 2125-26 (2022). “At the first step, the government may justify its regulation by establishing that the challenged law regulates activity falling outside the scope of the right as originally understood[.]” Id. at 2126 (citations omitted). Activity that falls beyond the original scope of the amendment was “categorically unprotected[,]” and the analysis could thus end. Id. If the activity was protected, the court proceeded to the second step, where “courts often analyze[d] how close the law comes to the core of the Second Amendment right and the severity of the law's burden on that right.” Id. (citations omitted). Most courts considered the right to possess arms for selfprotection in the home to be the core of the right. See Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 671 (1st Cir. 2018).
In Bruen, the Supreme Court examined the test developed after Heller and found that it had “one step too many.” 142 S.Ct. at 2127. According to the test articulated in Bruen,
[w]hen the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that
it is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the individual's conduct falls outside the Second Amendments ‘unqualified command.'Id. at 2129-30 (quoting Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49, n. 10 (1961)).
The decision in Bruen has prompted significant litigation concerning existing gun laws, including numerous challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). See, e.g., United States v. Rahimi, 61 F.4th 443, 448 (5th Cir. 2023) (finding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) unconstitutional); United States v. Ryno, --- F.Supp.3d ---, 2023 WL 3736420, at *7 (D. Alaska May 31, 2023) (upholding constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)). The Eighth Circuit recently addressed a constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1) in United States v. Jackson and, applying the Bruen framework, found that the section was constitutional. See Jackson, 69 F.4th at 501-506. The Jackson court analyzed the language in both Heller and Bruen, highlighting the ways in which the Supreme Court upheld the validity of felon in possession bans. Id. at 501-502. Jackson affirmed that “[g]iven these assurances by the Supreme Court, and the history that supports them, [the Eighth Circuit] conclude[s] that there is no need for felony-by-felony litigation regarding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).” Id. at 502.
DISCUSSION
As Simonson acknowledges, “the Eighth Circuit has recently ruled that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is constitutional and not subject to either facial or ‘as applied' challenges.” Docket 20 at 1. Though other circuit courts have ruled differently, see Range v. Att'y Gen. of United States, 69 F.4th 96, 106 (3d Cir. 2023) (finding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied to petitioner), this court remains bound by the precedent of the Eighth Circuit. See M.M. ex rel. L.R. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 512 F.3d 455, 459 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting an Eighth Circuit decision “is controlling until overruled by [the] court en banc, by the Supreme Court, or by Congress.”) Thus, this court must deny Simonson's constitutional challenge.
CONCLUSION
Because the Eighth Circuit has already held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the standard articulated in Bruen and because Simonson's argument rests entirely on a contrary interpretation of law, it is
ORDERED that Simonson's motion to dismiss the Indictment (Docket 19) is denied.