Opinion
1:18-CR-00013 EAW
2021-05-04
UNITED STATES of America, v. Jose Luis SANTIAGO-ALMONTE, Defendant.
Michael Jason Adler, Government Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, Buffalo, NY, for United States of America. James P. Harrington, Jesse Colton Pyle, Harrington and Mahoney, Buffalo, NY, for Defendant.
Michael Jason Adler, Government Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, Buffalo, NY, for United States of America.
James P. Harrington, Jesse Colton Pyle, Harrington and Mahoney, Buffalo, NY, for Defendant.
DECISION AND ORDER
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge
Defendant Jose Luis Santiago-Almonte (hereinafter "Defendant") has filed a pro se motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Dkt. 195). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Pursuant to the terms and conditions of a plea agreement, on June 20, 2019, Defendant waived indictment and pleaded guilty to a one-count superseding information charging attempted possession of 500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. (Dkt. 122; Dkt. 123; Dkt. 124; Dkt. 125). On June 23, 2020, the undersigned sentenced Defendant to a below-Guidelines sentence of twelve months and one day in prison. (Dkt. 177; Dkt. 183).
With an offense level of 25 and a criminal history category of I, the Sentencing Guidelines recommended a prison sentence of 57 to 71 months. (Dkt. 184 at 1).
Defendant is currently housed at Federal Correctional Institution Fort Dix ("FCI Fort Dix") in New Jersey with a scheduled release date of July 30, 2021. See Find an Inmate , Fed. Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited May 4, 2021). According to the BOP's website tracking COVID-19 cases in its facilities, one inmate at FCI Fort Dix is currently testing positive for COVID-19. See COVID-19: Coronavirus , Fed. Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/ (last visited May 4, 2021).
Defendant asks that this Court reduce his sentence to time served or alternatively modify his term of supervised release to home confinement because of the extraordinary and compelling circumstances that exist due to the COVID-19 pandemic. (Dkt. 195 at 1). Defendant states that he is 41 years old, and suffers from obesity, vitiligo, and Type 2 diabetes, and that his motion should be granted because of those conditions, combined with his inability to obtain proper medical care and the "out-of-control outbreak of the Coronavirus at FCI Fort Dix". (Id. ). In another portion of his motion, Defendant contends that he suffers from "poorly controlled hypertension." (Id. at 7).
The government opposes Defendant's motion on two grounds. First, the government contends that Defendant has failed to establish extraordinary and compelling circumstances. (Dkt. 197 at 5-14). In making that argument, the government submits that Defendant's medical records only support a conclusion that he suffers from Type 2 diabetes, and furthermore, while initially refusing a COVID-19 vaccine in January 2021, Defendant has now been fully vaccinated. (Id. ). The government also contends that the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) require denial of the motion. (Id. at 14-15).
The government contends that Defendant suffers from Type I diabetes, but according to Defendant, he suffers from Type 2 diabetes.
Also submitted in connection with Defendant's motion is a memorandum from the United States Probation Office ("USPO") dated April 19, 2021. (Dkt. 199). The USPO notes, among other things, that Defendant was denied entrance to the Residential Reentry Center because of an open felony charge incurred while on pretrial supervision. (Id. at 2). The USPO opposes Defendant's motion, noting the significant reduction from the recommended Guidelines with the Court's initial sentence and that "any further departure will diminish what Your Honor's sentence is trying to accomplish under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)." (Id. ).
II. LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS
"A court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except pursuant to statute." United States v. Gotti , 433 F. Supp. 3d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). The compassionate release statute, as amended by the First Step Act, is such a statutory exception, and provides as follows:
The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that ... the court, upon motion of the Director of the [BOP] ..., or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] ... to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that ... extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction ... and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Relief is appropriate pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A) when the following conditions are met: (1) the exhaustion requirement of the statute is satisfied; (2) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a reduction of the prison sentence; and (3) the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) support modification of the prison term. "The defendant carries the burden of showing that he or she is entitled to a sentence reduction under the statute." United States v. Roney , No. 10-CR-130S, 2020 WL 2846946, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. June 2, 2020), aff'd , 833 F. App'x 850 (2d Cir. 2020). Defendant states in his motion that he submitted a request for compassionate release to the warden at FCI Fort Dix on January 12, 2021, and to date, he has received no response. (Dkt. 195 at 2). The government disputes the date that Defendant submitted the request, but acknowledges that Defendant has exhausted his administrative remedies. (Dkt. 197 at 5). Thus, the administrative exhaustion requirement does not bar the Court's consideration of Defendant's request.
Although the statute references the Sentencing Commission's policy statements, the Second Circuit has held that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 Application Note 1(D) does not apply to compassionate release motions brought directly to the court, and therefore a court is not constrained by the Sentencing Guideline's policy statements as to what constitutes "extraordinary and compelling." United States v. Brooker , 976 F.3d 228, 236 (2d Cir. 2020).
With respect to the merits of Defendant's application, the Court concludes that Defendant is not entitled to the relief he seeks. While Defendant's medical condition increases his risk of serious illness if he contracts the virus causing COVID-19, and while prison settings present challenges for preventing the spread of COVID-19, the conditions at FCI Fort Dix now appear well-controlled in terms of COVID-19, despite earlier outbreaks of the virus. Moreover, as the government points out, Defendant has now been fully vaccinated, which should minimize any risk that he faces from COVID-19. Thus, the Court concludes that Defendant has failed to establish extraordinary and compelling circumstances justifying the grant of compassionate release.
In addition, Defendant was involved in a serious crime, and his criminal record is not unblemished, including the felony charge that remains pending from the time Defendant was on pretrial release. The Court already afforded Defendant a significant reduction from the recommended Guidelines sentence when it initially sentenced him, and the COVID-19 pandemic existed at the time the Court imposed its initial sentence and, thus, was accounted for in the Court's initial sentence. As a result, granting compassionate release would not be consistent with the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and it would seriously undermine the fairness and purpose of the original sentence.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) is denied.
SO ORDERED.